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This thesis offers, in response to the challenges of a globalised world, a coherent 
systematisation of the Brazilian model of precedents as a new hybrid between civil 
and common law. Conceptual and broadly comparative (constantly drawing 
knowledge from the English common law), it presents how precedents are 
understood and how they operate in Brazil. This thesis systematises the concepts 
and establishes a consistent vocabulary for the categories of creativeness, 
declarativeness, persuasiveness and bindingness of precedents, which can then be 
comprehended by both Brazilian and English audiences. In addition, it creates a 
unique reference to be applied in the comparative study throughout the thesis. This 
thesis also analyses the practical uses of precedents in Brazil and then compares 
them to the English model. It discusses how judges in Brazil deal with concepts such 
as the ratio decidendi, the distinguishing and the overruling of precedents. As the 
last few decades in Brazil have seen a clear increase in the use of precedents in 
terms of frequency, creativity and bindingness, this thesis offers a comprehensive 
taxonomy of the several Brazilian binding precedents that are expected to 
progressively transform the Brazilian approach to precedents into an example of a 
hybrid model. This thesis focuses on the new and very important Supreme Court’s 
Binding Súmula (a category of binding precedent introduced into Brazilian law by 
Amendment 45 to the Federal Constitution, passed in 2004), analysing its origins, 
features and significance under a dual perspective that could be interesting for both 
common and civil law traditions. This thesis finally focuses on some of the 
advantages of the doctrine of stare decisis – stability, certainty of law, equality, time-
saving –, as positive criteria of functionality, in order to analyse improvements in the 
deliverance of justice in Brazil since the adoption of a more comprehensive approach 
to binding precedents. The last chapter also presents and debates some strengths of 
the new Brazilian approach to precedents, emphasising that the Brazilian mix of civil 
and common law elements has proven to be a very synergic model. Identifying many 
of the problems of Western precedent models as well as suggesting some solutions, 
this thesis aims to be used as a tool for both researchers and those dealing with law 
reform and to contribute to the development of the theory of precedents in both civil 
and common law legal worlds.  
 
 
Keywords: 1 – Conceptualism. 2 - Comparative Law. 3 - Common Law. 4 - Civil Law. 
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1.1 Measuring the Importance of Precedents from a Mixed Common and Civil 
Law Perspective  
 
(i) The Importance of Studying Precedents 
 
The aim of this thesis is to offer, in response to the challenges of a globalised 
world, a coherent systematisation of the Brazilian model of precedents (a new hybrid 
between civil and common law?), conceptual and broadly comparative (mainly with 
the English model), presenting how precedents are understood and how they 
operate in that country.  
This thesis assumes that the theory of precedent is, for many reasons, a very 
controversial theme which deserves to be a subject of thought under a unified 
perspective of both common and civil law families.1,2 The first reason is that judicial 
precedents3,4 are found in any legal system. In any country, independently of its 
                                                 
1
 According to Cotterrell, the idea of legal families “suggests that different state legal systems, or 
central elements of the legal doctrine within them (including styles of developing and presenting 
doctrine, and of legal reasoning and interpretation), can be treated as having sufficient similarity to 
make comparison fruitful. At the same time, it suggests that these comparable systems or system 
elements treated as a group can be distinguished from others treated (...)”. See Cotterrell, Roger. The 
Concept of Legal Culture. In Nelken, David (ed). Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot/England, 
Dartmouth, 1997), p. 13. 
2
 The legal world is not seen here as a simple division between the common law and civil law 
traditions as if nothing else exists. There are other traditions beyond the Western world, although 
there are also considerable disagreements about the number and their frontiers. See Edge, Ian. 
Comparative Law in Global Perspective. In Edge, Ian (ed). Comparative Law in Global Perspective 
(Ardsley/NY, Transnational Publishers Inc., 2000), p. 7. However, in enterprises like this, it is 
imperative to not lose the focus and therefore the focus is based on the Western tradition. 
3
 The meaning of the term “precedent” in a non-legal perspective is easily understandable. According 
to The Oxford English Dictionary, precedent means “a thing or person that precedes or goes before 
another; that which has been mentioned just before; that which precedes in time; something occurring 
before; an antecedent”. See Oxford University. The Oxford English Dictionary, vol 8 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 1243. 
4
 In legal terms, a “precedent” can be defined as “an adjudged case or decision of a court, considered 
as furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising or a similar 
question of law”. See Black, Henry Campbell. Black’s Law Dictionary (6
th
 ed, St. Paul, West 
Publishing, 1990), p. 1176. Focusing on the question of persuasiveness or bindingness of judicial 
precedents, Walker defines them as “previous decisions of the superior courts deemed to embody a 
principle which in a subsequent case raising the same, or a closely related, point of law, may be referred 
to as stating or containing the principle which may be at least influential on the court’s decision of it, or 





connection to a specific family of law, a decision made by a court in a previous case 
constitutes a precedent for similar cases, although its attributes, such as its creative 
or merely declarative power, its persuasive or obligatory character, shall depend on 
the contours attributed to it by the established judicial system.5 The second reason is 
the relevance of judicial precedents to the law: legislation, legal writing and law 
teaching – all have as destination the courts that pronounce the final word on what 
the law is. The third and most important reason, the topic has not yet been 
thoroughly investigated from the perspective of the civil law tradition, as opposed to 
the tradition of common law. Therefore, as far as civil law countries are concerned, 
such as the Brazilian case with its peculiar approach to precedents, there is an 
enormous field to investigate.6,7,8 
This thesis constantly highlights the Brazilian mix of civil law and common law 
elements that has proven to be a very synergic model. Being a critical evaluation on 
the frontier of common and civil law traditions, this thesis aims to present an 
innovative vision to precedents that can be useful indistinctly in all countries related 
to the Western legal tradition.9 
  
(ii) The Current Mixture of Common Law and Civil Law Traditions 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
decision considered as a source of law in later cases”. See Walker, David Maxwell. The Oxford 
Companion to Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 977.  
5
 See Summers, Robert S. Essays in Legal Theory (Dordrecht, Boston and London, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000), p. 206.   
6
 This is recognised by Bustamante as a general characteristic of the civil law countries. See 
Bustamante, Tomas da Rosa de. Uma teoria normativa do precedente judicial: o peso da 
jurisprudência na argumentação jurídica (Tese Doutorado, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de 
Janeiro – PUC/RJ, 2007), pp. 220-221. 
7
 A rare example of deep investigation of the subject based on a civil jurisdiction (specifically Russia) 
is Vereshchagin, Alexander. Judicial Law-Making in Post-Soviet Russia (Abingdon/UK, Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007). 
8
 See also Souza, Marcelo Alves Dias de. Do Precedente Judicial à Súmula Vinculante (Curitiba, 
Juruá, 2006), pp. 16-17. 
9
 The idea of west is used in this thesis, as does Goldman, to locate, culturally, the legal phenomena 
occurring in Western Europe and its colonial offspring. England, whilst geographically isolated from 
continental Europe, is, undoubtedly, part of this world. This Western law tradition includes, for 
instance, Western European countries, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and South 
America countries, like Brazil. See Goldman, David. Globalisation and the Western Legal Tradition 





It is known that common law10 and civil law11 are two of the most important 
legal traditions in the world, each with their own origin and development. However, in 
spite of having different origins, countries related to the tradition of civil law and 
countries connected to the tradition of common law have had many contacts with 
one another over the centuries. These contacts have recently become increasingly 
narrower in scope and this new reality touches on long-established truths.12,13 
While in the past, in common law tradition, decisions in cases were rarely 
influenced by statutes, today the legal system of any country related to this tradition 
demands that the judges also investigate legislation. This is constantly growing to 
include an increasing amount of new situations.14  As a matter of fact, within the 
English legal system15 as well as the systems of other countries related to the 
tradition of common law, the law is being legislatively normalised with the passage of 
time and nowadays it is difficult to find a judicial decision that makes no reference to 
statutes. There are those who say that both English and American law, for example, 
are about to enter (if they have not done so) an era of statutes, in which statutes 
have almost the same role as they have in countries that are related to the Roman-
Germanic tradition.16,17 Besides, in recent times, a series of restatements has been 
                                                 
10
 With regard to the historical patterns of the common law tradition, see Glenn, H. Patrick. Legal 
Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (2
nd
 ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 
pp. 222-270. 
11
 About the historical development of the civil law tradition, see Glenn (2004, pp. 125-169) and 
Merryman, John Henry. The Civil Law Tradition: an Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America (2
nd
 ed, Stanford/CA, Stanford University Press, 1985). 
12
 In terms of Europe, as Bustamante says (2007, p. 27), these contacts are strongly influenced by the 
reality of the European Union.  
13
 It should never be forgotten that, in both traditions, the law has gone through the influence of strong 
Christian morality. The same philosophical doctrines have been in place, since the beginning of the 
Renaissance: individualism, liberalism and the notion of subjective rights. The substance of the law – 
and here we are speaking of the conception of justice, which is in both cases the same – imposes 
similar solutions for legal questions in both families of the law. 
14
 See Gunasekara, Gehan and Sims, Alexandra. Statutory Trends and the "Genetic Modification" of 
the Common Law: Company Law as a Paradigm (2005) 26(2) Statute Law Review – Stat LR, pp. 83-
85. 
15
 The English precedent system covers England and Wales. However, just to facilitate 
understanding, the expressions “English system” and “England” will be used.    
16
 In the now distant year of 1982, from class notes taken in 1977, Guido Calabresi published “A 
Common Law for the Age of Statutes”, which won a praise of the American Bar Association, focusing 
on this issue and demonstrating that Parliaments in common law countries have more often produced 
statutes. See Calabresi, Guido. A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge/MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1982). 
17





produced that act as a type of “pre-codification” in the European style, without, 
however, official authority.18 This has occurred, in part, due to the growing number of 
precedents that make it excessively laborious to consult these sources of the law, 
and in part due to the considerable increase in the number of statutes in common 
law countries (above all in the American system).19 These restatements are seen by 
many as the predecessors of official codes that will come to exist in the future.20,21,22 
In turn, in the countries that adopt the tradition of civil law, the opposite is 
happening. It is already recognised that a system that strictly adheres to legislation, 
                                                                                                                                                        
currently, the legislation embraces almost all the areas of law so extensively, both public and private, 
that it cannot be presupposed anymore that the starting point is a judicial precedent. Commonly, the 
starting point must be the legislative politics expressed by a meaningful legal text. The courts, 
naturally, must interpret and apply the legislation. See Re, Eduard D. Stare Decisis. Revista Jurídica, 
n. 198, abr. 1994, p. p. 31. 
18
 As Jansen states: “The most important of such reference texts are the American Restatements of 
the law, which have become a major textual authority of the American common law. Today, large 
parts of the law have been restated, and the Restatements are taken by the participants to the legal 
discourse as a valid expression of the law. During the last decades, the American Restatement 
approach has also influenced the developments of transnational restatements of the law. The 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has largely applied the 
terminology and formal style of the American Restatements for its Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts; and a similar approach was taken, on the European Level, by the Lando 
Commission on European Contract Law. Today, the Restatements’ formal style is used by the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and by the Acquis Group, the main non-legislative actors in the 
current political process of unifying European private law”. See Jansen, Nils. The Making of Legal 
Authority: Non-legislative Codifications in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 50.  
19
About restatements, see also Twining, William. General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a 
Global Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 306-312. 
20
 Anticipating this, since 1999, England has a kind “Code of Civil Procedure” under the official 
denomination of Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Replacing the previous fragmentary rules, and 
departing from the long national usage, the new legislation regulates the matter in systematic and 
comprehensive terms (with the exception of the appealing and execution procedures). It is authentic 
novelty that can be considered as the greatest legislative transformation in this field for more than a 
century. 
21
 In truth, this idea of codification of the common law is not original. Two centuries ago, a political 
project of Bentham was to reform the entire legal system based on the idea of codification. Bentham, 
it is said, detested case law, because, for him, it was pure judge-made law, which represented all the 
worst that is in common law systems: a shape without defined borders. Bentham launched a very 
influential, despite unsuccessful, campaign to codify the common law, designed to reach legal 
certainty removing the judges’ discretion to create law. See Bustamante (2007, pp. 89-90). 
22
 Arguments in favour of the codification are broadly known (mainly under the civil law tradition). 
Codes can be described, as Samuel does, “as maps of law”. See Samuel, Geoffrey. Civil Codes and 
the Restructuring of the Common Law. In Fairgrieve, Duncan (ed). The Influence of the French Civil 
Code on the Common Law and Beyond (London, British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, London, 2007), p. 91. To Steiner, despite some scepticism that has been expressed, 
“codification carries with it a certain number of advantages which have been identified primarily as 
accessibility/comprehensibility and consistency/certain”. See Steiner, Eva. French Law: a 
Comparative Approach (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 44. See also Vidal, Félix M. Calvo. 





be it codified or not, as the only source of law, proves to be, at the present time, an 
insufficient one. In truth, the advantages and disadvantages of the common law are 
somewhat symmetrical to the civil law. While the former requires the adoption of 
general and abstract rules in order to give a more systematic approach to law, the 
second commonly lacks the binding precedent and the concretism provided by the 
case law to better define the abstract patterns of the conducts regulated by statutes 
and codes.23 
Currently there is nothing more equivocal than to imagine that the judges are, 
in absolute terms, only connected to statutes in a legal system related to the tradition 
of civil law or that they are only connected to precedents in a system that belongs to 
common law. Many areas of law in the legal systems of both traditions are shaped 
by the Parliament but in all of those legal systems, to a greater or lesser degree, 
judges rely on precedents.24 As Vereshchagin says, the question of following 
statutes or precedents, only one or the other, is mistaken.25 In both worlds of civil 
and common law, it is necessary to consult statutes and previous judicial decisions. 
Only in the former, consultation of statutes is done first; in the latter, the first sources 
to be consulted are judicial decisions. Nevertheless, in the end, in both cases they 
finish working with both statutes and precedents jointly.   
  
(iii) The Brazilian Experience 
 
Despite having followed the tradition of civil law and thus having statutes as 
the first formal source for the application of the law, Brazil has not been immune to 
the influence of binding precedents. Historically, motivated by a variety of factors, 
which include to reach a uniformity of understanding on legal questions and to 
guarantee greater speed in judicial decisions, Brazil has fixed types of decisions or 
sets of decisions that have formal bindingness.
26
 
                                                 
23
 See Losano, Mario. Os grandes sistemas jurídicos (Marcela Varejão tr, São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 
2007), pp. 336-337. 
24
 See Summers (2000, p. 210): “Thus the frequent caricatures of civil law judges are entirely free 
from the shackles of precedent while the common law judges are enslaved to their own past (or 
engaged in ‘preserving the good old order’) are not even remotely accurate today, if they ever were”. 
25
 See Vereshchagin (2007, p. 113).   
26
 As will be seen in Chapter 4, it is possible to find types ranging from the result of the incident for 
case-law standardisation that binds a court’s panel, going through the decisions endowed with a 





However, with globalisation27,28, the facility of communications and the greater 
cultural exchange, the absorption of common law categories – including binding 
precedents – has, visibly, intensified.29 The last few decades in Brazil have also seen 
a natural increase in the use of precedents in terms of frequency and creativity. 
Currently, judicial decisions rather infrequently refer only to the Constitution or the 
relevant statutes, and precedents are quoted even when the legal issue is “covered” 
by legislative provisions.  
Nevertheless, Brazilian lawgivers and academics have attempted to develop a 
system of binding precedents in which the concepts and modus operandi are also 
compatible with the Brazilian historical, philosophical and legal backgrounds 
(connected with the civil law). The recent creation of a Binding Súmula (“Súmula 
Vinculante”, in Portuguese) in the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, via constitutional 
reform (by Constitutional Amendment 45/2004), is a perfect example of this intense 
cross-cultural exchange.30 Progressively, it is believed, concerning the use of 
precedents, Brazil will become a new example of a mixed system31,32 or what might 
be known as a country related to this “new” Western legal family.  
                                                                                                                                                        
normative sentences of the Labour Courts). 
27
 As Twining says: “In the present context the term ‘globalisation’ refers to those processes which 
tend to create and consolidate a unified world economy, a single ecological system, and a complex 
network of communications that covers the whole globe, even if does not penetrate to every part of it. 
Anthony Giddiness characterises the process as ‘the intensification of world-wide relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles 
away and vice versa”. See Twining, William. Globalisation and Legal Theory (London, Butterworths, 
2000b), p. 4. 
28
 About globalisation and law, in a broader and deeper sense, see Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 
Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalisation, and Emancipation (2
nd
 ed, London, 
Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002). 
29
 See Wambier, Teresa Arruda Alvim. Precedentes e evolução do direito. In Wambier, Teresa Arruda 
Alvim (coord). Direito jurisprudencial (São Paulo, RT, 2012), p. 86. 
30
 As will be seen in detail in Chapter 5, this Binding Súmula represents the Federal Supreme Court 
consolidated case law and is constituted by numbered statements committed to defined legal themes. 
Each statement presents the consolidated understanding of the Supreme Court about determined 
questions of the law. These statements have to be followed by the others courts and administrative 
agencies. 
31
 Mixed is intended in a “classical” way in this thesis, meaning, as Castellucci states, “the 
coexistence of both the civil law and the common law traditions with their typical legal features, both 
identifiable in the system in an obviously relevant amount”. See Castellucci, Ignazio. How Mixed Must 
a Mixed System Be? (2008) 12(1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law - EJCL, p. 4 
<http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-4.pdf> accessed 20 July 2012. 
32
 About the role of precedents in mixed systems, see McGonigle, Ryan. The Role of Precedents in 
Mixed Jurisdictions: a Comparative Analysis of Louisiana and the Philippines (2002) 6(2) Electronic 






Considering the Brazilian experience, it is possible to raise some challenging 
questions about the theory of precedents.33 This thesis will address them using a 
cross-cultural vision of this field of law, aiming to play, using Castellucci’s words, “a 
role in developing a civil law/common law dual legal language for the Western 
world”.34 
After all, as the same Castellucci states: 
The mix of civil law and common law identifiable in ‘classical’ mixed systems 
works reasonably well, in principle, as basic ideas about law are shared in 
both of its components; it has often proved a very synergic mix, as clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that many or almost all of the Western legal tradition 
systems seem to more or less converge towards a similar mixed model.35 
 
 
1.2 Methodology: Conceptualism and Comparative Law as Tools 
 
(i) Language and Conceptual Problems Involving a Cross-Cultural Approach to 
Precedents  
 
Law is more closely linked to language than it is normally considered and 
vocabulary is an “ideal” area for misunderstanding.36 Furthermore, if human 
language, no matter what language we are referring to, is an imperfect vehicle for 
the expression of legal concepts, those who compare “suffer to a greater extent from 
ambiguities of language than the lawyers of the system in which the ambiguities 
occur, because they cannot always be expected to be aware that a foreign legal term 
is not well defined”.37,38 
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 Twining (2000b, p. 7) is correct when he believes “that the world is increasingly interdependent, that 
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 See De Cruz, Peter. A Modern Approach to Comparative Law (Deventer/The Netherlands, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), p. 35: “Whereas physicians, chemists, economists, 
mathematicians and musicians have a common vocabulary, legal terminology is fraught with linguistic 
traps and is a potential minefield of misunderstanding; meanings vary from country to country. (…). 
Even in English-speaking countries, homonyms may have different meanings. Hence, even if the 
basic legal concepts are similar, different terms may be utilised so as to create an impression of 
divergence and this may occur within the same legal family”.  
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It is extremely common (and dangerous) that in different legal systems an 
identical or similar expression denotes quite diverse legal categories or concepts.39,40 
For instance, “there are certain terms in every system of law which cannot be 
translated into another language simpliciter but must be explained at some length”41 
and “the use of an identical or similar term in the legal terminology of the two 
countries does not guarantee comparability”.42 Besides, some terms or phrases from 
Anglo-American law seem to have been created only to confuse the civil lawyer. But, 
in this field, the difficulties are mutual. On the other hand, Anglo-American lawyers 
do not feel comfortable with several terms that are used by those involved with the 
civil law tradition. 
However, in spite of the fact that there is no official comparative language and 
no magic solution to this problem, language remains one of the main tools of 
comparative lawyers. Consequently, in this work, it is necessary to deal with terms 
which are found in several systems of law and consider the possible meanings or 
variations that these terms can have in each system of law. Language is an 
important factor for this research and it is fundamental to deal with it correctly.43  
With this in mind, this thesis constantly calls into question how much the 
theory of precedents is influenced by a particular language and vocabulary and what 
happens when a certain legal term is translated into a different language, in order to 
deal with concepts and terms in a consistent manner. The difficulties that this 
proposal involves, of course, are undeniable. However, an attempt to minimise such 
problems of expression shall be a matter for attention of a comparative study dealing 
with the theory of precedents.44 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Research (2
nd
 ed, London, Wildy & Sons Ltd., Reprinted 1971), p. 119. 
38
 Concerning (in)coherence in comparative law, see Andenas, Mads and Fairgrieve, Duncan. 
Introduction: Finding a Common Language for Open Legal Systems. In Canivet, Guy; Andenas, Mads 
and Fairgrieve, Duncan (eds). Comparative Law before the Courts (London, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Reprinted 2005), p. xxix. 
39
 See Gutteridge (1971, p. 118) 
40
 See Bogdan, Michael. Comparative Law (Deventer/The Netherlands, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1994), p. 59. 
41
 See Gutteridge (1971, p. 125). 
42
 See De Cruz (1993, p. 4). 
43
 See Grossefeld, Bernhard. The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1990), p. 85. 
44
 See Gutteridge (1971, p. 122): “The present position in regard to legal terminology is one which 





Along with the terminological difficulties, a second problem that this thesis will 
have to deal with is the absence of univocal concepts45 for the categories utilised in 
the theory of precedents, which can be applied in both civil and common law 
traditions.46 
As a matter of fact, as this thesis is concerned with analysis of both terms and 
concepts, it is crucial to have in mind the words of Twining: 
They are intimately related, for one uses words to label concepts, but it is 
important to keep them conceptually distinct. For example, a term may ‘travel’, 
but become attached to a different concept; the same word may refer to more 
than one concept; I may have a concept but be unable to express it in words; 
words may imperfectly capture a concept.47 
 
Besides, concepts represent realities or ideas from the world of nature or the 
world of culture, the world of causality or the world of values and, unfortunately, they 
can be vague. Vagueness in concepts of the theory of precedents inside a national 
legal system is less common than in comparative law, not only because one idiom is 
used but also because the legal fabric decreases the vagueness of these concepts. 
Positive law – statutes or case law – presents points of reference that circumscribe 
the ambiguousness of the terms and expressions used, and the lawyer, utilizing 
these subsidies provided by the positive law and by the context of the system as a 
whole, can find the marks that delimit the realities or ideas that the established 
concepts actually refer to.48 In terms of comparative law, the theory of precedent, 
along with some concepts of precise and univocal meaning, presents many 
imprecise and fluid concepts49, because in the world of comparative law there is not 
a unique positive law that combines the realities under certain categorization.  
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far as is feasible, from the linguistic problems which press upon him”. 
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to the terminological, conceptual, methodological and functional most relevant controversies. 
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(ii) Systematising Concepts 
 
This investigation, as any modern comparative law study should, needs to 
have a systematic basis to produce valid findings. Any comparison drawn between 
national systems of law or categories of these systems without a prior conceptual 
framework may be arbitrary50. In fact, as suggested by Twining, in this era of 
globalisation, comparative law involves all of the fundamental tasks of legal theory, 
including synthesis, construction and elucidation of concepts, which has been the 
traditional concern of analytical jurisprudence.51,52 
To achieve these aims, Chapters 2 and 3 critically and comparatively call into 
question the role of judicial precedents in the formulation of Brazilian law and 
discusses the meaning of creativity, mere declarativity, persuasiveness and 
bindingness of precedents. These two chapters also try to approximate civil and 
common law views with respect to the theory of precedent, suggesting a set of 
cross-cultural concepts and terminology to be used mutually in this area of law: the 
study of categories such as ratio decidendi and obiter dictum, distinguishing, 
overruling, among others, will be a fundamental part of this work. Dealing with 
                                                                                                                                                        
stand). Both American and English Legal systems have adopted a doctrine of stare decisis but their 
actual operation within their individual jurisdictions are ‘markedly different’ (see Atiyah and Summers 
(1987)). The essential difference between American and English practice is that the lower courts in 
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conceptual categories in the diversity of the different national precedent models, the 
goal here is to transform this material into something logical and intelligible.53 
Chapter 4, in turn, presents a comprehensive systematisation of the several 
categories of binding precedents in the Brazilian legal system. The proposal is to 
catalogue, distinguish, and classify the concepts, establishing secure references to 
any further steps. In the process of systematisation of concepts, the knowledge 
previously produced by philosophers of law, comparatists and philosophers in 
general will be used, in order to keep a consistent link and not to produce more 
conceptual errors. 
Conscious of the impossibility of avoiding all vague or ambiguous concepts, 
the purpose is to decrease this problem to tolerable levels, so concepts and terms 
“can be used with reasonable clarity and precision to express, describe, analyse, 
compare, generalise about, explain, or evaluate subject matters of our discipline 
across various kinds of boundary”.54,55 The conceptualisation achieved in these first 
few chapters will be conventionally utilised during the whole thesis and therefore the 
reader will always be conscious about what this discourse is dealing with.  
 
(iii) Conceptualism and Comparative Law Working Together 
 
To attain its final objectives, apart from conceptualism56, this thesis uses a 
second instrument: comparative law.57,58,59,60 While remaining conscious that the 
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doctrine of stare decisis61 has peculiarities in each of the countries in which it has 
been adopted62, once the conceptual systematisation of theory of precedent is 
achieved, it is possible to go deeper and present a comparative taxonomy of the 
Brazilian binding precedents.63 
This thesis supports Grossfeld’s opinion when he states that “comparative law 
is not in competition with conceptualism but in partnership with it”, and “a conceptual 
framework is useful, for it often makes it easier for the comparatist to find the right 
question to ask”.64 We have the belief that, nowadays, the boundaries of 
comparative law have been drawn so widely that they should necessarily work 
together with an area traditionally occupied by linguistics and conceptualism.65 
As a method of study66, Comparative law has a lot to offer in this intellectual 
adventure.67 Only through comparative law the fundamental questions of this thesis 
                                                                                                                                                        
law has various purposes: (a) it can be an academic discipline for general education or pedagogical 
purposes; (b) it can be a means of understanding legal rules in general; (c) it can be an aid to obtain a 
better understanding of one’s respective national legal system, working in lege lata (useful, for 
instance, when courts have to interpret or apply internal rules); (d) it can be an aid to legislation and 
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(1994, pp. 27-39). 
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can be answered, particularly because the lines to answer these questions are not 
completely clear. It will be the free tool to provide coherence for the investigation of 
English and Brazilian systems of precedent. For instance, comparative law will 
allows us, studying the national models of precedent, to discover the patterns of 
internal consistency, harmony and efficiency of these models and of the Western 
panorama as a whole. It will show us what categories of English and Brazilian law 
can be properly compared and how can this task be carried out. Comparative law 
certainly will help us to highlight the essentials in the national legal systems and 
present us with the strengths and the weaknesses of these systems.68 It will present 
the solutions that these systems offer for a given legal problem and how and where 
one can use the results in other national legal systems. It will not be in competition 
with internal traditions but in partnership with it. Comparative law will, in fact, 
exercise a control function and allow us to reach a judgement which will be more 
balanced, thanks to a broader perspective. Furthermore it will lead to a more critical 
assessment, thanks to a multicultural understanding of the theory of precedents.  
It is important to make clear that the comparison in this thesis will be both 
conceptual (focusing on concepts and terms) and functional (focusing on the 
possible solutions to the legal problems through the experience of each model that is 
analysed). 
The comparison will be multilateral and cross-cultural, between English and 
Brazilian models mainly (eventually with the American and French models, as 
important samples of common law and civil traditions, respectively). It will also be an 
integrative and contrastive comparison, focusing on the similarities and differences 
between both models of precedents.69 The comparison will be horizontal and 
vertical, because it will compare the current precedent models of these countries, but 
it will also have, to some extent, some incursions on the historical panorama. 
Although this thesis has as background a comparison between legal systems 
in their entirety or between entire families of legal systems (called macro-
comparison), it will be, truly, a micro-comparison, between models of precedents and 
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legal categories from specific countries.70,71 Furthermore, it will not be a comparison 
of substantive law, but a procedural comparison, meaning a comparison between the 
procedural characteristics of the models, precisely the way that these national 
systems deal with judicial precedents. 
In order to compare the national models, the thesis works in four different 
ways: (i) describing the categories of the models concerned (mainly, the Brazilian 
and the English); (ii) highlighting the differences and similarities between the 
compared models; (iii) reflecting and criticising the resemblances and dissimilarities 
between systems and concepts72, as well as the respective standards of 
functionality; (iv) discussing the alternatives and presenting suggestions for the best 
regulation of the matter. 
In summary, working together to systematise part of the pre-existent 
knowledge concerning the theory of precedents, conceptualism and comparative law 
have a very important practical value, as tools to present to researchers and those 
actively concerned with law reform, as final findings, a clear understanding of the 
factors which are important to positive innovation in Western precedent models.73 
After all, “if the theoretical results are accurate, they can be applied to any 
legal systems indistinctly”. In fact, as Zucca points out: 
To what extent that is possible depends in turn on the accuracy of the 
accompanying comparative analyses. Whilst I do not believe that we can ever 
depict a global empire in which the law rules independently from its context, I 
believe in the possibility of enriching one’s own understanding of different 
domestic experiences by comparing them and drawing out common patterns 
and differences. For this reason, comparison sharpens understanding: it 
points to the role of contingencies and local practices in shaping legal 
concepts.74 
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Evidently, this thesis will not propose the mere adoption of foreign models, 
which supporters of certain systems may do. The transplant of foreign rules, without 
previous discussion and adaptations, invariably leads to unsuitable solution to the 
traditions and reality of the recipient country. However, the judicial systems of any 
Western country essentially face the same basic problems, which they normally try 
to solve through similar means of justice (though sometimes with different results). 
Countries of both traditions may consider jointly some measures to improve their 
models of precedents and better deal with these problems.  
 
(iv) Concerning the Legal Resources 
 
The literature reviewed in this thesis will be integrated throughout the whole 
work as and when the need for analyses appears. The review aims to provide the 
reader with a background of the topic and to present this work as a link in the chain 
of research that has developed the field of knowledge in the theory of precedent. 
Traditional legal method has been used in conducting the research for this 
study. However, this thesis aims to measure and present the real importance of 
precedents in both common and civil law traditions and, consequently, specialised 
material from both common law and civil law countries is used – mainly in English 
and Portuguese, but also in Spanish and French. Both classical and modern 
sources, concerned with conceptualism, jurisprudence, comparative law, legal 
systems, constitutional law, procedural law and theory of precedent are used. This 
includes statutes, case-law (law reports), commentaries, books, legal journals, 
reports, data-bases and available on-line tools, among other resources.  
The resources have been used in many ways. Firstly, for instance, they 
have been utilised to explore the real impact that globalisation events have had in 
the development of contemporary theory of precedents. Secondly, they have been 
employed to demonstrate the traditional approach to the issue of precedents in Brazil. 
Thirdly, they demonstrate how the developments that have taken place in recent times 
have already shifted the thinking about precedents in Brazil. Fourthly, they have been 
used to comparatively present (in relation to England) the Brazilian current approach to 
                                                                                                                                                        





precedents, highlighting its principal and strong aspects. Finally, these resources have 
also been used to support the findings achieved in this thesis in a way that they can be 
valuable to both civil and common worlds. 
 
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis will deal with both theoretical and practical aspects of the theory of 
precedent in Brazil and, in order to fulfil the original purposes of the research, it 
consists of one introductory chapter (Chapter 1), a further four chapters as well as a 
final chapter for the conclusions (Chapter 6).75 
The four core chapters that follow this introduction are divided into two main 
blocks. From a general point of view, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on the 
theoretical aspects and the practical uses of precedents in Brazil still under a 
traditional civil law perspective and then compare them with the English model. They 
also aim to establish the conceptual basis for development of the thesis. The second 
part (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) aims to present a taxonomy of the Brazilian binding 
precedents and a detailed analysis of most of them. Chapter 5 is specifically 
dedicated to the new Brazilian Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula.  
More specifically, the aim of Chapter 2 is to discuss and compare the role of 
precedents in the development of the law in Brazil and England. It will systematise 
the concepts of declarativeness, creativeness, persuasiveness and bindingness of 
precedents (mainly in Brazil), including establishing a consistent vocabulary for the 
categories related to these important and controversial issues of the theory of 
precedents, which can then be understood by both Brazilian and English audiences. 
This Chapter is very important from a practical point of view because it creates a 
unique reference to be applied in the comparative study of both national models of 
precedents throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 3 analyses, still under a civil law perspective, how precedents work in 
Brazil and then compares it to the English model. The issues that will be dealt with in 
this chapter include the way Brazilian judges evaluate old and new precedents; how 
Brazilian judges discriminate – if they do so – ratio decidendi and obiter dicta; how 
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they deal with seemingly relevant precedents; why Brazilian judges so frequently 
depart from precedents; how they deal with the issue of prospective overruling; and 
how precedents are reported in Brazil. Conceptual diversities arise in the way the 
Brazilian and English legal systems deal with precedents and the purpose is also to 
explain and minimise the impact of such diversities in the understanding of this 
thesis. 
As the last few decades in Brazil have seen a clear increase in the use of 
precedents in terms of frequency, creativity and bindingness, Chapter 4 aims to 
present a comprehensive taxonomy of the several Brazilian categories of binding 
precedents that are expected to progressively transform the Brazilian legal system 
into an example of a mixed system. This chapter will explain the main aspects and 
the binding character of the following categories of Brazilian precedents: (i) the 
Portuguese Assentos, (ii) the Prejulgados in Labour Courts, (iii) the Labour Courts 
“normative sentence”, (iv) the Prejulgados in Electoral Courts, (v) the normative 
power of the Electoral Courts, (vi) the general incident of standardisation of case law 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, (vii) the special incident of standardisation of case 
law of the Federal Small Claims Courts, (viii) the binding decisions in case of 
multiplicity of special appeals (that are appeals to the Superior Court of Justice) 
based upon a similar question of law, (ix) the incident to declare the 
unconstitutionality of a normative act in the context of the decentralised (“difuso”) 
judicial review of legislation, (x) the binding decisions concerning the general 
repercussion (“repercussão geral”) in the extraordinary appeals (that are appeals to 
the Supreme Court) and (xi) the binding decisions on the centralised (“concentrado”) 
judicial review of legislation in Brazil.76 
Chapter 5 focuses on the new and very important Federal Supreme Court 
Binding Súmula (introduced into Brazilian law by Amendment 45 to the Federal 
Constitution, passed in 2004), analysing its origins, features and significance under a 
dual perspective that could be interesting and useful for both common and civil law 
traditions. According to the new article 103-A of the Brazilian Constitution, the 
Supreme Court is allowed to issue a Binding Súmula that represents, by means of 
several statements, its consolidated case law. As will be seen, as a result of similar 
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understandings in numerous concrete cases, the incorporation of a statement in 
Binding Súmula of the Supreme Court is the climax of the Brazilian decentralised 
(“difuso”) judicial review of legislation, the last stage of a long journey, which usually 
reaches the Supreme Court via an extraordinary appeal. All other courts and the 
public Administration are hence obliged to follow these statements of the Supreme 
Court Súmula.  
The last chapter (Chapter 6) – after the previous chapters to have given a 
complete account of how precedents are understood and how they operate in Brazil 
– will provide the conclusions of the research in terms of efficiency of the new 
Brazilian model of precedents. It focuses on some of the advantages of the doctrine 
of stare decisis – stability, certainty of law, equality, time-saving –, as positive criteria 
of functionality, in order to analyse some improvements in the deliverance of justice 
in Brazil since the adoption of a more comprehensive approach to binding 
precedents. The analysis will be illustrated with data and figures from Brazilian 
official databases and reports. This methodology is well balanced to avoid the 
overusing of either pure conceptual elements or strict empirical knowledge. Taking 
the English model as a paradigm, it finally comparatively presents and debates some 
strengths of the new Brazilian approach to precedents: greater simplicity of the 
Brazilian new model of Binding Súmula if compared with the common law doctrine of 
stare decisis; the good access to precedents in the Brazilian legal system; and the 
balance between statutes and precedents as established by the model of Binding 
Súmula, emphasising that the Brazilian mix of civil and common law elements has 





2 The Judicial Law-Making in Brazil 
 
 
2.1 General Considerations 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and compare the role of 
precedents77 in the development of the law in Brazil and England. Taking a 
comparative perspective between these two countries, it will systematise the 
concepts (and establish a consistent vocabulary) for the categories of creativeness, 
declarativeness, persuasiveness and bindingness of precedents, which can then be 
understood by both Brazilian and English audiences, in order to compare this very 
special area of the law. 
The following are some issues that this chapter intends to discuss when 
contrasting Brazilian law with English law: (i) The impact historical heritage, legal 
theory and recent legislative provision had on the approach to precedents in Brazil. 
(ii) To what extent precedents are sources of law in Brazil; are they creative or 
merely declarative sources? (iii) How is the issue of creative precedents and the 
violation of the principle of the separation of powers addressed in Brazil? (iv) To 
what degree are precedents persuasive or binding in Brazil? Are there any degrees 
of persuasiveness and bindingness? (v) How is the issue of binding precedents dealt 
with in relation to the violation of the “principle of the rational persuasion of the 
judge”?78 (vi) How is the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court changing its approach 
with regards to the mere persuasiveness of its decisions in the decentralised judicial 
review of legislation? 
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 In this chapter the term “precedent” is generally used in a narrow or strict sense, that is, to mean a 
single prior judicial decision dealing with some legal issue and possibly relevant to a case to be 
decided. In other words, a precedent means a single decision that is taken as somehow related or 
possibly influencing the decision of the following case. This thesis, mainly in chapters 4 and 5, will 
also refer to precedents in a broader or lato sensu to encapsulate Brazilian particular binding 
precedents that are not precedents in the stricto sensu (as applied in the Anglo-American stare 
decisis doctrine). They are results of diverse types of procedure (as in the example of the new 
Supreme Court Binding Súmula), each of them, in its own way, having binding character. The aim of 
this footnote is to distinguish the meaning and the uses of the term “precedent” in its strict and broad 
senses. 
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 In Brazil, the principle of the “rational persuasion of the judge” is also known as the principle of “free 
motivated convincing”. According to article 131 of the Civil Procedure Code (Law 5869/1973), judges 
shall analyse the arguments of the litigants and the evidence of the case and freely build up their 
decisions. However, they must state the reasons that lead them to the decision, as all the decisions of 





In order to answer these questions, the history of Brazilian law needs to be 
revisited. The views of some schools of jurisprudence on the role of precedents in 
the formulation of the law, as they are adopted in Brazil, will be outlined in this 
chapter, highlighting the problems arising from a later discovery of the common law 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, this chapter revisits the debates (taking place in Brazil) 
on the role of precedents being creative or merely declarative. It focuses on the 
issue of creative precedents and the alleged breach of the principle of the separation 
of powers, presents a critical opinion on the debate and, finally, systematises the 
issue of creativeness and declarativeness of precedents in Brazil. This Chapter also 
analyses the question of persuasiveness and bindingness of precedents in Brazil. It 
starts by giving general information on the topic and then moves onto the concepts 
of persuasive precedents (highlighting the factors that can influence the degrees of 
persuasiveness) and binding precedents in Brazil. Thus, it moves into the debate 
(taking place in Brazil) on the violation of the principle of the rational persuasion of 
the judge by the adoption of a rule of binding precedents. Finally, it carefully 
analyses the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court recent case law concerning the mere 
persuasiveness of its decisions in the decentralised judicial review of legislation, in 
order to present how the Court is changing its approach with regards to this major 
issue. 
The systematisation of concepts and the establishment of a consistent 
vocabulary for the theory of precedents proposed in this chapter will also be very 
important from a practical point of view, because they will create a unique reference 
to be applied in the comparative study of both national systems of precedent 
throughout the thesis. This will allow the reader to always be aware of what the 
thesis is dealing with and accurately evaluate its content, which cross the boundaries 
between Brazilian and English law. 
 
2.2 The Influence of Continental Europe on Brazil’s Legal History 
 
Like in most countries in the Western world, the status accorded to Brazilian 
precedents may be viewed as the final result of an assemblage of historical heritage, 
jurisprudence and recent legislative provision. 
The historical origin of the “República Federativa do Brasil” is in the 





beginning of the 16th century.79 Around three centuries later, in 1815, Brazil was 
promoted from colony to a sovereign kingdom that was united with Portugal.80 
Following this, on 7 September 1822, the eldest son of the Portuguese King João VI 
and Regent of Brazil, Prince Pedro, declared the country's independence from 
Portugal. Prince Pedro was declared and crowned (in October and December 1822, 
respectively) the first ruler of independent Brazil, as Emperor Dom Pedro I.81 It was 
during this “first Empire”, on 25 March 1824, that the first Brazilian constitution was 
promulgated. Pedro I abdicated on 7 April 183182, leaving behind his oldest son, who 
was to become the Emperor Dom Pedro II.83,84  
At the beginning of Brazil, the old norms imported from Portugal provided 
satisfactory solutions to most of the legal issues of the new country. For instance, the 
“Ordenações Afonsinas” (1492) and the “Ordenações Manuelinas” (1512) as well as 
the (Spanish) “Ordenações Filipinas” (1603)85 were applied for several years in 
Brazil.86 Interestingly, in the country’s legal history, the making of binding precedents 
was first registered – as early as the 19th century, during the rule of the 1st Emperor 
of Brazil (D. Pedro I) – with the incorporation of the old Portuguese Assentos87 into 
Brazilian law. Indeed, as Brazil still could not count on its own case law, the existing 
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 Similar to what happened in North America with the foundation of colonies by the English in the 
beginning of the 17
th
 century. See Séroussi, Roland. Introducción al derecho inglés y norteamericano 
(Tradução de: Introduction aux droits anglais et américain, Enrique Alcaraz Varó tr, Barcelona, Ariel, 
1998), p. 81. See also Ráo, Vicente. O direito e a vida dos direitos, vol 1 (3
rd
 ed, São Paulo, RT, 
1991), p. 106.  
80
 Previously, in 1808, fleeing the troops of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, the Portuguese 
Royal Family had already established themselves in Brazil, transforming the capital, Rio de Janeiro, 
into the capital de facto of the Portuguese Empire. 
81
 In 1821, King João VI had returned to Portugal and the Portuguese government attempted to turn 
Brazil once again into a colony, setting aside the new achievements that had been incorporated since 
1808. However, Prince Pedro took the side of the Brazilians. 
82
 He went to Europe to fight a civil war for the throne of Portugal. 
83
 During the period of the minority of Dom Pedro II, the Brazilian Empire was lead by successive 
Regents. 
84
 Throughout that time, most Brazilians were in favour of the monarchy. Republicanism did not have 
great support and the monarchy was only overthrown on 15 November 1889. Even so, Pedro II was 
at the height of his popularity among his subjects. Actually, the abolition of slavery on 13 May 1888 by 
the “Lei Áurea”, sanctioned by Princess Isabel (the Emperor’s daughter, who was in charge while the 
Emperor was in Europe), which displeased part of the country's elites, is more likely to be the real 
factor for the overthrow. Besides, the first Republican governments were basically military 
dictatorships. 
85
 See the time of the Iberian union under the crown of the Kings of Spain (1580-1640). 
86
 See Souza, Marcelo Alves Dias de. Ensaios ingleses (Mossoró, Queima-Bucha, 2011), pp. 57-59. 
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Assentos, produced in Portugal, were naturally accepted into the still developing 
Brazilian legal system. This regime of the Portuguese-Brazilian Assentos would last 
until that the monarchy was overthrown, when, due to the ideology brought with the 
proclamation of the Republic, the country attempted to definitively break the ties with 
Portugal.88 
Eventually, in form and substance, Brazilian law was progressively adapted to 
the specific conditions of the country. Firstly, apart from the Portuguese civil law, a 
rudimentary law was developed in Brazil during the period of the first Empire. The 
first Brazilian codifications appeared such as the Criminal Code of 1830 and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1832 (the first Civil Code only appeared in 1916), 
which helped the justice administration. Secondly, besides the influence of Iberian 
law (from Portugal and also Spain), the development of the Brazilian law was 
strongly influenced by the law produced in Continental European countries such as 
France, Germany and Italy, which also explains the Brazilian association with civil 
law. 
Due to this background, Brazilian law is historically linked to the Roman-
Germanic tradition, and civil law concepts prevail over common law practice. Several 
branches of Brazilian law are codified, although non-codified statutes also play a 
substantial role in the framework of the legal system. Doctrinal works have strong 
influence upon legislative development and judicial decisions. Judicial precedents 
are generally only persuasive. Currently, the entire legal system is covered by the 
Federal Constitution of 1988 (promulgated on 5 October 1988), the fundamental law 
of Brazil. Up until April 2012, there have been 76 amendments to the Federal 
Constitution. According to the principle of the sovereign of the Constitution, all other 
legislation and judicial decisions must conform to its provisions. This includes the 
state’s constitutions and “organic laws” of the Municipalities and the Federal District, 
which also must not contradict the Federal Constitution. 
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 It was only in 1850, with the advent of the Regalement 737, that the Brazilian legal system had a 
specific legislation regulating the structure of the Judiciary and the civil procedure. However, this 
legislation said nothing about the dynamics and value of the case law of the Brazilian courts in order 






2.3 Recent Common Law Influxes 
 
If the Brazilian law ended up choosing an association with the civil law (and 
statutes are the first formal source for the application of the law), it has not been 
immune to the influence of common law. Actually, over the past 20 or 30 years, 
starting with the adoption and development of the class action, the Brazilian lawgiver 
has progressively turned to common law countries in order to borrow ideas for the 
improvement of its legislation, especially in areas such as procedural law.89 In 
contemporaneous Brazil, due to globalisation, the absorption of these common law 
practices – including a wider use of binding precedents – has visibly intensified. 
During recent years, precedents have become a much debated subject90, 
even though, in some cases, without much academic depth. At the beginning, the 
debate among Brazilian scholars has mainly focused on the convenience or not of 
the adoption of the Binding Súmula91,92, and less on the grounds and modus 
operandi of a true Brazilian theory of stare decisis. When the debate was initiated, 
there were many voices that arose – albeit for different reasons, which mainly 
included supposed violations to principles of the separation of power and of the 
rational persuasion of the judge – against the adoption of the Binding Súmula or any 
attempt to implant a Brazilian theory of stare decisis.93 A great part of these opinions 
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 As Markesinis and Fedtke state “legal transplants continue to be extremely important in practice. 
Alan Walton observed in 1974 that borrowing is ‘the most common form of legal change’, and this is 
true for constitutional ideas today as it has been for private and commercial law in the past”. See 
Markesinis, Basil and Fedtke, Jörg. Engaging with Foreign Law (Oxford and Portland/OR, Hart 
Publishing, 2009), p. 129. 
90
 Scholars in Brazil, such as Dinamarco, have recognised that the Brazilian civil procedural science 
has experienced, at present more than ever, a great need for noticing the surrounding realities 
represented by the elements and concepts of the procedural system of other countries in the search 
for appropriate solutions to the problems of its justice. See Dinamarco, Cândido Rangel. 
Fundamentos do processo civil moderno (5
th
 ed, São Paulo, Malheiros, 2002), p. 762. 
91
 See lists of arguments in favor and against in Schäfer, Gilberto. Súmulas vinculantes: análise 
crítica da experiência do Supremo Tribunal Federal (Porto Alegre, Livraria do Advogado Editora, 
2012), pp. 32-35. 
92
 It should be reminded that, as will be seen in more depth later, the Binding Súmula (or a statement 
of this Súmula) is something different from the judicial precedent as it is defined under the theory of 
stare decisis. 
93
 Nobre Júnior lists the following names whom were of this opinion: Evandro Lins e Silva, José Celso 
de Mello Filho, Carmen Lúcia Antunes Rocha, Luiz Flávio Gomes, Valmir Pontes Filho, Dalmo de 
Abreu Dallari, Pestana de Aguiar, Dínio de Santis Garcia, Vicente de Paula Maciel Júnior and Mauro 
Roberto Gomes de Mattos. According to the same author, those who were in favor of the adoption of 
the Binding Súmula were also of considerable number and included: Miguel Reale, Carlos Mário da 
Silva Velloso, Sálvio de Figueiredo Teixeira, José Augusto Delgado, Walter Nunes da Silva Júnior, 





was affected by a lack of knowledge about what a doctrine of stare decisis truly is. 
Furthermore, there was also the question of prejudice – against foreign models – to 
be taken into account. 
The doctrinal prejudice against foreign law – in this case, that from common 
law origin – has not been, by any means, reflected in the law reform process 
delivered by the Brazilian Parliament during recent years.94 However, the Brazilian 
legislator tends to rely on what academics suggest about the transplant of foreign 
law and, following the opinion of the experts, the simple adoption of the theory of 
stare decisis in a pure common law way is not on the agenda in Brazil. It is really 
common sense that a simple transplant of a foreign model, preached by enthusiasts 
of any legal system, would not be suitable for Brazil (as for this comparative study it 
would not be useful to just transplant the concepts of the theory of stare decisis, as 
they are applied in England, to explain Brazilian law).95 Concerning the way of 
dealing with precedents, Brazilian lawgivers and academics have attempted to 
borrow some concepts and what are considered successful practices in the common 
law tradition. Nevertheless, based upon this knowledge, they have attempted to 
develop a doctrine of binding precedents in which the concepts, terms and modus 
operandi do not affront the Brazilian historical, philosophical and legal backgrounds. 
Many mechanisms that reach vertical and horizontal uniformity in judicial 
decisions, based on binding precedents, have been introduced in Brazilian law, 
which will, at least most of them, be discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, the Federal 
Supreme Court Binding Súmula (which will be discussed in Chapter 5) – as created 
by Constitutional Amendment 45/2004, where the case law of the court is crystallised 
into several statements that are to bind all other courts and the Executive branch – is 
the climax of this progress towards an original mixed approach to precedents. This 
newly created binding precedent, it is important to note, is just another step in a legal 
system that has led to the construction of a special model of binding precedents, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fernando da Costa Tourinho Neto, Ivan Lira de Carvalho and Saulo Ramos. See Nobre Júnior, 
Edilson Pereira. O direito processual brasileiro e o efeito vinculante das decisões dos tribunais 
superiores. Revista de Informação Legislativa, v. 37, n. 148, out./dez. 2000a, pp. 154-155. 
94
 This openness to the use of foreign sources in the course of legislation can be explained by the 
tendency of the Brazilian legislator to mould the law according to the prevailing political thought of the 
time. According to Markesinis and Fedtke (2009, p. 177), the same has happened in Germany over 
the last 100 years. 
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despite the historical Brazilian adoption of statutory and codified law such as in 
Continental Europe. 
The last decades in Brazil have also seen a natural increase in the use of 
precedents in terms of frequency and creativity. Precedents are currently used as 
one of the main grounds of every judicial decision. Courts and judges’ decisions 
rather infrequently refer only to the Constitution or the relevant statutes, and 
precedents are quoted even when the legal issue is “covered” by legislative 
provisions. In this case, the reference to precedents has been a sort of medium for 
the reference to the legislation and not as an alternative to it (the legislation). Indeed, 
statutory provisions are frequently addressed, analysed and interpreted by means of 
discussion of relevant precedents. These provisions gain persuasive force when they 
are embodied in one or several precedents.  
From the historical point of view, this expansion of the use of precedents in 
Brazil started becoming mainly important, in terms of frequency and decisiveness, in 
some specific areas of the law. An important factor is whether a certain field of the 
law is comprehensively regulated by legislative provisions, because, where they are 
lacking – such as the cases of administrative and social security law, which are not 
codified in Brazil –, precedents play a more significant role. Besides, at present, 
significant importance can be perceived among the uses of precedents in 
constitutional, electoral and tax law, supposedly due to the fact that cases in these 
areas deal mainly with issues of law, while in others areas, such as criminal law, 
judges often devote greater attention to the issues of fact. This also leads to another 
difference that is noted in the use of precedents by Brazilian courts. Considering the 
different levels of the judicial structure, lower courts often devote their attention to the 
issues of fact. Consequently, the use of precedents, commonly limited to the 
decision of the issues of law, seems to be less decisive. On the other hand, since 
higher courts – especially, the Supreme Court and the Superior Courts – mainly deal 
with issues of law, precedents play a distinguished role in the rationale of their 
judgments.96 
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 According to Taruffo and La Torre, this imbalance in the use of precedents between lower and 
higher courts is similar to Italy. Taruffo, Michele and La Torre, Massimo. Precedent in Italy. In 
MacCormick, Neil and Summers, Robert S. (eds). Interpreting Precedents: a Comparative Study 





In spite of these imbalances, the outcome is that, in Brazilian judicial practice, 
precedents play a role that is currently more important than the role of the doctrine. 
Apart from the reference to the relevant constitutional or statutory provisions, they 
are the most important justificatory material used in judicial decisions. Indeed, if 
precedents traditionally have not been formally listed among the “sources of law” in 
Brazil, nowadays they are considered at least as de facto sources and, gradually, 
part of doctrine is moving toward the recognition of the case law as a formal source 
in the Brazilian legal system.97 
This panorama clearly serves to challenge the myth that affirms that the 
doctrine of binding precedents or stare decisis is an exclusive common law 
practice.98 The bindingness of judicial decisions is a characteristic freely auto-
attributed by any legal system in order to achieve, among other values, equality, 
certainty and speed in judicial decisions. In other words, the adoption of a rule of 
stare decisis by a legal system does not request its historical association with the 
common law tradition. 
This new situation also serves to put aside a second myth that states that civil 
law judges, in terms of the creativity of their decisions, perform a completely different 
role if compared with their common law counterparts.99 Similar to judges in common 
law countries, Brazilian judges also create law, and it can be proved by evidence that 
some areas in Brazilian law, which were not originally statute regulated, have been 
considerably developed by case law. 
In summary, although historically associated with the civil law, Brazilian law, 
especially over recent years, has undergone qualitative changes, including the 
adoption of some successful common law practices, such as a wider use of 
precedents in courts. Currently, it has visibly intensified and, concerning the 
frequency and relevancy of the uses of statutes and precedents as the grounds to 
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 Basically, according to article 4º of Decree-Law 4657/42 (the statute that gives the guidelines to the 
interpretation and application of the law in Brazil), apart from statutes, customs and the general 
principles of law are the others formal sources of law in Brazil.  
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 See Silva, Lucas Cavalcanti da. Controle difuso de constitucionalidade e o respeito aos 
precedentes do Supremo Tribunal Federal. In Marinoni, Luiz Guilherme (coord). A força dos 
precedentes: estudos dos cursos de mestrado e doutorado em direito processual civil da UFPR 
(Salvador, JusPODIVM, 2010a), p. 173. See also Marinoni, Luiz Guilherme. Precedentes obrigatórios 
(São Paulo, RT, 2010b), p. 27.   
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 See Ataíde Júnior, Jaldemiro Rodrigues de. Precedentes vinculantes e irretroatividade no sistema 
processual brasileiro: os precedentes dos tribunais superiores e sua eficácia temporal (Curitiba, 





judicial pronouncements, the Brazilian legal system is likely to become in the future 
an example of a mixed model.  
 
2.4 A Later Discovery of the Common Law Jurisprudence  
 
In parallel with its historical and legal background, the development of the 
Brazilian jurisprudence100 has been based on ideas transplanted from Continental 
European countries and this approach has also influenced the role that has been 
attributed to precedents, as sources of law, in Brazilian law. 
Historically, two opposite philosophical ideas dominated the debate in the 
philosophy of law during the 19th and 20th centuries in Brazil: the naturalist and the 
positivist conceptions of law. 
In general, the ideas of natural law101, which have been developed in Brazil, 
affirm the existence of: (i) a kind of law that is based upon reason, upon the quality of 
individual or collective human beings, or even upon the relationship between human 
beings and God; (ii) a law which pre-exists the positive law, which is made by the 
human beings or the State. For Brazilian jusnaturalists, this natural and superior law 
has to be respected always. Positive law (and even the Brazilian Constitution), under 
which the Brazilian society lives, must be in harmony with the laws of nature and the 
natural rights of human beings.102 Beginning from this idea that there is a pre-
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 It is important to remind readers that the term “jurisprudence” is used, in law, with at least four 
different meanings: a) as a synonym for philosophy or science of law; b) with the meaning of a series 
of uniform judicial decisions about the same judicial question; c) representing, in a less precise way, 
the group of judicial decisions of a country as a whole; and d) referring, improperly, to an isolated 
judicial decision. Here, the term jurisprudence means science or philosophy of law. Concerning this 
issue, see Santos, Evaristo Aragão. Em torno do conceito e da formação do precedente judicial. In 
Wambier, Teresa Arruda Alvim (coord). Direito jurisprudencial (São Paulo, RT, 2012), pp. 141-142. 
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 According to Nader, the first thinker to expose a doctrine about the natural law was the Greek 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (approximately 535-470 BC), who professed a pantheist cosmological 
jusnaturalism. See Nader, Paulo. Filosofia do direito (4
th
 ed, Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 1995), p. 155.  
Throughout history, naturalism has been represented, among others, by thinkers such as Aristotle, 
Cicero, Saint Augustine, Hugo Grotius, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, John Locke, Del Vecchio; 
while in 20
th
 century Anglo-American law, the names of Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin can be 
highlighted. However, this wide-ranging set of followers goes from effusive apostles, such as Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, who developed a classification of rights based upon the relationship between 
human beings and the Creator, to more moderate defenders, such as Fuller (in its Morality of Law, 
1969), who only state that there are pre-existing principles to “positive law” and that they have to be 
considered in any judicial system. See Cooper, Phillip J. Public Law and Public Administration (3
rd 
ed, 
Atasca, F. E. Peacock Publishers, 2000), p. 57. 
102
 Similar to the United States of America, where, for the jusnaturalists, positive law (the American 
Constitution included) must be in harmony with the laws of nature and natural rights of humans 





existent law to the law that is made by the State, usually referred to as positive law, 
the supporters of natural law, in this most “purist” form, do not give to precedents the 
status of law maker. For them, the role of precedents, rather than creating law, is to 
reveal the law, which means to discover (from principles of natural law and reason) 
and declare the law that already exists, for this is just the result of simple reasoning: 
“the law as it ought to be” (the judicial decision making) must reflect “the law as it is” 
(the pre-existent natural law).103 
Legal Positivism104 in Brazil opposes the idea of a natural law. While the 
supporters of Jusnaturalism in Brazil occupy themselves with the basis and the 
legitimisation of the positive law, founding its validity upon the respect of principles 
and absolute values, the positivists are interested mainly in ascertaining the formal 
logic tenets of its validity.105 The law is positive, which means that it is man’s making, 
and they insist that what is important is to have a system or “logic” of positive 
law.106,107,108 
                                                                                                                                                        
importance to Western law in general and to American Law in particular. (...). Particularly in its more 
modern manifestations, the theory suggest that while mankind’s relationship to the world is a matter of 
natural order, their relationships with their fellows are in large part a matter of social contract. Our 
ability to live together under such a social contract stems from the fact that people are both rational 
and social beings who, under the right conditions, can govern themselves. But social contracts, under 
which the society operates, such as the U.S. Constitution, must be in harmony with the law of nature 
and the natural rights of all citizens”. 
103
 The meaning of the expressions “the law as it ought to be” and “the law as it is” here does not have 
any connection with the meaning such expressions may have in logic (legal or not). They are used 
here only to illustrate the fact that, for the jusnaturalists, the “law” that is made by the State or by men, 
which is subsequent, must reflect the pre-existent natural “law”. 
104
 As for Legal Positivism, it should be understood the assemblage of the several manifestations of 
this kind of thought and not any of the several specific tendencies, that is, Normativism, the Exegetical 
School, Analytical Jurisprudence, Decisionism and their principal scholars, such as Thomas Hobbes, 
John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart, among many others. 
105
 Kelsen, a normativist tendency bulwark very much studied in Brazil, for instance, exalts the formal 
validity of the norm, making it the centre of all of his conception of law. See Kelsen, Hans. Pure 
Theory of Law (Gloucester/MA, Peter Smith, 1989). 
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 It is possible, based on Nader and Hart, to catalogue the main positivist ideas from a comparative 
Brazilian and English approach. They are: (i) Identification of the law with mandates; (ii) There is no 
essential nexus between the spheres of morals and law; (iii) The study of the judicial concepts must 
be “watertight” to sociological, ethical and teleological reflection; (iv) Given the logical character of the 
judicial system, judicial decision making must be inferred independently of the support of other 
elements, such as ethics and politics; and (v) Moral judgments cannot be emitted or supported as 
related to facts. See Nader (1995, p. 175) that cites Hart. 
107
  It was based on these ideas that in England Austin “launched his attempt to develop a fully 
articulated logical system of law. He began with the idea that law is the command of the sovereign 
backed by a sanction. The task is to develop from that premise a system that is logically coherent and 
consistent”. See Cooper (2000, p. 57). The importance of the English John Austin’s (1790-1859) 
analytical jurisprudence is justified by its content as well as the influence that it had upon his 





Under the view of Positivism generally adopted in Brazil, the task of the judge 
is mainly to maintain the logical integrity of the legal system. In other words, the role 
of the judicial activity (or of judicial precedent) is to maintain the coherence of the 
existent statute law (including the Constitution). It serves, using a metaphor, as an 
amalgam to fill in undesirable gaps (for those who admit their existence) or simply to 
maintain the whole system in a more united form. 
The problem is that legal positivism has been divided into several currents. If 
there is some relative consensus concerning the aims of the judicial activity, opinions 
among Brazilian positivists are considerably divided over the constitutive attributes of 
precedents: do they create or merely reveal the law? Some of the positivists, above 
all based on a strict view of the principle of separation of powers109, deny precedents 
the attributes of creating law.110 But others, following Kelsen’s opinion, assert that a 
judicial decision does not have, as it is often supposed, a simple declaratory 
character. The judge simply does not have to find out and to declare a law that is 
already firm and finished, whose making has already been completed. The function 
of the court is not a mere “finding” of the law or “juris-dictio” in this declaratory 
meaning. The “finding” of the law, through a reasoning decision, consists of the 
determination of the general and particular norm to be applied to a concrete case. 
This determination does not simply have a declaratory nature, but a constitutive one 
as well. The important element of decisionism in the activity of the judge – though 
the judge is bound by statute law – clearly approaches Kelsen’s view to legal realism 
and the English legal positivism in general. They all believe that the law is a human 
creation and that the individual norms that decide concrete cases are created by 
judges.111,112,113 
                                                                                                                                                        
such as George Paton in Australia and Sir John Salmond in New Zealand. In Brazil, concerning this 
question, see Nader (1995, p. 181). 
108
 Kelsen, beginning with what he called “basic norm” as the basic principle, in his “Pure Theory of 
Law”, also successfully forwarded in the same direction. 
109
 This argument will be fully developed later in this Chapter.  
110
 An example is the well-known but nowadays outdated School of Exegesis. It emerged from the 
Napoleonic Code and its principal defenders included Demolombe, Bugnet, Aubry, among others. For 
them, the Code represented, both formal and materially, the only source of law, which would be 
complete and perfect, and jurists should research the law only from the rules stated in it. They denied 
judges the liberty of invoking other sources in order to find solutions to concrete cases. Concerning 
the School of Exegesis, the French style of phrase unique and precedents, see Bustamante (2007. p. 
33). 
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On the other hand, only recently (particularly in the last 20 years), Brazilian 
jurists are debating the ideas of the typical common law schools of thought, such as 
the American Sociological School of Jurisprudence and American Legal Realism.114 
The view that the law is, or must be, the maximization of social needs and the 
minimization of social tensions and costs, as developed by the American School of 
Sociological Jurisprudence, that emerged in the 20th century (represented by jurists 
such as Roscoe Pound and Julius Stone, among others115,116), for example, has 
been increasingly applied in Brazilian criminal courts. Beginning with the tenet that 
they must be engaged in this balance of interests – and denying the traditional view 
of a mere declaration of a fixed criminal law –, judges have weighed in their 
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 See Bustamante (2007. pp. 27, 100-101). 
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 Apart from these two opposite conceptions of law (naturalism and positivism), the Historical School 
can also be mentioned as an example of philosophical thought that was, in the past, an object of 
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decisions about the pros and cons of a criminal procedure when considering the low 
significance of the crime committed and have sometimes acquitted the defendant. 
With these heterodox decisions, they have contributed to the law-making role of 
precedents in Brazil. For instance, this view was recently applied by the Supreme 
Court on several occasions, as in: Habeas Corpus 107370/SP117, Habeas Corpus 
105919/RS118, Habeas Corpus 104286/SP119 and Habeas Corpus 100937/RS.120 It 
was also applied by the Superior Court of Justice many times, as in: Habeas Corpus 
203806/SP121, Habeas Corpus 185372/SP122 and Habeas Corpus 108349/RS.123 
In the last few years, the Brazilian legal community has also focused on the 
ideas of the American Legal Realism, the thought developed, in different periods, by 
at least two groups of jurists124, which consists, in general terms, of the adoption of 
an empirical method of scientific investigation in which (i) concrete reality is given 
prominence, (ii) the creation of law by judicial decisions is recognised, (iii) and a 
secondary role is attributed to the statutes.125 
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In Brazil, it is becoming quite clear that the law consists of decisions made by 
persons in charge and the judicial decisions are included in this set. In other words, 
judges also make the law. This has progressively debunked the orthodox doctrine 
according to which judges must only apply pre-existent rules. That was a mistake, 
argue the “Brazilian realists”, because frequently judges make their decisions 
according to their own political or moral preferences and choose an appropriate 
judicial rule as a rationalization. These realists also demand a scientific approach 
that focuses on both what the judges say and on what they do, as well as on the real 
impact that their decisions have on the widest parts of Brazilian society. They say 
that it is crucial to understand all this very well so that the law can be progressively 
improved. 
However, the eclectic views of American legal philosophy are better suited to 
the Brazilian tradition. Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, seeing the law through a more 
varied perspective, can be cited as a perfect example of this kind of approach.126 As 
it will be noted in detail later, Cardozo’s criticism to both declaratory and constitutive 
theories concerning the role of precedents in the making of law – that shows how 
dangerous the unrestricted adoption of any one of them is – fits perfectly with 
Brazilian law. Asserting that he recognizes “judge-made law as one of the existing 
realities of life”127, Cardozo asks: “Where does the judge find the law which he 
embodies in his judgment?”.128 And he answers: “There are times when the source is 
obvious. The rule that fits the case may be supplied by constitution or by statute”.129 
Nevertheless, he later emphasises: “It is true that codes and statutes do not render 
the judge superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. There are gaps to 
be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There are hardships and 
wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided”.130 For Cardozo, truth is midway between the 
extremes that are defended at one end by Coke, Hale and Blackstone and at the 
other by such authors as Holland, Gray and Jethro Brown.
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in Brazil – use several criteria132 to deliver their decisions, according to the 
circumstances and facts of the case in trial. Therefore, in common law countries, as 
well as in Brazil, from the work of filling in the gaps – the process used by the judge 
to decide a case that has no safe pre-existent reference (statute or case law) – 
decisions emerge that make new and binding law.133 
Indeed, as will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, from a theoretical 
point of view, there is no relevant difference between the process of production of 
case law in both civil and common law traditions. For positivism – which, although 
declining, is still the basis of two legal traditions – the role of a judge is to create 
rules (primarily, individual rules) based on the general norms of the respective legal 
system. These rules or case law – although they have different degrees of strength 
or bindingness in each tradition – is generated in the same way. 
Finally, from the point of view of post-positivism in Brazil134 (or of a neo-
constitutionalism) – which brings into the law issues that were traditionally placed 
outside the borders of the law discourse: politics, fundamental social rights and, 
above all, a potential transformation of society through or by the law – the merging of 
Brazilian law into a common law perspective is even more necessary. The Brazilian 
legal system must give effect to the substantive constitutional norms, which, in turn, 
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protect values such as equality, certainty and speed in judicial decisions.135 Faced 
with this necessity, the Brazilian state, taking into consideration these values, is 
obliged to adopt mechanisms that improve the performance of the Judiciary as a 
whole. Certainly, one of the measures to be taken is precisely the adoption of an 
effective model of binding precedents. 
 
2.5 Declarativity and Creativity of Precedents in Brazil 
 
2.5.1 The Issue 
 
A precedent can be defined as “an adjudged case or decision of a court, 
considered as furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case 
afterwards arising on a similar question of law”.136 From the reunion of this definition 
and the meaning of the expression common law as a kind of written law formed by 
precedents, emerges a question which has been constantly debated in the 
specialized Anglo-American literature: does a precedent (or the wide group of 
precedents, here denominated common law) really make the law itself or does it only 
declare the pre-existent law (legislated or not)?137 Naturally, the same kind of 
question has also been posed by Brazilian scholars when they argue that any 
doctrine of precedent will raise problems in relation to what is to be recognised as 
the law, especially in a civil law country such as Brazil. 
Addressing this question, two different points of view (about the nature of the 
judicial precedent) have divided the attention of jurists: the declaratory (or orthodox) 
theory and the constitutive theory. 
The first point of view, which can be referred to as the declaratory or orthodox 
theory, asserts that the law pre-exists judicial decisions. The existence of law, 
sometimes legislated, other times customary (of immemorial use and universally 
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recognized in the country), is independent of the judicial decisions, which are nothing 
more than a mere declaration or evidence of its existence.138,139 This theory, besides 
being adopted by renowned authors, both old (Hale, Blackstone and Carter140, for 
instance) and modern (especially in England but also in the United States of 
America), has been accepted many times in courts.141  
The second position, dominant nowadays (especially, in the United States), is 
known as the constitutive theory and understands that the law is made by judicial 
decisions, that is, “judges-make law”. Paradoxically, it was a natural consequence of 
the long historical evolution of the declarative theory. Indeed, if the judicial decisions, 
in common law countries like England, are “the” clear revelation of the existent law, 
precedents have the tendency to become “the” sources of law.142 
The principal arguments for the constitutive theory are born precisely out of 
criticism of the declaratory theory. Authors such as Gray, Holmes, Cardozo, Pound 
and Salmond assert that it is a puerile fiction to conceive law as existing 
independently of, and previous to, the judicial decisions. On the contrary, they 
defend the idea that common law is not composed of immemorial customs, but by 
the norms made by the judges when they decide concrete cases submitted for their 
consideration.143 Gray, making a deep critical analysis of the theses defended by 
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Carter and Blackstone, states that the declaratory theory must be understood as 
some form of resistance of jurists to the recognition of the fact that the courts, with 
the state’s consent, have applied, in the process of decision making, norms that did 
not pre-exist and that consequently could not be known by the parts and lawyers 
when the dispute took place. It is, Gray says, resistance to the certain fact that the 
courts are continuously making ex post facto law.144,145,146  
According to the defenders of the constitutive point of view, in any legal 
system, innumerable solutions found by the courts concern matters that were not – 
and could not have even been – previously imagined by the Legislature, which is 
limited by the necessary generality and abstraction of the norms that it produces. In 
regards to these cases, in which the norm is only found in the decisions of the 
courts, it would be a mistake to state that such solutions or “the law” already pre-
existed in the legal system.147 
 
2.5.2 The Debate Surrounding the Violation of the Principle of Separation of 
Powers and Other Relevant Questions 
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Although it is noticeable that the declaratory theory, which affirms judges do 
not create law at all, has not long been accepted without some reserve148, currently 
traces of its persistent influence can still be found in Brazil.149 The defenders of 
declaratory theory in Brazil have some plausible arguments against the possibility of 
judicial law making, especially constitutional and philosophical arguments. 
Firstly, there is the doctrine of the separation of powers, encapsulated in the 
Brazilian Constitution, which recommends that the legislative, judicial and executive 
functions of the State should be exercised by separate bodies. The possibility of the 
courts to make law would represent a clear breach of the doctrine.150 
Secondly, it is also questioned, if the decisions of the courts create law, why 
only some courts, precisely those in the appropriate hierarchical relationship to the 
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deciding court, are bound by those decisions. If the precedent contains the law, 
those courts, which are not bound by it, would not be acting under the law.151 
Thirdly, some scholars in Brazil, such as Alvim, argue that the judge, by 
basing his/her decision on authentic analytical judgments, even with the case of 
gaps in the law, will always be only an explainer of the system. This way, even 
“making” a norm, the judge will be bound, to a certain degree, by: (i) the 
constitutional structure itself; (ii) the infra-constitutional legal system, in general, in 
the sense that the “judicial norm” to be made cannot ignore or be incompatible with 
the principles of the system. On account of the fact of this existing limitation, even in 
such cases that whereas, apparently, the judge would have the authentic power to 
create law, this – they defend – is logically impossible. In cases of analogical 
application of a legal provision or a general principle of law, for instance, there is a 
gap in the statutes’ framework, but not in the legal system, which is, by definition, 
complete (the logical plenitude of the legal system). In these cases, the judge just 
explains, within the system, the manner and the form through which the concrete 
case should be solved. Notwithstanding, the judge’s work, instead of being based 
upon a statute identified in the light of the judicial facts that were brought to him, will 
consist, before the lack of statutes, in a search into the system as a whole. It is 
normally said that such a search consists of a form of integration of the judicial 
system (that is, something is aggregated to it), but what occurs is simply that the 
system is unadulterated and its norms are applied to solve controversial concrete 
cases, not subsumed under a pre-existent statute.152 
Nevertheless, with both positions in mind (declarative and constitutive), even 
in a historically civil law country such as Brazil, all these arguments can be 
surpassed. 
As for the first argument, relating to the theory of separation of powers, it is 
possible to counter that this theory is not so strict to the point of totally precluding the 
exercise, by one of the State’s powers, of a function usually attributed to another 
power. Actually, the theory of the separation of powers, although understood as 
being fundamental for political power to take action, does not deserve the almost 
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religious reverence that it occasionally receives. Once it is not a scientific 
classification of the State’s functions or a dogma of the democratic system, it is a 
recipe of liberty whose practical value depends on circumstances.153,154 
Currently, Brazil has seen the development of a new conception of the 
principle of separation of powers. This new constitutionalism abandons the idea of a 
rigid separation des pouvoirs and confirms the idea of a sharing of powers.155 
Actually, in the contemporaneous Brazilian constitutionalism, the examples of 
exercise by one of the State’s powers of another power’s typical function are widely 
known, such as the very important judicial review of legislation. The centralised and 
abstract judicial review of legislation by the Supreme Court in Brazil, which no one 
opposes, certainly represents a kind of negative legislative activity, to use the 
kelsenian expression. 
In Brazil, as Dinamarco states, it is also notable that, after the advent of the 
Constitution of 1988, the procedural system of legal protection has been changing 
from an individual to a collective perspective (with the fast development of the class 
actions, for instance). Although in this transmigration an abandonment of the 
individual protection cannot be seen, such movement means that the 
contemporaneous judge in Brazil does not manipulate exclusively individual cases 
(atomic cases, in Watanabe’s terms), but also those which, for the massive impact 
they can have, involve an impressive part of the community. This new posture 
constitutes an open path to the overcoming of that rigid logical scheme of strictly 
deductive nature, which tended to reserve the abstract and generic treatment of law 
to the Parliament and to confine the judge to the scope of concrete, specific and 
individual businesses.156 
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which the power to create law might be exercised by the Parliament (the representatives of the 
sovereign people) and nothing else was expected from the judges but the passive, dry and 
“unanimated” application of the law. See Cappelletti, Mauro. Constitucionalismo moderno e o papel 
do Poder Judiciário na sociedade contemporânea. Revista de Processo, v. 15, n. 60, out./dez. 1990, 
pp. 111. 
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Furthermore, based on a neo-constitutionalist interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988 – which brings into the law issues that were traditionally placed 
outside the borders of the law discourse: politics, fundamental social rights and, 
above all, a potential transformation of the society through or by the law – the 
Brazilian legal system, as already stated, must give effect to the substantive 
constitutional norms, which protect values such as equality, certainty and speed in 
judicial decisions. As already said, the Brazilian state is obliged to adopt 
mechanisms that improve the performance of the Judiciary as a whole. One of the 
measures to be taken is the adoption of an effective model of creative and binding 
precedents.157 
Indeed, it has become progressively clear in Brazilian judges’ mentality that 
the Judiciary, constituted by the State to administer justice on the State’s behalf, 
detains part of the State’s political power. It is illogical to consider as non-law-marker 
the Judiciary when it, (above all) in the absence of a statute rule, has permission to 
supplement the Legislature; as the courts must decide cases, they must do it for all 
the State’s purposes. Thus, the law the judges apply is the State’s law, whether they 
find it formulated in statutes or that they had to formulate it themselves.158,159 
The second argument – precedents cannot be considered as law makers 
because they have different criteria according to the court to which they are 
presented (for instance, a precedent does not bind a court that, in the hierarchy of 
the judicial system, is higher than the court from which this precedent is originated) – 
is also surmountable. Firstly, it is something that originates from the nature of things 
themselves: the court hierarchy is fundamental to the theory of stare decisis as well 
as the hierarchy of legal norms, with the supremacy of the constitution, is 
fundamental to the function of the legal system of any country. Besides, the fact that 
norms are applied in one case but not in another is a phenomenon that is commonly 
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accepted in law. In Brazil, simple examples can be found in diplomatic160 and 
parliamentary161 immunities and tax exemptions.162 They are distinctions that, if not 
originating from the nature of things, are also commonly accepted as characteristics 
of the legal system to assure its own effectiveness.  
Thirdly, refuting the argument developed by Alvim, the fact that the judicial 
system is hermetic – which is unquestionable, because, by definition, there will be 
solutions to every emerging law question – does not mean that since its 
establishment it has become complete, that it is impossible to gradually add to it with 
new norms or to make new law. Of course, the Brazilian legal system is always in 
evolution. Law is made daily, and to prove this it is enough to refer to the daily fact 
that new statutes are constantly enacted and come into operation, which evidently 
makes new law. Obviously, the same can be said in favour of the law-making role of 
precedents: the system is hermetic, once there are solutions in it to all the questions 
emerged. Certainly, this is enough for the definition of the plenitude of the system. 
However, with the new judicial decision, especially the one that is about a theme 
which has not been legislated yet, a new norm is created – law is created – that is 
aggregated to the system. 
 
2.5.3 A Critical Systematisation 
 
All this necessarily leads to a classification of the precedents in Brazil (as 
everywhere)163 into: declaratory precedents or constitutive precedents. It is 
declaratory the precedent that only recognises and applies a pre-existent rule 
(commonly statutory law), while the constitutive or creative precedent is the one that 
creates and applies a new rule. In the first case, it is possible to say, the norm is 
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applied because it already constitutes law, whereas, in the second, the norm 
becomes law for the future because it is now applied. 
In Brazil, declaratory precedents, such as in other countries of Latin origin, are 
also named precedents secundum legem. According to Steiner, this “category refers 
to judicial function of applying and interpreting existing rules”.164 In other words, 
judges act within the boundaries established by the wording of the statutes and 
codes, especially defining the meaning and the scope of their provisions. 
On the other hand, constitutive precedents are sometimes called precedents 
praeter legem. In this sort of precedent, commonly in the absence of statutes 
regulating the matter, the courts go beyond interpretation and create new rules. In a 
more subtle sense, it can be said that a creative precedent is either the judgment 
that decides a new legal question for the first time, or even a judgment that decides a 
legal question in a new or especially original manner. In Brazil, these constitutive (or 
praeter legem) precedents are supplementary and should be consistent with the 
legislation as a whole, above all the Federal Constitution.165 All of these precedents 
are linked with legislated norms or norms that should have been legislated, originally 
interpreting them, occupying the spaces left by them or expanding the limits 
previously established by them (legislative provisions).166 
In Brazil, the declaratory precedent is more common than the constitutive one. 
Many areas of law in Brazil are shaped by the legislation or even codified. Indeed, 
the majority of the issues that the courts deal with have been already regulated by 
legislative acts (or even by previous judicial decisions), meaning that what is left to 
new judicial decisions is only to declare or confirm this pre-existent law. However, as 
it happens in France, for instance, it is with constitutive precedents that judicial law 
making has been at its most creative in Brazil.167 Although far fewer in number, 
constitutive precedents are as important as, or more important than, declaratory 
precedents, once they make law where it did not previously exist. 
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Besides, it is necessary to note that in Brazil both precedents (declaratory and 
constitutive) are to be considered sources of law (as de facto sources or even, as 
many scholars already accept, as a formal source). As for declaratory precedents, it 
does not matter the fact that there is previous law concerning the same point of law 
that they encapsulate. Declaratory precedents clarify the contents of the laws, make 
them more precise and concrete, and effectively influence the judge’s future 
decisions. Regarding the constitutive precedents, the idea that both legislators and 
judges shape the law appears to be common sense in Brazilian jurisprudence. 
Although constitutive precedents can be considered new sources of law, while the 
declaratory is not, both act as paradigms for further similar cases. Thus, the division 
of the task of the Brazilian courts into two activities – the declaration of pre-existing 
laws on the one hand and the law-creation on the other – is undeniable.168 
 
2.6 Persuasive and Binding Precedents in Brazil 
 
2.6.1 The Issue 
 
In general terms, it can be said that the decision of a case taken previously by 
the Judiciary constitutes, in cases that are similar to it, a precedent. In other words, a 
precedent means a decision that is taken as somehow related or possibly influencing 
the decision of a following case. With no great effort it can be seen that precedents 
exist in any judicial system. Their attributes, however, such as their persuasive or 
binding character (or their creative or merely declaratory power, as was seen 
earlier), depend on the outlines attributed to them by the established legal system. 
In Brazil, every precedent has some authority and, in general terms, it can be 
said that the degree of authority of precedents follows the traditional parameters: (i) 
sometimes, the authority of a precedent may depend on the correctness of its 
rationale. The judge of a case, before whom the precedent is presented, is not 
bound to follow it so that the allegation of the precedent itself does not dismiss the 
demonstration of the goodness of the position taken. Thus, it is only a persuasive 
precedent; (ii) the authority of a precedent may be affirmed by itself and may impose 
a solution to a new case, unless a better alternative reason is presented. This means 
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that there is a strong presumption in favour of the precedent so that, only in 
exceptional cases, can it be disregarded, which implies a relatively binding 
precedent; (iii) besides, certain precedents can be binding on some cases and 
persuasive on others and they are considered as another kind of relatively binding 
precedent. That is because, although the origin of the precedent is one of the 
attributes considered in establishing the binding character or not of the precedent in 
a certain case, this character also depends on the hierarchy of the court where the 
precedent is being cited. For instance, the precedent of a certain court binds those 
courts that are lower than it but does not do so with higher ones; (iv) finally, the 
authority of the precedent can be so absolute that, even provided that it is a mistake, 
the court cannot depart from it. It is an absolutely binding precedent.169,170,171     
 The task now is to systematise the actual extent of this authority or, in other 
words, to show how and in what degree do precedents influence the decisions of 
similar cases in Brazil. The classification of precedents into two great categories – 
persuasive precedents and binding precedents – must be kept.  
 
2.6.2 Persuasive Precedents 
 
As stated earlier, a precedent is persuasive if the judge of the case, before 
whom the precedent is present, is not bound to follow it. If the precedent is followed, 
it is because the judge is somehow convinced of its appropriateness. Since the 
Brazilian legal system is not based upon a general doctrine of stare decisis, most 
precedents are still persuasive.172 The key consequence of this is that in Brazil, as a 
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rule, courts (including single-judges courts) do not have to follow the previous 
decisions of superior courts, the decisions of courts in the same hierarchical level or 
what they have already decided themselves. If they follow – and they frequently do – 
it is due to the persuasiveness of the precedent.173   
There is no official rule to categorise precedents according to the degree of 
their persuasiveness. The degree of persuasion of a persuasive precedent depends, 
besides the soundness of the proposition itself, on many other factors, such as: the 
hierarchical rank of the court that pronounced the decision, the reputation of the 
court, the prestige of the judge who conducted the decision, the decision’s date or 
age, if it was taken by a panel or by the full bench, if it was unanimous or not, if the 
precedent represents a trend, the quality of the arguments, the branch of law 
involved, changes in the political, economic and social background, among 
others.174,175,176,177,178,179 
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However, it is possible to elaborate a list of factors that might influence a 
court’s decision to follow or not a relevant precedent: 
(i) The hierarchical rank of the court setting the precedent is one of the most 
important factors. Although lower courts, as a rule, are not formally bound to 
apply them, they are expected to take into due account precedents of the 
higher courts. On the other hand, a precedent of a court belonging to the 
same rank is considered less effective than a precedent of a higher court. 
Previous decisions of lower courts are considered less persuasive and, when 
a decision of a lower court is quoted in a higher court decision, it is an 
example rather than an influential precedent. It can be said that the decisions 
of the Federal Supreme Court (even those that are not considered formally 
binding) and the decisions of the four Superiors Courts are considered far 
weightier than those of others courts (appellate courts and trial judges). A 
precedent of a court of appeal is deemed very persuasive by trial judges when 
the precedent is of the same appellate court that would review the judgment 
on appeal. Finally, courts have a factual tendency to follow their own previous 
decisions more strictly than precedents of other courts of same hierarchy.  
 
(ii) A decision of a court is considered more influential when it has been 
pronounced by full bench, by the special court180 (in the Superior Court of 
Justice, for instance) or by a criminal or civil section181 of a court than when it 
has been delivered by a small panel or by a single judge on behalf of the 
court. Sometimes, indeed, the Supreme Court (and its Justices), when it is 
dealing with especially important issues and expected to deliver a judgment 
that should influence subsequent cases, rather prefers – and it has regimental 
permission to do this – to decide in full bench rather than by a panel or by a 
single judge on behalf of the court. 
 
(iii) The reputation of the court – that is, the conservatism or progressiveness 
of the court concerning certain agenda, the quality of its previous decisions, 
the authority of the court or the panel on given matters, the acknowledge 
independence of its judges, among other factors – does play an important role 
in determining the persuasiveness of its decision. As for the Brazilian law, as 
a matter of principle, the judges’ prestige is something that is hard to consider 
because, in theory, all judges of a court have the same status (except, 
perhaps, in a certain sense, the president). However, since it is always made 
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public which judge wrote which opinion, the reputation (as certain judges are 
known to be particularly wise in certain matters) is also relevant. In practice, 
the decisions of some judges are considered more respectfully than others. 
 
(iv) If there is some formal dissent, it is always stated in the decision, which is 
labelled as “by majority”. If not, the decision is labelled as “unanimous”. The 
dissenting opinion(s) is (are) sometimes published together with the majority 
opinion. Therefore, the presence or absence of dissent might influence the 
weight given to the precedent. 
 
(v) The age of a precedent is also a relevant factor. A definite opinion about 
the issue does not yet exist, but new precedents are generally considered 
more influential than the older ones. Old precedents should be considered 
with caution simply because the law in Brazil is very changeable. They tend to 
be considered as being somewhat superseded and have little influence when 
the social, political and economic background has changed and, especially, 
when the legal basis of the issue has changed. Evidently, no value at all can 
be ascribed to old precedents that have been explicitly overruled or 
superseded by newer ones. 
 
(vi) Whether the precedent represents a trend or is part of a line of decisions 
is also highly relevant. In particular, if a court adheres to its own prior 
decisions, this is a clear indication that it will not alter its understanding. 
 
(vii) Changes in the social, political and economic backgrounds are especially 
relevant. Changes in these backgrounds since the date of the precedent are 
considered sufficient reasons to not apply it. Such an argument is invoked 
daily by courts as a justification for not following an old precedent or even to 
set a new interpretation on it. On other hand, a new precedent will be 
considered highly influential when it effectively reflects the new political, 
economic and social panorama. 
 
(viii) Obviously, legislative changes in related areas since the prior decision 
took place are also considered highly relevant as the Brazilian legal system, 
historically linked with the civil law, is primarily based on codes, statutes and 
the Federal Constitution. 
 
(ix) Another important factor is whether a certain field of the law is completely 
or mostly regulated by legislative provisions, because, where they are lacking 
– such as in the cases of administrative, labour and social security law, which 
are not codified in Brazil –, precedents play, in terms of frequency and 
decisiveness, a more significant role. Besides, significant importance can be 
perceived among the uses of precedents in constitutional, electoral and tax 
law, supposedly due to the fact that cases in these areas deal mainly with 
legal issues while in others areas, such as criminal law, judges often devote 
their main attention to issues of fact.  
 
(x) Certainly, the proper soundness of the supporting arguments in the 
decision is of greatest importance for subsequent cases. It can be said that 





main reason for following a precedent. In particular, the soundness is 
especially relevant when a very new precedent is considered to be followed, 
when a precedent (generally, an old one) is debated in order to decide 
whether to overrule it or not, or when there are conflicting precedents.  
 
2.6.3 Binding Precedents: the Debate Surrounding the Violation of the 
“Principle of the Rational Persuasion of the Judge” 
 
One of the objections, probably the most common, raised against the 
adoption of any doctrine of binding precedent in Brazil – and more specifically to the 
new Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula – is that this would change the 
judge’s decision into a simple mechanism of applying the existent precedent to the 
case on trial.182 The judge would lose his free conviction to decide and would be 
completely prevented from departing from a precedent, although he/she considered 
it wrong. It is argued that judges in Brazil are constitutionally independent and bound 
only to the Constitution and statutes, and they cannot be bindingly submitted to any 
judicial previous decisions.183       
But those in Brazil who have a minimum knowledge about the theory of stare 
decisis as it is applied in common law countries know that this is not true. Actually, 
although the doctrine of binding precedent (or stare decisis) means that judges must 
follow precedents, in practice the judicial decisions, in systems informed by any rule 
of binding precedent (England and the United States are examples of this), are 
neither neutral nor mechanical. The rule is to follow the precedent, but, often, for 
several pertinent reasons, a court may depart from an (apparently) binding 
precedent. In England, Elliot and Quinn explain that, “in theory, only the Supreme 
Court [formerly, the House of Lords], which can overrule its own decisions as well as 
those of other courts, can depart from precedent: all other courts must follow the 
precedent that applies in a particular case, however much they dislike it”. However, 
“there are a number of ways in which judges may avoid awkward precedents that at 
first sight might appear binding”.184,185 
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Secondly, this minority resistant view in Brazil has an inconceivable lack of 
pragmatism, because, in favour of a mythologically free persuasion of the judge, it 
wastes all the advantages of the doctrine of binding precedent. It is romantic, unreal 
and, above all, contrary to the public interest.186 Taking as an example the issue of 
the judicial review of legislation, which in Brazil aggregates both the centralised and 
decentralised models, a strong dispute between them has been experienced for 
many years. The multiplicity of cases with different decisions, in areas such as social 
security, tax or administrative law but also related to constitutional law, requires the 
adoption of efficient mechanisms in order to uniform unify this disconnected case 
law. The adoption of a doctrine of stare decisis in Brazil (specifically the adoption of 
the Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula) – the majority opinion agrees – is not intended 
to undermine the role of the lower courts; what is desired is a reinforcement of the 
role of the highest national court in order to have rapid decisions and, above all, a 
uniformed case law. 
An excerpt of the opinion of Justice Francisco Rezek in Declaratory Action of 
Constitutionality 1/DF illustrates well what this issue means to the Supreme Court: 
 
There was a time – older members of this Court remember – in which a 
certain Appellate Court, in a prestigious unit of the Federation, chronically and 
clearly defied the Supreme Court’s case law (by the way, a minor theme: the 
representation of the offended woman in crime against the customs). The 
                                                                                                                                                        
were careful enough to list them and they can be, to a proper degree and with proper adaptations, 
applied to the Brazilian law: (i) by distinguishing the awkward precedent on its facts – arguing that the 
facts of the case under consideration are different in some important way from those of the previous 
case, and therefore the rule laid down does not apply to them. Since the facts are unlikely to be 
identical, this is the simplest way to avoid an awkward precedent, and the courts have made some 
extremely narrow distinctions in this way; (ii) by distinguishing the point of law – arguing that the legal 
question answered by the precedent is not the same as that asked in the present case; (iii) by giving 
the precedent a very narrow ratio decidendi. The only part of a decision that forms binding precedent 
is the ratio, the legal principle on which the decision is based. Since judges never state ‘this is the 
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the ratio and therefore bind the courts in later cases. Judges who wish to avoid an awkward 
precedent may reason that those parts of the judgment which seem to apply to their case are not part 
of the ratio, and are only obiter dicta, which they are not obliged to follow; (iv) by arguing that the 
precedent has no clear ratio decidendi. There are usually three judges sitting in Court of Appeal 
cases, and five in the Supreme Court. Where each judge in the former case has given a different 
reason for coming to the same decision, or where, for example, two judges of the Supreme Court take 
one view, two more another, and the fifth agrees with none of them, it can be argued that there is no 
one clear ratio decidendi for the decision; (v) by claiming that the precedent is inconsistent with a later 
decision of a higher court, and has been overruled by implication; (vi) by stating that the previous 
decision was made per incuriam, meaning that the court failed to consider some relevant statute or 
precedent.; (vii) by arguing that the precedent is outdated, and no longer current with modern 
thinking. See Elliott and Quinn (2011, p. 12). 
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Supreme Court had a firm, constant and unanimous position about it, and this 
Appellate Court, because it thought about it differently, used to decide on the 
terms of its own conviction, alleging the so-called “freedom of persuasion”, 
proper to every judge and court. The result: all those decisions were, through 
an extraordinary appeal, reversed by this court. That thing that should end in 
its origin, according to the Supreme Court’s case law, it only ended here, after 
a lamentable expenditure of financial resources, time and energy in a judiciary 
that is already congested and with a minimum time to take care of new things. 
And when did it happen that the Supreme Court’s case law failed and the 
rebellious court’s decision found its glory moment? When the defendant, 
because he was assisted by a negligent lawyer or he was lacking in other 
means, did not appeal. Only in this circumstance the unfortunate defiance of 
the Supreme Court worked. With all due respect, I do not see any beauty in 
this. On the contrary, it seems an immoral situation to which the judicial 
consciousness should not give in at all.187 
 
Thirdly, it can be said that the constitutional principle of the rational 
persuasion of the judge or freedom to interpret law, although it is very important, 
must be reconciled with the principle of equality of all before the law, which is also 
encapsulated in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. Every time diverging judicial 
decisions are applied to similar cases, this being a fruit of an almost religious 
embrace of a judge’s freedom of persuasion, the constitutional principle of equality 
before the law, in its contents, is seriously attacked. In other words, the constitutional 
expression contained in the Brazilian Constitution’s article 5º, caput, will remain as 
an empty formula unless the courts reconciliate both principles; and to have this 
reconciliation, it is necessary to acertain the non-destruction of any of them.188,189 
It is important to make it clear that the establishment of a more 
comprehensive approach to binding precedent in Brazil (in the case of the Supreme 
Court’s Binding Súmula) does not signify imposing ties to lower courts and judges so 
                                                 
187
 Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade – ADC-QO 1/DF – STF – Full Bench – Rapporteur 
Justice Moreira Alves – j. 27-10-1993 – DJ 16-6-1995 – LEX/JSTF, n. 214, pp. 52-53. 
188
 Tassara comments on the tension the famous “judges’ independence”, which would not be so real, 
in quite interesting way. According to him, judgements are inevitably linked with prejudices. This 
implies a peculiar dependence of the judge: of himself and of everything that makes up its interpretive 
horizon. This dependence of the judge of his own environment, together with openness of the 
statutory language, in part explains the plurality of interpretation that different judges end up 
producing. Precedents will help to reduce this kind “dependence”. Binding the judges to precedents is 
to oblige them to control their prejudices by dialoguing with the reasoning of their peers. This will 
increase the external dimension of the judge’s independence, because nothing ruins more the 
confidence in justice than the appearance of arbitrariness ('independence' without control) in those in 
charge of realizing it. See Tassara, Andrés Ollero. Igualdad en la aplicación de la ley y precedente 
judicial (Serie Cuadernos e Debates, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1989), pp. 83-84. 
189





there are no possibilities for them to see the law in a new way when the 
understanding that is bindingly adopted shows signs that is outdated under inevitable 
social changes. What is proposed is a formula for preventing the litigants’ fortune 
from depending on the frequent changes in the composition of the courts and the 
changes in the understanding that comes from this (which is very common in Brazil 
nowadays), depending on the mere distribution of the case to judicial body X or Y or, 
which may be seen as being even worse, depending on the vanity or the 
stubbornness of the judge of the case. 
Finally, to tell the truth, in strict terms there is no violation of the freedom of 
persuasion of judges in Brazil with the adoption of a rule of stare decisis.190 Actually, 
in Brazil, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, even after the Federal Supreme Court 
states a certain understanding in an “Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade” or in an 
“Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade”191, for instance, nothing prevents judges 
or lower courts, although it is not very practical, from adopting a contrary position to 
the Supreme Court (the same is to happen with Binding Súmula, as will be seen in 
Chapter 5). Against the disobedient decision, there are no disciplinary sanctions.  As 
will be seen later, the consequence of this is simply to allow a “Reclamação” to the 
Supreme Court in order provoke it to restore the authority of its own binding decision.  
Nery da Silveira, a former Justice of the Supreme Court, in obiter dicta of his 
opinion in Declaratory Action of Constitutionality 4/DF, confirms this point of view: 
 
I also make it clear that, in my point of view, our judicial system does not 
authorise the coercion of the judge’s activity. If, by chance, magistrates have 
a different understanding from the Federal Supreme Court, I am not 
preventing them from deciding according to their conscience. To ensure the 
magistrate’s independence to every degree is part of our best judicial 
tradition. The Supreme Court is the top of the system, but any magistrate of 
this Nation must have the power to decide independently. I am sure, however, 
that, once the preliminary injunction is granted, with a biding effect, from that 
moment on, no judge, in cases in which that norm would be applicable, can 
refuse to follow it, for a question of logic, because the magistrate knows that, 
if he does so, he will be harming the party, who will then be compelled to 
come to the Supreme Court and, presenting a complaint [“Reclamação”], 
demand the cassation of the lower court’s decision, for ignoring this Court. 
However, I emphasize that the judge will take no risk of a disciplinary sanction 
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if he always decides, justifiably, according to his conscience and 
independence.192 
 
2.6.4 Binding Precedents in Brazil: a First Systematisation   
 
As previously seen, a precedent is relatively binding when the court has the 
power to depart from it once there are good reasons to do so. The proposition 
encapsulated in the (supposedly) binding precedent is so incorrect that it must be, in 
the interest of justice, avoided. The absolutely binding precedent is one that must be 
followed, even though the judge or the court considers it incorrect or irrational.  
However, in Brazil, the classification of precedents as persuasive, relatively 
binding or absolutely binding, concerning the concrete case that is being decided, 
depends on extrinsic factors, such as the hierarchy between the courts of the 
precedent and the case in trial. The force of a precedent can vary under these 
different circumstances and cannot be considered as part of its internal attributes. 
Indeed, in Brazil the same previous decision can simultaneously be binding upon 
one court and merely persuasive for another, considering, for instance, the rank of 
the court that laid it down and its relation to the court that actually applies this 
precedent. To put it another way, the classification, in persuasive or binding 
precedents is specifically valid for the case that is actually being decided. Thus, 
some authors193 tend to disregard the utility of the subdivision of binding precedent 
as being relative and absolute, recognising only the existence of two types of 
precedents: persuasive and binding (or the “true” precedent, meaning that only 
binding precedents are considered as precedents in the proper sense).  
As it is necessary to define the Brazilian classification about the 
persuasiveness and bindingness of precedents, this graduation between absolute 
and relative binding precedents will be not used, but only the classification between 
binding precedents and persuasive precedents throughout this thesis (sometimes 
considering the case that is being decided).194 
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Finally, in Brazil, taking into consideration the term “precedent” in a broader 
sense, there are some examples of precedents that are formally and aprioristically 
binding and are supposed to be followed in every subsequent case. There are, for 
instance, the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, in the centralised judicial 
review of legislation, concerning the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of statutory 
provisions. Either the Federal Supreme Court considers the legislation constitutional 
or unconstitutional, the others courts and the Executive bodies must bindingly apply 
the Supreme Courts’ understanding.195 The new Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula 
can also be cited as a good example of this. These binding precedents lato sensu 
shall be fully addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
2.6.5 The New Bindingness of the Federal Supreme Court Decisions in the 
Context of the Decentralised (“Difuso”) Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
Recently, the Federal Supreme Court has taken an important step towards a 
wider adoption of the idea of stare decisis in Brazil. Historically, the Supreme Court 
decisions in the context of the decentralised196 judicial review of legislation 
(commonly in concrete cases via extraordinary appeal), which declare the 
unconstitutionality of a legislative provision, are considered mere persuasive 
precedents. Actually, according to article 52, X, of the Federal Constitution, these 
decisions of the Supreme Court require a further interference of the Federal Senate, 
which should pass a resolution, in order to give erga omnes and binding 
effectiveness to the declaration of unconstitutionality. However, mirroring the 
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legislative changes that the legal system has suffered (above all the determinations 
of Law 9882/1999, related to the centralised judicial review of legislation, and the 
creation of the Binding Súmula by the new article 103-A of the Brazilian Federal 
Constitution, regulated by Law 11417/2006), the Supreme Court is likely to change 
this understanding about the authority of these decisions in the decentralised review. 
Indeed, in some recent cases, the court has stated that its decisions, even those 
taken in the decentralised review in concrete cases, must bind all other courts when 
they deal with the same legal/constitutional issue. In other words, these precedents 
in strict sense (or their rationale) shall be taken as the reference point by the lower 
courts, concerning the issue of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the 
legislation, in case of these courts have to decide concrete cases connected with this 
issue.197 
The leading case for this case law overruling was Reclamação 4335/AC198, 
where the Supreme Court explicitly started to change its quasi-secular 
understanding that its decisions in the decentralised control of constitutionality had 
only inter partes effects and persuasive authority in further cases. 
The Reclamação 4335/AC was filed by the Public Defence Service of the 
State of Acre against a decision of one of the criminal courts of the capital of the 
State (Rio Branco city), responsible for execution and supervision of criminal 
sentences of convicted felons while serving time. This criminal court had dismissed 
applications in favour of several convicts, who were serving sentences of fully 
imprisonment for hideous crimes, for a progression to a regime of less severe 
conditions. The Reclamação alleged that the criminal court of the state of Acre, while 
dismissing the progression of the regime of those condemned for hideous crimes 
simply based on prohibition of this progression by the § 1º of article 2º of Law 
8072/1990 (Law of Hideous Crimes), had disobeyed the previous decision of the 
Supreme Court in Habeas Corpus 82959/SP
199
, which had considered that 
legislative provision unconstitutional. 
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In his opinion, Justice Gilmar Mendes (the rapporteur of the decision and a 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) stated that, according to the traditional 
understanding, the suspension of the legislation, previously declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court in the decentralised and concrete judicial review, by the 
Federal Senate is the political act that lends erga omnes effectiveness to that 
declaration. He asserted, however, that the amplitude given to the abstract control of 
norms after the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988, above all the 
advent of Law 9882/1999, has contributed to undermining the belief in the 
correctness of the necessity of this posterior suspension of the legislation by the 
Senate, which is clearly inspired by a concept of separation of powers that today 
would be surpassed. The rapporteur considered that the Federal Constitution of 
1988 itself and the Law 9882/1999 had radically changed the concept of the 
separation of powers in Brazil, becoming much more common in the legal system 
decisions, in judicial review of legislation, with overall and binding effectiveness than 
it was under the previous constitutions. He also stressed that reinterpretations of the 
categories linked to the decentralised judicial review of legislation, notably the 
requirement of an absolute majority for the declaration of unconstitutionality and the 
suspension of enforcement of the law declared unconstitutional only by resolution of 
the Senate, are inevitable. The line of argument of Justice Gilmar Mendes was that 
the constitutional provision – which states that the erga omnes effectiveness of the 
declaration of unconstitutionality issued by the Supreme Court in the decentralised 
judicial review depends on a further deliberation of the Senate (introduced in Brazil 
by the Constitution of 1934 and preserved by the Constitution of 1988) – has lost 
much of its meaning with the parallel model of abstract judicial control of legislation. 
He considered the “interference” of the Senate as a simple way of giving general 
publicity to the Supreme Court’s decision, which was perfectly supplied by the 
publication of the decision in the official press which delivered all Supreme Court 
decisions.200,201 
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The new understanding led by the (former) Chief Justice concerning article 
52, X, of the Federal Constitution is a clear case of constitutional mutation, where the 
Supreme Court, more than exercising the power of interpreting and extracting a rule 
of the constitutional text, self-recognised the power to change the constitutional text 
in comment.202 
In his opinion in Reclamação 4335/AC, Justice Gilmar Mendes, considering 
dispensable the intervention of the Federal Senate, concluded that the decisions 
taken by the criminal court of the state of Acre had disregard the erga onmes and 
binding effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s decision (precisely, its rationale) in the 
Habeas Corpus 82959/SP (a case of concrete and decentralised judicial review of 
legislation). He upheld the Reclamação (the preventive measure) and annulled these 
contested decisions. He also determined that the criminal court in the state of Acre to 
deliver – considering that the § 1º of article 2º of Law 8072/1990, which had 
prohibited the progression of the regime of those convicts for committing heinous 
crimes, was considered unconstitutional (the rationale of the precedent Habeas 
Corpus 82959/SP) – new decisions assessing, in each concrete case, whether those 
interested in the progression do or do not meet the general legal requirements to 
enjoy the benefit.203 
Furthermore, in what is currently called in Brazil the “objectivation” of the 
decentralised judicial review of legislation performed by the Supreme Court204, this 
understanding, which gives erga omnes and binding effectiveness to decisions taken 
in this control, has been applied in other cases.205,206 According to the Informative 
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455 of the Federal Supreme Court, the Court upheld, in a trail “en block”, 4908 
extraordinary appeals filed by the National Service of Social Security in which were 
discussed whether Law 9032/1995 should be applied to retirement pensions and 
death pensions granted before that this law had come to force. Initially, the Court, by 
majority, emphasizing the homogeneity of the issue dealt in the cases in trial and 
paying homage to what article 5º, LXXVIII, of the Federal Constitution states (the 
resolution of judicial disputes within a reasonable time), decided to continue the trial 
of all 4908 extraordinary appeals en bloc. With respect to its merits, the Court 
unanimously applied the guidance reached in the decisions of two previous similar 
extraordinary appeals. Invoking once more the fundamental right to a quick 
procedure, it gave binding effect to these two precedents, this time using the 
additional advantage of the novel possibility of a judgment en bloc. 
To summarise, this chapter has presented part of the traditional (essentially 
civil law) approach to precedents in Brazil in order to compare it to England. Having 
fulfilled in this chapter the purpose of addressing the role of precedents in the 
formulation of the law in Brazil and systematising concepts (such as 
creativeness/declarativeness and persuasiveness/bindingness of precedents) and 
terms, the following chapter will analyse the practical uses of precedents in Brazil still 
under a traditional civil law perspective and then compare them to the English model. 
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3 Dealing with Precedents in Brazil 
 
 
3.1 General Considerations 
 
This chapter will discuss how judges in Brazil, while still operating under a civil 
law perspective, in practice deal with precedents. The issues that will be dealt with in 
this chapter include the way Brazilian judges evaluate old and new precedents; how 
Brazilian judges discriminate – if they do so – ratio decidendi and obiter dicta; how 
they deal with seemingly relevant precedents; why Brazilian judges so frequently 
depart from precedents; how they deal with the issue of prospective overruling; and 
how precedents are reported in Brazil.  
In Brazil, precedents have been models for future decisions207, but because of 
the function that the system historically attributes to them – a persuasive force, 
generally – they formally tend to play a secondary role when compared with the 
legislated norms.208,209 Based on the civil law tradition, the approach to precedents in 
Brazil can be summarised as follows: (i) the key to the system is that the lower 
courts do not have to follow the previous decisions of the superior courts; (ii) courts 
and judges do not have to follow precedents of courts and judges at the same 
hierarchical level. Thus, if a court or a judge is called upon to decide a case and 
finds that there is a precedent of a court at the same level, they are not bound to 
maintain the same approach; (iii) courts and judges do not have to follow what they 
have already decided themselves. The fact that a specific court has always decided, 
in a particular way, a category of cases, does not forbid it, in any given moment, from 
adopting another direction that seems to it (the court) more appropriate.210,211 
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Besides, considering how judges and courts present212 and ground their 
decisions, precedents have been manipulated in different ways in Brazil. Some have 
been content to rely on authority found in the codes or statutes, only superficially 
considering the pertinent precedents. Others have gone deeper, carefully reasoning 
on precedents, examining each issue as considered by other courts and judges.213 
However, as already said, the last decades in Brazil have seen a clear 
increase in the use of precedents in the terms of frequency and creativity. 
Increasingly, precedents are used as one of the main grounds for most judicial 
decisions. Currently, courts’ and judges’ decisions rather infrequently refer only to 
the Constitution or the relevant statutes, and precedents are quoted even when the 
legal issue is “covered” by legislative provisions. Very frequently the statutory 
provisions are addressed, analysed and interpreted by means of the discussion of 
related precedents, and they gain persuasive force when they are embodied in one 
or several precedents. In these cases, the use of precedents has been a sort of 
medium for the reference to the legislation and not an alternative to it. 
Certainly, the way judges in Brazil apply precedents does not correspond to 
the common law experience, but, on the other hand, it is not a simple mechanical 
activity, in which the Brazilian judge has a passive position of verifying if some court 
(particularly a higher court) has already pronounced on the matter and, if persuaded, 
decides in the same way. Although some law professionals, educated under a 
Roman-German tradition, can think that this is the manner of applying precedents to 
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concrete cases214, this extremely simplistic and distorted view does not correspond 
to reality in Brazil. This reality is much more complex. 
To understand how judges deal with precedents in Brazil it is necessary to 
have some previous understanding of many legal concepts related to the doctrine of 
stare decisis and how to manipulate them. It is fundamental, for instance, to 
understand how Brazilian courts evaluate precedents. It is necessary to understand 
the concepts of ratio decidendi and obiter dicta as they are characterized in Brazil. 
Besides, in comparing both the precedent and the case to be decided, it is 
imperative to be aware (and recognise if it is the case) of the possibility of 
distinguishing and overruling to an accurate application of the precedent. It is 
essential to address the issue of prospective overruling in Brazil. Finally, it is 
necessary to emphasise the role that law reporting plays in the way case law grows 
under the Brazilian legal system.  
Once again, in order to provide a useful Anglo-Brazilian comparison, it will be 
necessary to deal with many concepts and terms of the common law doctrine of 
stare decisis, which are not familiar in the Brazilian law vocabulary. Certainly, it is 
difficult to transplant these concepts and terms to Brazilian law by means of simply 
reading and writing them, while adding that, even in common law countries, they are 
very controversial subjects. The reverse is also true: it will be imperative to deal with 
many concepts and terms of Brazilian law and it is not an easy task to present them 
to an English audience. However, a meaningful comparison is not impossible. In 
order to fulfil this purpose, this chapter will always cross-culturally debate the 
concepts, techniques and the respective vocabulary of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Based on this, the Brazilian traditional way of dealing with precedents will be critically 
presented. 
 
3.2 Evaluating Precedents 
 
Brazilian courts and judges have developed their own way of evaluating 
persuasive precedents. Although there is no formal categorization of these 
precedents according to the degree of influence or prestige, the following 
considerations can summarise how Brazilian courts and judges in general have 
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evaluated precedents – or what criteria they have given priority to – in order to follow 
them or their supporting arguments. 
First of all, it is imperative to recall that the use of precedents to ground later 
decisions in Brazil is more frequent and decisive in some branches of law than in 
others. If a certain field of the law is only partially regulated by legislative provisions, 
such as in the cases of administrative and social security law, which are not codified 
in Brazil, precedents play a more significant role. In these cases, courts and judges 
tend to rely on precedents and these areas in Brazilian law have been considerably 
developed by case law. Besides, significant importance can be perceived among the 
uses of precedents in constitutional, electoral, labour and tax law, possibly due to the 
fact that cases in these areas deal predominantly with questions of law while in 
others areas, such as criminal law, judges have to mainly focus on the issues of fact. 
Another peculiarity that is noted in the use of precedents by Brazilian courts is 
linked to the different levels of the judicial structure. Lower courts and judges often 
devote their attention to the issues of fact and, consequently, in cases before them, 
the use of precedents, commonly being limited to the decision of the issues of law, 
seems to be less decisive. On the other hand, since higher courts – specially, the 
Supreme Court and the Superior Courts – deal mainly with issues of law, precedents 
play an important role in the rationale of their judgments. 
Apart from this, the proper soundness of the supporting arguments in the 
previous decision has been of great importance for the decision of subsequent 
cases. It can be said that, frequently, the soundness (or the high persuasiveness) of 
the arguments is the main reason for following a precedent. In particular, the 
soundness is especially relevant when a very new precedent is considered as 
suitable for following, when a precedent (generally, an older one) is debated on in 
order to decide whether to overrule it or not, or when there are conflicting 
precedents. 
The hierarchical rank of the court the pronounced the decision is also certainly 
another important factor in the process of evaluating a precedent. Although lower 
courts, as a rule, are not formally bound to apply, they are expected to carefully 
consider precedents of the higher courts. Precedents of courts belonging to the 
same rank are regarded as less effective than precedents of higher courts. Previous 
decisions of lower courts are regarded as being not very persuasive and, when a 





than an influential precedent. It can be said that the decisions of the Federal 
Supreme Court (even those that are not considered formally binding) and the 
decisions of the four Superior Courts are considered stronger than those of other 
courts (for example, appellate courts and trial judges). A precedent of a court of 
appeal is deemed very persuasive by trial judges when the precedent is of the same 
appellate court that would review the judgment on appeal. Finally, courts have a 
factual tendency to follow their own previous decisions more strictly than precedents 
of other courts of same hierarchy.  
The reputation of the court – that is, the conservatism or progressiveness of 
the court concerning certain agenda, the quality of its previous decisions, the 
authoritativeness of the court or the panel on given matters, the acknowledged 
independence of its judges, among others factors – also plays an important role in 
determining the influence of the decision. As for the Brazilian law, as a matter of 
principle, the judges’ prestige is something that is difficult to evaluate because, in 
theory, all judges of a court have the same status. However, since in collegiate 
courts it is always made public which judge wrote the opinion, in practice, the 
decisions of (or written by) some judges are more respectfully considered than the 
decisions of others.215 
A decision of a court is also viewed as being more influential when it has been 
pronounced by (one of the following) the full bench, the special court (in the Superior 
Court of Justice, for instance) or a criminal or civil section than when it has been 
delivered by a small panel or a single judge (on behalf of the court). Indeed, 
sometimes, the Supreme Court, when dealing with especially important issues and is 
expected to deliver a decision that could influence subsequent cases, rather prefers 
– and it has regimental permission to do so – to decide in full bench than by a panel 
or by a single Justice on behalf of the court. 
The quorum of the decision is also a relevant factor in the process of 
evaluation. In Brazil, if there are one or more dissenting opinions, it is always stated 
in the decision, and the dissenting opinions are commonly published together with 
the majority opinion. If this is not the case, the decision is labelled as unanimous. 
Therefore, the presence or absence of dissent might influence the weight given to 
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the precedent. As Tucci remembers, dissenting opinions, which have the nature of 
dicta, in some situations end up highlighting the cracks in the paradigm of the 
prevalent understanding and, in some way, indicate a possible change in the 
assessment of similar questions later.216 
A characteristic that also deserves close attention is the special manner of 
evaluating old and new precedents in Brazil in comparison to the English approach. 
In countries related to the tradition of common law – and taking England for example 
– a precedent never loses its strength with the simple passage of time. Since it is still 
relevant in principle, it maintains its authority. The fact is, in England, the older the 
precedent the more valuable it is, as it is gradually illustrated and reinforced by later 
decisions that have preserved and updated it. Repeatedly interpreted and applied, it 
also reflects the wisdom of the various courts, as knowledge that transcends fleeting 
moments. Furthermore, a coherent line of precedents represents not only the 
experiences of several judges, but also their different talents and expertise, enabling 
them to engage with their peers both from the past and the present. A longstanding 
precedent, if preserved, proves to be the most precious material that has survived 
the test of time.217,218 
Conversely, in Brazil, old precedents commonly lose their strength with the 
passage of time and the newest precedent is always the most sought after and the 
most valued. Law professionals are aprioristically looking for the Supreme Court’s 
most recent (preferably from the same year) point of view about the issue.219 Since 
their time as law students, they are strongly recommended to not rely on old 
precedents, as these precedents frequently no longer represent the current court’s 
understanding about the researched issue.220 In truth, old precedents tend to be 
considered with caution because in general case law in Brazil is not reliable. Given 
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the absence of a general rule of binding precedents that assures uniformity and 
stability, the Brazilian case law is very changeable. It is common, within a short lapse 
of time, for minor or even radical changes to be made in the case law of any court 
concerning any issue. The main result is that a stable line of precedents is not 
preserved. Consequently, the more recent a precedent is, the more likely it is to be 
the real and current case law of the court, and this makes it more valuable. 
Changes in the social, political and economic backgrounds, which are very 
common in Brazil, are also especially relevant in evaluating old and new precedents. 
Changes in these contexts are considered sufficient reasons not to apply old 
precedents. Such an argument is invoked daily by courts as a justification for not 
following an old precedent or even to set a new interpretation to it. On the other 
hand, a new precedent will be considered highly influential when it effectively reflects 
the new political, economic and social panorama. 
Certainly, legislative changes in related areas since the prior decision took 
place are also considered highly relevant as the Brazilian legal system, historically 
linked with the civil law family, is primarily based on legislative provisions. An old 
precedent may be considered influential when the legal basis of the legal issue has 
not changed substantially, but they tend to be considered superseded or of no value 
at all when the legal basis of the issue that they deal with has changed. 
 
3.3 Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum 
 
Under the common law tradition, rather than what many people in civil law 
countries believe to be true, the only part of a precedent which is binding is its ratio 
decidendi or reason for deciding.221,222,223 Thus, if a proposition that is part of the 
decision is not part of its ratio decidendi, it is, by definition, a dictum or obiter dictum, 
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and, consequently, not binding.224,225 These dicta226 can be strongly persuasive and 
be followed, but are never binding.227,228,229 
If the categories of ratio decidendi and obiter dictum are fundamental to the 
theory of precedents under a common law perspective, the first task that a common 
lawyer must do when analysing a precedent is to try to identify what propositions 
really constitute its ratio decidendi, distinguishing from the mere obiter dicta.230 
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However, on many occasions, it is extremely complicated to reach a precise 
distinction between the obiter dicta and the ratio decidendi of a precedent. Indeed, 
according to Duxbury, “the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, 
although important, is not easily made”.231 The reality is that common law theorists 
have been unable to agree on a harmonious concept or a test for the 
individualisation of the ratio decidendi. Not coincidently, this concept in the English 
Courts has been, as stated by Gottlieb, “unprincipled and inconsistent”.232,233,234 
At first sight, this challenging task is not considered a problem in Brazil. 
Indeed, as precedents are commonly persuasive, it is not considered in Brazil a 
court’s duty to indicate the ratio decidendi of a precedent in order to follow what is 
stated in it. 
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Evidently, precedents in Brazil have rationes decidendi and obiter dicta. The 
Superior Court of Justice’s decision in Special Appeal 954.859235 gives us a good 
example how ratio decidendi and obiter dictum differ in Brazilian precedents.236 This 
decision dealt with the interpretation of article 457-J of the Brazilian Code of Civil 
Procedure, precisely the question whether this article requires, for the application of 
the fine it establishes, the personal notifying of the fined party. The court ended by 
stating that the fine has to have effect independently of the notification. The 
rapporteur, in his opinion, stated that some scholars see the need for a personal 
notification of the party: “They use the argument that it is not possible to assume that 
the decision published in the official press has come to the attention of the party, 
because those who follow these publications are only the lawyer, but the argument is 
unconvincing. First of all, there is no legal provision requiring such personal 
notification. Articles 236 and 237 of the mentioned Code are sufficiently clear in this 
regard. Secondly, the lawyer must be in permanent contact with the client. It is up to 
the lawyer to communicate to the client that there was a condemnation against him. 
Indeed, a good lawyer should forward to the formal notification, preventing the client 
to be able to perform what was determined by the decision”. However, the rapporteur 
added that “if the lawyer negligently omits to inform the client to perform the decision 
and the fine applied, the lawyer must be responsible for such damage”. It is 
important to note that the Superior Court of Justice was not judging the responsibility 
of the negligent lawyer, but only considering the need for the party to be notified for 
the application of the fine. Thus, the observation of the rapporteur, in the sense that 
the lawyer becomes responsible for the fine if he does not inform his client on the 
decision, was a clear obiter dictum. It was an en passant argument, completely 
separated from the question that was being decided and unnecessary to arrive at the 
conclusion of the decision. This observation, that the negligent lawyer is indirectly 
responsible for a fine of article 475-J of the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, can 
never be considered as the ratio decidendi of the precedent. 
 However, these categories do not have to be duly distinguished to verify 
which is to be followed or not. If the grounds for this in England is that the judges’ 
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power to interpret the precedent has its limits in the doctrine of stare decisis itself, 
which imposes obedience only to the ratio decidendi of the precedent, in Brazil, as 
the courts are not bound by the doctrine, the judges can freely interpret the 
precedent to reach a principle – independently of its characterisation as ratio 
decidendi or obiter dictum – which they feel to be just or appropriate to apply to their 
decisions. In other words, the later court, if dealing with a persuasive precedent, is 
entitled to interpret this precedent to freely extract the doctrine which will then be 
persuasively followed. 
Certainly, judges in Brazil must examine the precedent with scrupulous care 
to ascertain whether they can legitimately apply the statements expressed in it. They 
must achieve a coherent and just reasoning that can be appropriate to the case in 
trial. But everything that was stated in the previous decision, even what is only obiter 
dictum, can be evaluated and cited as a motivation or principle in the later court’s 
decision. 
By not distinguishing ratio and dicta, Brazilian courts can also avoid difficult 
situations. For instance, the hypotheses of a decision which have several rationes 
decidendi instead of only one, is one of the biggest problems of the determination of 
the ratio decidendi of a precedent in English courts. It may happen when the court as 
a whole presents more than one reason as being fundamental for its decision.237 It 
may also happen when, in a court composed of several judges (for example, the 
Divisional Court of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords/Supreme Court), although reaching a certain result, several judges may give 
different reasons for their decisions.238 In the first hypothesis, the dominant opinion in 
England is that all rationes bind and a court cannot, in a later case, choose only one 
of them as binding and relegate the other(s) to the quality of dictum.239 With respect 
to the second hypothesis, although there is not a defined doctrine about it, the most 
frequent understanding is in the sense that those cases lack a discernible ratio 
decidendi and, therefore, the court of the subsequent case is free to decide based 
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upon another parameter.240 In Brazil, as the need to separate ratio and dicta does 
not exist, if the precedent has several arguments (even if they do not coincide, taking 
into consideration the several judges), the later judges or courts can simply decide 
their cases based upon any argument encapsulated in the precedent. They can use 
all of the arguments or they can choose one or more of them and relegate the 
other(s) without caring which of them is ratio and which of them are dicta. In 
England, decisions of insufficient motivation or a clear principle, according to the 
dominant opinion, must be considered as not having ratio or binding authority.241 
This is also not a problem in Brazilian law. For in Brazil it does not matter what is 
ratio decidendi or obiter dictum in a case or how well exposed and clear the ratio is. 
It is not part of a court’s duty to indicate the ratio decidendi of the precedent in order 
to follow it and everything that was mentioned in it can be considered and cited as a 
motivation or principle for the court’s decision. 
 
3.4 The Ratio Decidendi of Precedents in the Context of the Decentralised 
(“Difuso”) Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
The novel bindingness of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court’s decisions in 
decentralised judicial review of Legislation, as discussed in Chapter 2, shall produce 
a great impact in the Brazilian legal system. In the future, courts and judges, when 
deciding cases that deal with a constitutional issue previously decided by the Federal 
Supreme Court in decentralised review, will be bound to follow the Supreme Court 
precedent. 
However, it is wrong to think that this new bindingness of precedents of the 
Supreme Court will make the decisions of constitutional cases in lower courts, where 
the same decided issue arises, a mechanical activity, in which the judge will have the 
passive role of only to quote the Supreme Court’s previous decision and then decide 
in the same way. On the contrary, this novel form of bindingness will change that 
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approach that is given to the distinction between what is ratio decidendi and what is 
obiter dictum in a Supreme Court’s precedent. This distinction, undervalued when it 
comes to persuasive precedents in Brazil, will appear crucial in the future. Indeed, to 
understand the functioning of this new rule of stare decisis and to make it work 
appropriately, the issue of identifying the ratio decidendi (the essential reasons as it 
will also be called there) of these decisions of the Supreme Court will become 
imperative242, because it will be only the ratio of these precedents that will bound 
further decisions. 
On the other hand, dicta will be only persuasive: if a Justice of the Supreme 
Court adds, in his opinion, marginal reasons (even those that are important for the 
development of the law), such reasons will not bind other judges, even those of the 
first instance. The most carefully considered and deliberate statement of law by any 
Justice of the Supreme Court, which is a mere dictum, will not bind any court or 
judge in Brazil. Technically, they will be free to follow what they think is 
appropriate.243 
The task is how to define what constitute the ratio decidendi of these 
decisions proffered by the Federal Supreme Court in the decentralised judicial 
review and attributing binding effects to it. As in England, the real value of a 
precedent is not in its dispositive part (that is protected by the res judicata), but in the 
reasons given to justify it.244 However, the decentralised judicial review of legislation 
performed by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court has its own peculiarities. 
First of all, it is important to note that the judicial review of legislation 
performed by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court via extraordinary appeals is only 
indirectly linked with the facts of the concrete case (which commonly starts before an 
inferior court, arriving in the Supreme Court after a long journey and other appeals). 
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The scope of these extraordinary appeals to the Supreme Court is restricted to the 
(constitutional) questions of law that were supposedly wrongly resolved by the 
appealed decision. They are not suitable for (re)considerations of facts and 
evidence. In particular, it is important to remember the trend of objectification of this 
decentralised judicial review performed by the Supreme Court, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. 
Consequently, the ratio decidendi of these precedents is not necessarily 
related to the resolution of the facts of the case. Therefore, it becomes natural to 
give the force of ratio decidendi to the essential legal reasons used to resolve the 
issues of the extraordinary appeal (even if these reasons are not necessary to the 
outcome of the concrete case).245 Each of the essential reasons to decide the legal 
issues of the extraordinary appeal are the rationes decidendi and therefore will bind 
future decisions of analogous questions of law. As Marinoni defends, even 
preliminary questions, necessary to arrive at the analysis of the merit of the case 
itself, can give rise to decisions that are fully capable of providing precedents with 
rationales that shall be bindingly observed in the future.246,247,248 Good examples of 
these preliminary questions are the decisions of the court about its own jurisdiction to 
decide on certain matters or the decisions on admissibility of the extraordinary 
appeal, which are capable of constituting a binding precedent. Sufficient evidence of 
this is the fact that several statements of the persuasive Súmula of the Supreme 
Court deal with these preliminary questions. To illustrate this, the following (non-
binding) statements can be mentioned: (i) Statement 279249, which defines that the 
extraordinary appeal does not serve to review issues of evidence; (ii) Statement 
280250, which affirms that the offense concerning the local law does not allow an 
extraordinary appeal; (iii) Statement 282251, which states that the extraordinary 
appeal shall be dismissed if the federal question [currently, after the advent of the 
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Constitution of 1988, the constitutional question] that it raises was not discussed in 
the contested decision; (vi) Statement 634252, which affirms that the Supreme Court 
does not have jurisdiction to grant a preliminary measure to give a suspensive effect 
to an extraordinary appeal that has not yet had its admissibility appreciated by the 
court of origin; and Statement 635253, which defines that it is a prerogative of the 
President of the court of origin to grant the preliminary measure to give a suspensive 
effect to an extraordinary appeal that has not yet had its admissibility appreciated.254 
Once these peculiarities of the judicial review of legislation performed by the 
Federal Supreme Court via extraordinary appeal are exposed, it is possible to 
conclude that the ratio decidendi in these constitutional precedents coincide with the 
fundamentals used to resolve the issues of the extraordinary appeal, that is, the final 
understandings of the (constitutional) questions of law encapsulated in the 
extraordinary appeal, as established by the Supreme Court. In other words, the 
portion of the precedent that enjoys the binding effect is not the conclusion of the 
concrete case but the constitutional fundamentals for the decision of the 
extraordinary appeal, which transcend that concrete case. 
In practical terms, in the case of decentralised judicial review of legislation 
(which commonly occurs via extraordinary appeal), the ratio decidendi (or the 
essential reasons) is precisely the principle of law involving the compatibility (or not) 
of a normative act and the Federal Constitution, as established by the Supreme 
Court. This rationale influences the decision of the concrete case, but it is not “the 
decision” of the concrete case. It is this ratio – the declaration of unconstitutionality 
and constitutionality of a normative act that underlies the decision of the case – that 
should be, according to the line of understanding that has been progressively 
prevailed in the Supreme Court, observed by all courts and authorities in cases to 
come. This can be illustrated with the cases of Reclamação 4335/AC255 and Habeas 
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Corpus 82959/SP256 (a clear case of concrete and decentralised judicial review of 
legislation), both mentioned previously. In Reclamação 4335/AC, the Rapporteur, 
Justice Gilmar Mendes, identified – and recognised binding effectiveness to it – the 
rationale the Supreme Court’s decision in the Habeas Corpus 82959/SP: this 
decision, granting the habeas corpus to someone, had considered, as the 
fundamental to decide (the ratio decidendi), that the prohibition of progression of the 
imprisonment regime of those condemned for hideous crimes determined by the § 1º 
of article 2º of Law 8072/1990 (Law of Hideous Crimes) as unconstitutional. 
 
3.5 Brazilian Courts and the Seemingly Relevant Precedents 
 
3.5.1 Following a Precedent  
 
In Brazil, traditionally, a precedent is followed in a later case due its power of 
persuasion. In other words, the principles encapsulated in the decision, although not 
having a binding character, due to their quality, are followed by the later court. The 
common law doctrine of stare decisis has established some criteria and developed 
techniques, which, carefully manipulated, safely lead a court in a later case to follow 
or depart from certain precedents. Despite the general persuasiveness of 
precedents, these criteria and techniques, carefully adapted, can be applied to 
Brazilian law.  
First, there is the question of the appropriate degree of generality of the 
matter of the precedent and the matter of the later case. It is necessary, for a 
persuasive following of a precedent in a later case, that there is a similarity between 
the issues of both cases. It does not require identity, because it would avoid the 
possibility itself of applying the precedent.  
Mutatis mutandis, as happens in common law jurisdictions with the material 
facts of the ratio decidendi of a precedent, in Brazil an appropriate level of generality 
should be applied to the matter and the statements encapsulated in the persuasive 
precedent. Some significance must be attributed to these matters based upon 
appropriate criteria of generality as representative of an abstract category. Certainly, 
as the matter of the precedent is considered more broadly, greater will be the 
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number of subsequent cases which can fall within the principles that it (the 
precedent) encapsulates.257,258 The generalisation of the matter and the statements 
of the precedent must have, as parameters and limits, the verification that there is no 
legal reason to distinguish the issues of the precedent and of the later case, both 
belonging, in the given situation, to the same category. 
 




In Brazil, among the techniques used to not follow a precedent, the 
distinguishing is the principal or, at least, the most common used. Distinguishing can 
be defined as the non-application of a precedent, despite the case in trial apparently 
being included in the scope of its holding, basically on the argument that the relevant 
facts (material facts) of its substantive rationale are not similar, by their peculiarities, 
to the specific facts of the case in trial.259 In general, if the facts (or, more broadly 
speaking, the matter) of a precedent, analysed at the appropriate level of generality, 
do not coincide with the facts (or the matter) of the later case, the cases must be 
considered by the court or judge of the later case as distinct. Consequently, the 
precedent will not be followed.260 
As in England, what is reasonable to distinguish depends on the analysis of 
the particular cases. It is also important to be reminded that some judges in Brazil 
have also an inclination to distinguish the facts or the matter of the case on trial from 
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 As McLeod (2011, p. 135) mentions, “the more general, or abstract, the statement of the facts is, 
the greater the number of subsequent cases which will fall within the principle which is being 
formulated, and therefore the wider the ratio will be”. 
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 See the famous Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills 
[1936] AC 85 as examples. In Donoghue v. Stevenson, the House of Lords stated that a producer of 
ginger beer could be liable to the consumer if the beer was contaminated during the manufacturing 
process, and the consumer became ill by the drinking of the product. It was the ratio decidendi of 
Donoghue v. Stevenson, extending the degree of generalization of the fact to another manufactured 
product, which was applied by the Privy Council in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, when a wool 
underwear maker was considered responsible because pieces of its clothes, containing chemical 
products, caused a kind of dermatitis. 
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 See Mello, Patrícia Perrone Campos. Precedentes e vinculação: instrumentos do stare decisis e 
prática constitucional brasileira. Revista de Direito Administrativo, n. 241, jul/set, 2005, p. 186. 
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the facts of the precedent.261,262 However, some factors can be cited as grounds for 
distinguishing in Brazil: (i) recognition of the factual peculiarities in the case to be 
decided that justify differential treatment of the problem; (ii) recognition of situations 
that the court that issued the precedent did not want cover, also entailing the 
avoidance of the application of the previous decisions; and (iii) conflict between the 
rationale of the precedent with rationales derived from other binding decisions, 
allowing the limitation of the rationale of that specific precedent.263 
On some occasions, Brazilian judges struggle to distinguish the facts or the 
matter of the precedent from those of the case on trial. This is a politically correct 
way to disregard precedents (mainly of a higher court), which they consider unfair 
and incorrect, even though they were recommended to be followed. It can be 
argued, however, that Brazilian judges do this unnecessarily, because, as a rule, 
they do not have to follow precedents as they are merely persuasive (though 
exceptionally precedents can be binding).264  
Undoubtedly, the possibility of distinguishing is important as a means of giving 
more freedom to the legal system and making justice in the concrete case. However, 
taken to extremes, the indiscriminate use of the technique of distinguishing has 
contributed to creating paradoxes in Brazilian case law that fails in granting the value 
of equality. 
 
(ii) Simply Not Applying a Precedent 
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 Also concerning England, see the opinion of Lord Reid in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd 
[1962] 2 WLR 186: “I would certainly not lightly disregard or depart from any ratio decidendi of this 
House. But there are at least three classes of cases where I think we are entitled to question or limit it: 
first, where it is obscure, secondly, where the decision itself is out of line with other authorities or 
established principles, and thirdly, where it is much wider than was necessary for the decision so that 
it becomes a question of how far it is proper to distinguish the earlier decision”. 
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 But in England, in some cases, courts depart from a precedent improperly. In Jones v. Secretary of 
State for Social Services (1972) AC 944 (HL), Lord Reid states: “It is notorious that where an existing 
decision is disapproved but cannot be overruled courts tend to distinguish it on inadequate grounds. I 
do not think that they act wrongly in so doing. They are adopting the less bad of the only alternatives 
open to them. But this is bound to lead uncertainty (…)”. 
263
 See Mello (2005, p. 186) and Silva (2005, pp. 247-248). 
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 Not always, although, for obvious reasons, the distinguishing has greater relevance for the binding 
precedents. As Zander states (2004, p. 275), “the process of distinguishing is important, however, not 
simply as the only means of avoiding a threatening precedent that is binding but equally as a means 





Since in the Brazilian system most precedents are not formally binding, they 
can simply not be followed.  Apropos of these persuasive precedents, there is not 
any institutional constraint and their persuasiveness is the main reason for their 
being followed in subsequent cases. To illustrate this, in Brazil, great value is given 
to the circumstances in which a previous case was decided. Judges can recognise 
that, concerning the matter of the case on trial, there is a precedent. Nevertheless, 
they disregard the precedent by recognising changes in the circumstances which 
caused that previous decision and simply pronounce a decision in another 
sense.265,266,267 In these cases, strictly speaking, there is no point in overruling the 
precedent; courts and judges can simply depart from it. 
The fact that in many cases precedents are simply not followed generates a 
significant amount of contradictory decisions (of courts of the same or different 
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 The change in circumstances is identified in Latin through the expression cessante ratione cessat 
ipsa lex, which can be translated as: when the reasons for the existence of the judicial norm cease, 
the norm itself ceases. 
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 Though it is more frequent in Brazilian law, in England this doctrine has a special relevance when it 
comes to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (formerly, the House of Lords) and its power to 
follow or disregard its previous decisions. Lord Simmon explains the question well in Miliangos v. 
George Frank Textiles Ltd [1975] 3 ALL ER 801: “(1) The maxim in the form cessante ratione cessat 
ipsa lex reflects one of the considerations which your Lordships will weigh in deciding whether to 
overrule, by virtue of the 1966 declaration, a previous decision of your Lordship’s House; (2) in 
relation to courts bound by the rule of precedent the maxim in its literal and widest sense is 
misleading and erroneous; (3) specifically, courts which are bound by the rule of precedent are not 
free to disregard an otherwise binding precedent on the ground that the reason which led to the 
formulation of the rule embodied in such precedent seems to the court to have lost cogency; (4) the 
maxim in reality reflects the process of legal reasoning whereby a previous authority is judicially 
distinguished or an exception is made to a principal legal rule; (5) an otherwise binding precedent or 
rule may, on proper analysis, be held to have been impliedly overruled by a subsequent decision of a 
higher court or impliedly abrogated by an Act of Parliament; but this doctrine is not accurately 
reflected by the citation of the maxim cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex”. 
267
 Judges in Brazil can also disregard a previous decision, for instance, under the argument that it 
was delivered per incuriam. Apropos, the amount of per incuriam decisions – in the sense of 
decisions that were delivered in the ignorance of a suitable precedent or even line of precedents
267
 – 
is relevant in Brazil. The reason for this is obvious. In Brazil, as there is not a general rule of stare 
decisis, judges sometimes do not carefully search for precedents and erroneous judgments can be 
delivered because relevant cases are not brought to the attention of the court. The problem is that 
when a court (per incuriam) evaluates a case without the knowledge of a precedent (and it is a 
relevant or binding precedent), it frequently reaches a different conclusion that it would have reached 
if it had observed the relevant precedent. In this case, this previous decision is not a defeasible 
precedent and should not be used as the (only) basis for the decision of the case in trial. In English 
case law, in Duke v. Reliance System Ltd [1987] 2 ALL ER 858, there is a technical definition of per 
incuriam decisions. John Donaldson MR exposes the issue when he says: “I have always understood 
that the doctrine of per incuriam only applies where (a court) has reached a decision in the absence of 
knowledge of a decision binding on it or a statute, and that in either case is has to be shown that, had 
the court had this material, it must have reached a contrary decision […] I do not understand the 
doctrine to extend to a case where, if different arguments had been placed before it, in might have 





hierarchy and even internal disagreements)268,269 and the attempts to solve this 
problem have not been effective. The practice also demonstrates that the appellate 
courts see themselves as authorised to disregard the precedents of the Superior 
Court of Justice (the court responsible for the harmonisation of the federal law), 
sometimes without even giving reasons for this.270 
As in England271, in case of contradictory decisions, the most common 
solution is to have the last decision as the most valuable, especially if in this the 
former conflicting decision was discussed or at least mentioned. However, it is not as 
simple as this. Although this convention exists, with the last decision considered the 
most valuable, it is not absolute. Actually, in such cases, within the system, both 
decisions are a priori considered valid. Thus, a court, later called to decide a similar 
case, considering, for example, the aspects of correction, justice and opportunity, 
simply tends to opt for one of the decisions and not applying the other.272 
 
(iii) Overruling a Precedent 
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 See Wambier (2012, pp. 36-38) and Marinoni, Luis Guilherme. O precedente na dimensão da 
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 To have a broader idea of the relevance of the problem in Brazil, see Josino Neto, Miguel and 
Leite, Rodrigo Costa Rodrigues. Análise das divergências jurisprudenciais no STF e STJ” (Salvador, 
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 Concerning this issue, see the excerpt of the opinion of Justice Francisco Rezek in Ação 
Declaratória de Constitucionalidade – ADC-QO 1/DF STF – Full Bench – Rapporteur Justice Moreira 
Alves – j. 27-10-1993 – DJ 16-6-1995 – LEX/JSTF, n. 214, p. 52-53, reproduced in Chapter 2. 
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 See Colchester Estates (Cardiff) v Carlton Industries plc [1984] 2 ALL ER 601: “The court would 
follow the later, 1984, decision holding as a general rule that where two decisions of the High Court 
are in conflict, the more recent decision should be followed, and the earlier one not followed, provided 
that the earlier was considered in the latter, but that it was still open to a judge faced with the 
inconsistent decisions to apply the earlier and not the later if he is convinced that the later is wrong” . 
See also Minister of Pensions v Higham [1948] 1 ALL ER 863 at 865, [1949] 2 KB 153 at 155, where 
Lord Denning says: “In this respect I follow the general rule that where there are conflicting decisions 
of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred if it is reached after full 
consideration of the earlier decisions”. 
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 The same is said in England. According to English law, there is no implicit overruling when a court 
(except for the House of Lords/Supreme Court) decides in an inverse sense to its previous decision. 
In several cases it can be said that, in the later decision, the conflicting previous decision was not 
even observed. Consequently, due to the ignorance of a binding precedent, the later decision was per 
incuriam and not valid. Indeed, the convention exists (the last decision is likely to be considered 





Theoretically, it is possible that a legal system can be based upon the doctrine 
that courts and judges must always follow precedents without any possibility of 
departing from or overruling them. In England until 1966, the House of Lords, 
formally renouncing the power to overcome its previous decisions, strictly followed 
this doctrine. In that year, the court announced, in a practice statement, that its 
judges (and, consequently, the court as a whole) could explicitly depart from or 
overrule273,274 their previous decisions when they think it is right to do so. Currently, it 
can be said that this extreme view of the doctrine of binding precedents is not 
accepted in any legal system, even those strictly following the doctrine. 
In England, however, to evaluate the convenience of overruling a precedent is 
not an easy task. Several questions must be balanced, especially because such an 
act implies a strong attack against the fundamentals of the system of binding 
precedents. The incorrectness, injustice and inconvenience of the precedent should 
be clearly certified as well as evaluating the damage for the stability of the system, 
which, definitely, to a greater or smaller degree, provokes some change in case 
law.275 
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 It is important to not confound overruling and overriding. In case of an overriding, a court limits the 
scope of the rationale of a previous case, due the occurrence of posterior changes in the legislation or 
in some principle of law. In practice, the overriding would be nothing more than a case of partial 
withdrawal of the rationale of a precedent, by virtue of a posterior rule that limits its amplitude. In the 
case of overriding, the court deals with a kind of situation that was not involved in the precedent that 
established the previous doctrine and thus concludes that, given the further development of issue, the 
case deserves a differential treatment under the new rule. Regarding the Brazilian legal literature, see 
Didier Jr. et al. (2009, p. 396), Silva (2005, p. 297) and Marinoni (2010b, pp. 346-349). 
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 It is also convenient to distinguish overruling and reversal in Brazil. Similar to England, in Brazil 
they are not interchangeable and carry different consequences. The second is the reform of a 
decision of a court a quo, made by a court ad quem, through an appeal, within the same procedure. A 
court can overrule its own precedents or even precedents of lower courts. The prior decisions 
continue to bind their parties, but the overruled precedent is no longer authoritative to subsequent 
cases. By contrast, when a court ad quem reverses the decision of a court a quo, considering it as 
erroneous (on the facts or on the law) the prior decision in that specific case, this decision is no longer 
applied in that case. As for the situation in England, see Ginsburg, Jane C. Legal Methods (Westbury, 
The Foundation Press, 1996), p. 5. 
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 Concerning England, Reynolds sums up the issue very well: an overruling requires the English 
judge “to determine that the old rule was a mistake, or that society has changed since it was 
announced, or that the new rule simply works better. (…). Although deciding that establishing a new 
rule would better serve society is necessary to the decision to overrule, it is not in itself sufficient; the 
larger question of whether to overrule requires consideration of other societal interests, and whether 
those interests are sufficient to require adherence to a ‘wrong’ decision. The major factor to be 
considered in determining whether to overrule precedent is the value of a regime of stare decisis (…). 
Every overruling requires that a price be paid: loss of stability and confidence, damage to the 
efficiency of the system, reduction in predictability. A court must analyze these factors so that it can 
cast a balance on the profit or loss to be gained from overruling. Although some of the factors to be 
considered are relatively determinate in their effect, careful analysis can help resolve some of the 
problems”. See Reynolds, William L. Judicial Process in a nutshell (2
nd





The Brazilian common approach to this question is different. Brazilian courts 
and judges, educated under a civil law perspective, believe that they are entitled to 
change their views and pronounce different decisions when they think it is the right 
case. The historical absence of a doctrine of stare decisis always allows judges to 
take the wisdom from the past but also suggests that they are freely able to depart 
from what they consider incorrect.276 
In the Brazilian legal literature, a set of factors that could cause or base the 
overruling of a precedent can be mentioned: (i) the precedent is considered wrong; 
(ii) the precedent causes an obvious injustice; (iii) the precedent no longer 
represents good public policy; (iv) circumstances have changed since the precedent 
was decided; (v) the Parliament has legislated differently about the point of law; (vi) 
the precedent is a very recent decision; (vii) it is a very old decision; (viii) the 
precedent is preventing the development of law; (xix) the rule set out in the 
precedent is more procedural than substantial; (x) the precedent has led to a series 
of detailed distinctions that only increased the uncertainty of the law; (xi) the 
precedent is a consequence of a judicial error or conflict with other decisions or 
principles already consolidated; and (xii) the composition of the court has 
changed.277 Despite being good reasons to no longer apply or explicitly overrule a 
precedent, these many factors are not imperative. They also do not constitute an 
exhaustive list. It seems more correct to say, especially considering the dynamic of 
law, that the reasons for overruling a precedent in Brazil may only be checked when 
examining the case in trial. 
The allowance of courts and judges to freely depart from or overrule what they 
consider incorrect is to be considered a weak point in the Brazilian legal system. 
Assessing the appropriateness of overruling a precedent should not be as easy task 
as it is. Several questions would have to be carefully balanced. The inaccuracy, 
injustice or inconvenience of the precedent should be considered but also the 
damage to the stability and predictability of the system that any change in the law 
certainly leads.278,279 However, reflecting on the possibility of a precedent that has 
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been decided incorrectly, Brazilian courts commonly assert that it is more valuable 
that they decide correctly based upon a later and more elaborated evaluation of the 
matter than keeping the consistency of the previous decisions. If a court believes, for 
instance, that the old case law was a mistake, society has changed since it was 
stated or even that a new rule would simply work better (or would better serve 
society), it departs from or even overrules the precedent. The broader questions of 
whether the overruling would affect other societal interests (stability, certainty and 
equality, among others) and whether those interests are sufficient to impose 
adherence to an “incorrect” precedent are not common objects of concern for 
Brazilian judges.280 Consequently, the impact of the abusive use of overruling for the 
stability and predictability of Brazilian legal system cannot be hidden.281 
Finally, the overruling of precedents can be classified in Brazil into the 
following: (i) explicit overruling, when a court decides to expressly adopt a new 
direction, abandoning the previous one; and (ii) tacit or implied overruling, when a 
new understanding is adopted by the court, but without expressly replacing the old 
one.282 The explicit overruling of precedents – when a court, entitled with power to do 
so, explicitly states that it is overruling a precedent or a line of precedents and, 
consequently, the overruled precedents (more precisely their ratio decidendi) are no 
longer officially accepted as authority in later cases283 – is less common in Brazil 
than the implied form.284 Understanding this does not require deep consideration. In 
Brazil, due to the absence of a general doctrine of binding precedents, if a court 
wishes to change its point of view about the law (even one that has prevailed for 
many years, that has been repeatedly pronounced and constantly applied by 
everyone), it is empowered to do so. On some occasions, it performs this silently, by 
initiating a new line of precedents. On other occasions, the court simply argues, en 
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taken as law. See Sotelo, José Luis Vasquez. A jurisprudência vinculante na “common law” e na “civil 
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passant, that the precedent is not compatible with a later decision of a higher court, 
with the changing of the statute book or even the more fluid argument of social 
developments. The fact is, without explicitly saying that it is overruling a precedent or 
a line of precedents, the court simply decides inversely to its previous decisions and 
creates a new case law. Differently to explicit overruling, in the hypothesis of implied 
overruling, as the precedent was not officially declared as a non-authoritative source, 
potentially it can per incuriam be followed in later cases, which is quite a common 
situation in Brazil indeed. 
 
3.6 The Issue of Prospective Overruling in the Context of the Decentralised 
(“Difuso”) Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
(i) Initial Remarks 
 
The issue of prospective overruling is nowadays of special relevance. It is 
related to the time effectiveness of the decision that announces a new case law, 
overruling or at least changing the case law encapsulated in a previous line of 
precedents: are the “effects” of this new decision to be retroactive or merely 
prospective? 
Based on the declaratory or orthodox theory – which affirms the pre-existence 
of law, whether it is legislated or are customs, in relation to the judicial decision – the 
English traditional approach used to support the idea that these “effects” are to be 
retroactive. As Zander explains: “When a court delivers a ruling which is perceived to 
change the law the effect is not only for the future. It also affects the past. This is 
because of the fiction that when it states the law a court is stating the law as it 
always has been”. Evidently, the same author concludes, 
 
if the case has already been litigated it cannot be reopened. It is subject to the 
principle expressed in the phrase res judicata. Equally, if the time allowed 
under the Statute of Limitations for bringing proceedings of that kind has 
expired, no case can now be brought on the basis of the changed rule. But if 
neither res judicata nor the Statute of Limitations applies, an action can be 
brought based on circumstances that occurred before the new decisions.285  
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Currently, however, the question in England cannot be analysed so simply. 
English courts, inspired by the American example286,287, have departed from the 
classical doctrine, (that is, the retroactive application of the new precedent) and have 
applied, or at least discussed the hypothesis of applying, prospectively the new 
precedent. In administrative law, for instance, especially when it comes to conceding 
the so-called “remedies” for citizens, the English courts have given prospective 
effects to the new precedents to avoid administrative chaos. In at least two recent 
cases (recent for England, not for Brazil), Jones v. Secretary of State for Social 
Services [1972] AC 944 and Miliangos v. George Frank (textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443, 
the hypothesis of prospective application was considered positively.288 
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 As Ginsburg (1996, p. 155) explains, in the United States, the rule is the classic retroactive 
application of the new precedent, i.e., “as a general matter, judicial decisions in fact do apply to 
events that occurred before the new or changed rule was declared. However, where prior decisions 
have been overruled, the parties to those cases are not free to reopen the case, if it has already been 
the object of a final judgment”
286
. This has been the understanding since the beginning of the 19
th
 
century with the decision in United States v. Schooner Peggy 5 US (I Cranch) 102 (1801). However, 
the American law is less strict than the English law regarding the traditional retroactive application of 
the new case law. Actually, courts there, different from what happens in England, often apply 
overruling precedents prospectively and do this in two different ways: (i) when announcing the new 
rule, simultaneously indicating from when it has to be applied to other cases
286
 as occurred in Durham 
v. United States 214 F. 2d 862 (1954); or (ii) leaving the question to the court where maybe the 
question, in the future, will be discussed, which, as a matter of fact, is what usually happens. It is said 
that the first case in which the Supreme Court of the United States clearly recognized the validity of 
the prospective application was Great Northern Ry v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 287 US 358 (1932). 
But the most symbolic case of prospective effect is considered to be Mapp v. Ohio 367 US 643 
(1961). Indeed, the Supreme Court, was called upon to evaluate the question of the time 
effectiveness of Mapp v. Ohio in Linkletter v. Walker 381 US 618, 620 (1965), and ended up stating 
that it was not possible to give completely retroactive effects to that decision (the Mapp v. Ohio’s). 
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 About the development of the prospective decision-making in the USA, see also Reynolds (1991, 
pp. 172-173). 
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 For the first of them, for instance, Lord Simon of Glaisdale asserted: “I am left with the feeling that, 
theoretically, in some ways the most satisfactory outcome of these appeals would have been to have 
allowed them on the basis that they were governed by the decision in Dowling’s case, but to have 
overruled that decision prospectively. Such a power – to overrule prospectively a previous decision, 
but so as not necessarily to affect the parties before the court – is exercisable by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, which has held it to be based on the common law: see Linkletter v. Walker 
(1965) 381 U.S. 618. (...) the true, even if limited, nature of judicial lawmaking has been more widely 
acknowledged of recent years; and the declaration of July 20, 1966, may be partly regarded as of a 
piece with that process. It might be argued that a further step to invest your Lordships with the ampler 
and more flexible powers of the Supreme Court of the United States would be no more than a logical 
extension of present realities and of powers already claimed without evoking objections from other 
organs of the constitution. But my own view is that, though such extension should be seriously 
considered, it would preferably be the subject-matter of parliamentary enactment. In the first place, 
informed professional opinion is probably to the effect that your lordships have no power to overrule 
decisions with prospective effect only; such opinion is itself a source of law; and your Lordships, 
sitting judicially, are bound by any rule of obviate any suspicion of endeavoring to upset one-sidedly 
the constitutional balance between executive, legislature and judiciary. Thirdly, concomitant problems 
could receive consideration – for example, whether other courts supreme within their own jurisdictions 
should have similar powers as regards the rule of precedent; whether machinery could and should be 





Until recently, this kind of dilemma had not emerged among Brazilian scholars 
and judges. Traditionally, under Brazilian law, a judicial decision was not a primary 
(or true) source of “law”, but merely secondary evidence of “law”. The judicial 
decision, according to this orthodox point of view, is supposed to be a mere 
declaration or proof of something – for instance, customs and mainly legislated 
norms – that previously already existed. As a consequence, the new precedent is 
expected to be retroactive. Another explanation of the traditional recognition of 
retroactive effects in Brazil is based on the fact that it is not presumed that the new 
decision will bindingly affect facts and transactions that took place under the 
previous case law orientation. The main criticism of the retroactive application of a 
binding new precedent resides in the fact that the new precedent could affect 
juridical acts (and even judicial decisions) that happened in the past, all of these acts 
performed based upon the confidence in the correctness of the previous case law 
(sometimes, a binding case law). This generates a major concern in common law 
jurisdictions, once people are supposed to regulate their life (and lawyers are 
supposed to counsel) according to what the courts bindingly state, in judicial 
decisions, as being the law. In systems based upon the legislative norm, as 
traditionally is the case in Brazil, a decision in a specific case is not to be bindingly 
applied to other similar cases and people are supposed to regulate their lives directly 
according to what is in the statutes and codes than to what is stated by the courts.289 
                                                                                                                                                        
any court (including an Appellate Committee in your Lordships’ House) should sit in banc when invited 
to review a previous decision”. 
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 However, also in civil law France, as Steiner (2010, p. 101) affirms, the Court of Cassation, 
considering the scope of the judicial function within the wider principle of the separation of powers, 
seems to take such a step towards prospective overruling in quite limited specific circumstances. 
According to her, “ln 2004, the Molfessis Report on Revirements de Jurisprudence to the Court of 
Cassation recommended that, in narrowly defined circumstances, decisions of the Court of Cassation 
might be applied 'non-retroactively'. Without setting out any (p. 100) formal factors or criteria to be 
taken into account when considering whether a new ruling by the Court of Cassation should apply 
retrospectively or not, the Molfessis working group nevertheless recommended that the court should 
limit the retrospective temporal effect of its ruling where there is (1) a strong motive of general public 
interest or (2) a manifest disproportion between the general benefits attached to the retrospective 
effect of a court ruling (e.g. the fact that persons in like cases are treated equally) and the potential 
unfairness such a retrospective change in the law would occasion to the parties involved. This 
working group further recommended procedural safeguards in so far as prospective overruling, as 
defined above, could only be applied by the Court of Cassation itself which for that purpose should, 
first, identify clearly and explicitly the meaning and scope of its revirement in the case at hand and, 
secondly, allow each party to the case to put forward their respective arguments on whether to 
overrule a previous decision retrospectively or prospectively. Without waiting upon the actual 
publication and recommendations of the Molfessis Report, the Court of Cassation took upon itself to 
overrule prospectively a former interpretation of a time-limitation rule for libel in a case where a radio 
station was sued for breach of the principle of presumption of innocence against a lawyer charged for 





Even in the case of the judicial review of legislation, where some decisions of 
the Supreme Court are expected to bind other courts, the retroactivity of the 
decisions has been the rule. The doctrine consecrated by Justice Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison290, stating that the unconstitutional law is null, void and of no 
effect, has been widely accepted in Brazilian law since the beginning of the 
Republican period.291 At that time, Rui Barbosa, one of the greatest Brazilian jurists, 
said that any legislative or executive act that disregards constitutional provisions is, 
in essence, null. This doctrine was followed by a list of authors of classic texts on the 
subject, such as Francisco Campos, Alfredo Buzaid, Castro Nunes and Lúcio 
Bittencourt.292 As this understanding prevails in Brazil, the decision that declares the 
unconstitutionality of a law commonly retroacts, which leaves all acts based on this 
unconstitutional law as invalid. 
Although the retroactive application is much more common in Brazil (and 
theoretically fits better with the Brazilian declarative understanding to precedents), 
due to the new categories of binding precedents developed there, scholars and 
judges recently began to realise that in certain situations retroactive decision-making 
imposes unfair solutions.293 It was inevitable that, in some exceptional situations, the 
general rule was mitigated, eliminating or reducing the consequences of the 
retroactivity, in favour of values such as good faith, fairness and legal certainty. After 
all, as everyone acts – or is expected to act – in accordance with the existing norms, 
there is a need to maintain confidence in the relations established under the aegis of 
a normative act that is presumably constitutional.294 As a result, prospective 
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overruling decisions began to be adopted by the Supreme Court (a technique rarely 
adopted by others courts yet).295 
Certainly, the prospective overruling is also criticised in Brazil. For instance, it 
is argued that: a) a court that uses the prospective overruling has the appearance of 
a Legislator and usurps a function that constitutionally does not belong to it. The 
prospective application is undesirable because it promotes “judicial” law reform and 
law reform must come from the democratically elected Legislature. The role of the 
Judiciary is to interpret the law, not to enact laws. Only the Legislature has the power 
to change the law prospectively; b) sometimes, the technique can discourage the 
debate on new constitutional issues. Parties and their lawyers have less incentive to 
address new constitutional issues or to fight for a favourable decision, if they know 
that the decision would not affect their own cases but only future litigations; c) finally, 
much of the prospective application doctrine is based on the arguments of legal 
certainty (the trust that people have in the legislation) and exceptional social interest, 
as prescribed by article 27 of Law 9868/1999. These arguments introduce into the 
debate elements of indeterminate concepts.296 
However, despite the criticism, giving prospective effects to decisions in the 
judicial review of legislation has sometimes appeared to be the most convenient 
solution or even imperative. The maintenance of the effects produced by the 
unconstitutional norm during its “constitutional” term, in certain cases, further 
safeguards the supremacy of the Constitution and the principles and rights that it 
encapsulates than an unconditional assignment of retrospective effects to the 
decision that affirms the norm unconstitutional. 
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Different to the Portuguese Constitution, for example, the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988 does not expressly contemplate the possibility of limiting the 
retroactive effect of the decisions of unconstitutionality.297 Following the American 
example, this silence regarding the term a quo for the temporal effects of the 
decision of unconstitutionality is interpreted in the sense that this regulation was left 
to the Legislature. However, even before the event of Law 9868/99, which expressly 
authorises the prospective effects in judicial review of legislation, the Supreme Court 
had already given prospective effects to some of its decisions, despite the absence 
of legislative regulation. With the advent of Law 9868/1999, the possibility of 
modulation of temporal effects of constitutional decisions was disciplined by its 
article 27 as follows: “In declaring the unconstitutionality of a law or normative act, 
the Supreme Court may, based on reasons of legal certainty or exceptional social 
interest, by a majority of two thirds of its members, restrict the effects of that 
statement or decide that it has only effectiveness from the res judicata or other 
moment it decides appropriate”. 
Currently, the Brazilian Supreme Court, in order to not disturb the past, has 
often refused to retrospectively change the law (notwithstanding the fact that it has 
expressed its disapproval over the normative act) and has pronounced that some of 
its understandings are to be followed just for the acts and transactions to be 
performed after the respective decisions. If it is the case that the new precedent is to 
be prospectively applied, the Supreme Court, when announcing the rule, sometimes 
indicates simultaneously a precise date from which the new precedent should be 
applied. The Supreme Court normally does not leave the question of time 
effectiveness to be decided by the court where the same point of law will be 
discussed in the future (because, with the possibility of many different points of view 
about time effectiveness, this could affect the uniformity of the application of its case 
law). 
Although, in principle, Law 9868/1999 concerns the centralised judicial review 
of legislation, in fact, the modulation of the temporal effects of the declaration of 
unconstitutionality has been admitted by the Supreme Court in both centralised and 
decentralised reviews.  Regardless of the model control of constitutionality 
(centralised or decentralised), it is always necessary to inquire about the possible 
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effects that the decision of unconstitutionality can cause in concrete situations. In 
both controls of constitutionality, although the retroactive effects of the decisions that 
affirm the unconstitutionality of a statute or other normative act continue to be the 
rule, sometimes the incidence of theses retrospective effects may appear more 
harmful to the legal system than the own offense to the Constitution. In these cases, 
the temporal modulation of the declaration of unconstitutionality, giving to it 
prospective effects, may appear indispensable.298 
 
(ii) The Mira Estrela Case 
 
The leading case in this issue was Extraordinary Appeal (Recurso 
Extraordinário) 197917/SP299, also known as Mira Estrela case, where the possibility 
of given prospective effects to the Supreme Court’s decisions in decentralised 
judicial review of legislation was widely discussed.  
In Mira Estrela, in 2002, the Supreme Court had to decide the fate of the 
representatives of the local Parliament of Mira Estrela, a town with only 2600 
inhabitants in the State of São Paulo. In 1990, the local Parliament had approved a 
bill increasing from nine to eleven the number of city representatives. The Supreme 
Court understood that the local law was unconstitutional, since it does not follow the 
proportion prescribed by article 29, IV, “a”, of the Federal Constitution. In doing this, 
the Supreme Court faced a dilemma: if the law was retroactively unconstitutional, all 
acts enacted by the Parliament of Mira Estrela since 1990 – a period of 12 years – 
would also be unconstitutional, which would have serious problems for the local 
government. 
Besides, a decision with retrospective effect would lead to the dissolution of 
the local Parliament. There would not be a Parliament to deliberate a new resolution 
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adjusting the local Organic Law to what is stipulated by the Federal Constitution in 
terms of the number of the local representatives. If this occurred, the democratic 
principle itself would be strongly affected, because the population of that municipality 
would be totally devoid of local representation. The absence of one of the municipal 
powers, the Legislature, would create an unbridgeable gap in the constitutional 
principle of the separation of powers, especially considering that the rule of law 
concerning the actions of the Executive Branch depends largely on what is 
deliberated by the Legislature (the task of the Executive is mainly the implementation 
of laws). 
The solution reached by the Supreme Court was to modulate the temporal 
effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality, opting for postponing these effects 
until the subsequent elections and the next period of mandate (which in Brazil is 
renewed every four years). In other words, in a case of prospectivity at a specific 
time, the Supreme Court was pleased to declare the unconstitutionality of the local 
law without altering the composition of the current Legislature, thus protecting the 
validity of laws enacted by this composition. 
In this famous decision of the Supreme Court, legal certainty, the democratic 
principle and the fundamental rights of the citizens (particularly their political rights, 
ensuring their representation) worked together. It was an exceptional situation in 
which a declaration of nullity, with its common ex tunc effects, would indirectly result 
in a serious threat against the principles protected by the Federal Constitution and 
the legal system as a whole. This exceptional social interest imposed an exceptional 
declaration of unconstitutionality with prospective effects. 
After Mira Estrela, the Federal Supreme Court has continued to give 
prospective effects to their decisions, as in Extraordinary Appeal 442683-8/RS300, a 
case concerning the way citizens can enter and progress in the civil service. In this 
case, it was demanded the nullification of the administrative acts that had granted to 
civil servants, based on internal competitions or contests, access/progress to 
completely different posts in the civil service. The Supreme Court, although it had 
expressly recognised the unconstitutionality of these internal contests in order to 
progress to different posts in the civil service, based on the principles of good faith 
and legal certainty, did not nullify the acts of access/progress of the civil servants 
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involved in this concrete case. The Supreme Court ascertained that the Federal 
Constitution, in article 37, II, had instituted the civil service exams as the means of 
access to the civil service. However, the court also stated that, at the time of the 
events (from 1987 to 1992), the understanding on the topic was not consolidated. 
Only on 17 February 1993 did the Supreme Court, in a case of centralised judicial 
review of legislation, suspend with ex nunc (prospective) effects, the effectiveness of 
article 8º, III, article 10, sole paragraph, article 13, § 4º, article 17 and article 33, IV, 
all them of Law 8112/1990, having these provisions been finally declared 
unconstitutional on 27 August 1998 (in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 
837/DF).301 Consequently, the principles of good faith and legal certainty (and the 
fact that disturbance of the Administration would be greater than any benefits from 
the undoing of the administrative acts) authorise the adoption of ex nunc effects to 
the decision that declares the unconstitutionality. 
Finally, it is important to mention that the Federal Supreme Court has also 
adopted the doctrine of progressive unconstitutionality, which is similar but is not the 
same as prospective overruling. Indeed, in Habeas Corpus 70514/RS302, the 
Supreme Court had to incidentally appreciate the constitutionality of Law 1060/1950 
(text altered by Law 7871/1989), which grants free legal assistance to poor people 
and, in §º 5 of article 5º, gives double time limit to public defenders in order to appeal 
of decisions (and perform others acts in courts). Although at the time the provision 
seemed – and, indeed, it proved to be – unconstitutional, the Federal Supreme Court 
preferred to affirm that the provision that gives double time to public defenders was 
constitutional until the public defence service is duly qualified or structured at the 
same level of the prosecution service. A similar decision was also found in 
Extraordinary Appeal 341717/SP303, where it was remembered that the same 
constitutional controversy had been resolved by the Supreme Court in Extraordinary 
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Appeal 135328/SP.304 In Extraordinary Appeal 341717/SP, the Supreme Court also 
preferred to maintain the constitutionality of the double time limit to public defender’s 
manifestations, while the state of São Paulo did not establish and organize the local 
Public Defender's Office, as determined by the Federal Constitution (article 134). 
The provision – in this case, article 68 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Decree-
Law 3689/1941) that also establishes the double term – was considered 
constitutional, but placed in a transient intermediate state “between the states of full 
constitutionality an or absolute unconstitutionality”, subjected, in the face of 
supervening changes in the circumstances of fact, to a progressive process in order 
to became unconstitutional. The state of omission in the due performance of its 
duties, such as when the local Legislature or the Executive refrains from adopting 
the measures required to implement the organic structures dictated by the Federal 
Constitution, the Supreme Court asseverated, culminates in establishing 
“constitutional imperfect situations”, whose occurrence justifies “a different treatment, 
not necessarily reduced to the regime of absolute nullity”.305  
 
(iii) Defining Legal Certainty and Exceptional Social Interest  
 
Apart from the arguments of legal certainty and exceptional social interest, it 
is possible to present, based on the Brazilian judicial practice, other reasons in 
favour of the prospective effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
decentralised judicial review of legislation. For example, a mandatory adoption of 
retroactive effects could certainly influence the court’s attitude, where it has to 
appreciate a case that can potentially give rise to the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of a normative act and affect facts legitimately performed under 
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the aegis of the normative act once presumed constitutional. Maintained, a priori, 
only the possibility of retroactive effects (ex tunc) to the decision that affirms the 
unconstitutionality of the norm, the court, as a matter of legal policy, would be more 
conservative, hesitant to make the abrupt change of direction in that particular issue. 
On the other hand, open the possibility of limiting the impact of the decision, in order 
not to reach situations prior to the decision itself (ex nunc) or even not to reach the 
facts of the case itself (in the case of decentralised and concrete control), the court 
feels inclined – or at least liberated from any constraint of giving an unfair decision to 
people who acted while relying on the unconstitutional norm – to affirm the 
unconstitutionality when it understands this the correct measure. 
However, in Brazil, the choice between a prospective or retroactive 
application of the decision of unconstitutionality is, under article 27 of Law 
9868/1999, indispensably linked with the definition of the indeterminate legal 
concepts of legal certainty and exceptional social interest. 
The expression legal certainty has had its general meaning already 
sufficiently established in Brazil. In summary, the legal system has to provide to the 
subjects the possibility to regulate their conducts with certainty and protect them 
from arbitrary conduct of the State. Closely related to the meanings of trust, good 
faith and predictability, the idea of legal certainty in the judicial review of legislation 
aims to guarantee the respect for the acts established under the aegis of the 
legislation imposed by the Parliament, which is aprioristically presumed to be 
constitutional.306 
The concept of exceptional social interest, on the other hand, is much more 
fluid. First of all, it is important to note that any constitutional principle may take the 
form of exceptional social interest. Indirectly, it is this constitutional principle, 
weighted and balanced with the principle of the nullity of the unconstitutional law, 
that will show if the best alternative to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution as a 
whole is the retroactivity or the prospectivity of the temporal effects of the decision. 
The characterisation of the exceptional social interest referred to in article 27 of Law 
9868/1999 presupposes the analysis of principles that support the maintenance of 
the effects of the unconstitutional norm, as well as the analysis of principles that 
recommend complete nullification of the unconstitutional norm with retroactive 
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effects. Having identified these principles, there is a need to define what prevails in 
that specific case. This weighting and balancing is the resource that the Supreme 
Court used when the traditional method of simple subsumption is inadequate, 
especially important with regard to fundamental rights.307,308 
The technique of weighting and balancing in order to promote the prospective 
overruling should not be exercised in absentia of formal criteria, allowing the 
interpreter (in this case, the Federal Supreme Court) to make arbitrary decisions 
without a legal or constitutional basis. The weighting and balancing procedure needs 
to be structured in the form of legal argumentation. It is necessary: (i) to identify the 
principles, values, rights and interests that conflict in the case; (ii) to place on one 
side those arguments which support these effects and, on the other, those 
arguments which recommend the traditional retroactive effects; (iii) to assign 
significance and weight for each of these principles, values, rights and interests; (iv) 
and to determine which principles, values, rights and interests must prevail.309 
The identification of the arguments or principles to be weighted is done case 
by case. However, based both on the specialised literature and the case law of the 
Supreme Court, it is possible to mention some legal arguments that, under the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, are the most valuable.  
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The process to define the most valuable arguments, as Humberto Ávila310 
proposes, requires the division of them into two groups: institutional arguments and 
non-institutional arguments. The institutional arguments are divided into immanent 
arguments (linguistic and systematic) and transcendental arguments (historical and 
genetic). The immanent institutional arguments are extracted from the legal system, 
its textual and contextual language, its values and its systematic structure. The 
linguistic arguments are related to the meaning of the text of the norm. The 
systematic arguments are related to the analysis of the norm inside the broader 
context of the other provisions of the legal system. The transcendental institutional 
arguments are those that do not depart from the text of the legal norms or from other 
formal sources of the legal system. The transcendental historical arguments seek to 
relate the norm with the moment it was conceived while the genetic arguments 
consider the will of the Legislature, referring to information concerning the origin of 
the norms object of interpretation, such as the memorandum justifying the bill and 
the parliamentary debates, among others sources. Finally, there exist the non-
institutional arguments, which are not related to any of the formal sources of the 
legal system. They appeal to other elements that are not essentially juridical. They 
are arguments, for instance, that rely on economic or political points of view. As 
examples, it is possible to mention a decision that does not give retroactive effects to 
the declaration of unconstitutionality to avoid possible individual actions against the 
state because this certainly would cause economical problems for the treasury. 
According to the Brazilian Supreme Court, it is in the legal system that the 
parameters should be sought to weight the arguments in conflict. This means that 
the institutional arguments should always prevail. At the apex of the hierarchy of the 
law in the Brazilian legal system is the Constitution and it is there that the analysis 
should start. The contents of the norms invoked in the concrete case should be 
noted and seen if there is a hierarchy among the principles considered in the 
interpretation process. The Federal Constitution itself, when it establishes that some 
norms are fundamental and others not, suggests the existence of hierarchy within 
itself. 
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In this process of justification based on institutional arguments (taken from the 
legal system), the constitutional principles that are axiologically more relevant must 
prevail. With regard to the axiological hierarchy of principles in the Federal 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognised the prevalence of fundamental 
rights when in conflict with other constitutional provisions. The Constitution itself 
provides us with several indications of this, not only by calling them “fundamental” 
rights and principles, but also by elevating them to a condition of “cláusulas pétreas” 
(norms that cannot be changed). Besides, the Constitution also expressly 
establishes that those fundamental rights or principles, whose list is not exhaustive, 
have immediate application. When the interpretation of the concepts of legal 
certainty or exceptional social interest gives rise to a conflict that has on one side the 
fundamental rights of individuals, the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of the 
prevalence of these rights at the expense of other arguments that can be raised in 
the issue. 
The pragmatic or consequentialist arguments can only be used to reinforce 
the institutional arguments already present in the case. The primacy of the rule of 
law in a state that describes itself as constitutional cannot be declined and for 
political and economic arguments a secondary place in the process of balancing 
arguments must be reserved. Indeed, the Federal Supreme Court has adopted the 
understanding of Rui Medeiros311 that the Court shall always justify the prospective 
effects of its decisions based on constitutional principles, that is, on juridical 
arguments and not on exclusively pragmatic arguments.  
For instance, attempts to modulate the temporal effects in the decentralised 
review have appeared in cases of tax law. In these cases, on one side were the 
fundamental rights of liberty and propriety of citizens (article 5º, caput, II and XXIII, of 
the Federal Constitution) and, on the other, were the jurisdiction and the interests of 
the treasury to collect tax. Although the risk of insolvency of the treasury and the 
damage to the financial health of the State had been used as arguments to require 
the application of ex nunc effects, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the tax, in 
several cases the Supreme Court stated the prevalence of the rights of taxpayers to 
be taxed constitutionally, privileging the fundamental rights of the citizens and the 
principle of legality, upon the mere consequentialist arguments of the treasury. The 
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Supreme Court sustained the traditional theory of nullity and given retroactive effects 
to its decisions. On this topic, the following Supreme Court’s extraordinary appeals 
can be mentioned: 273074/RJ312, 419905/PR313, 456182/SC314 and 553223/RJ315.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that retroactivity remains the rule concerning 
the temporal effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality; prospectity, the 
exception. The Supreme Court, in interpreting article 27 of Law 9868/1999, has 
stated that the modulation of the temporal effects of its decisions cannot be admitted 
at the expense of the fundamental rights of the citizens. Legal certainty is a concept 
to be invoked in order to protect the rights of citizens and not to defend the interests 
of the State. Prospective effects must take place only after careful deliberation that 
concludes to safeguard the idea of legal certainty and other constitutional principles 
characterized as an exceptional social interest. 
 
3.7 Law Reporting in Brazil 
 
One of the requirements for the efficiency of a legal system based (even 
partly) on precedents is the existence of a safe and easily accessible method of 
reporting its case law.316 Courts and lawyers who engage “in active practice are often 
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extremely busy and lack the time to carry out elaborate research into every case”.317 
As reporting is a cornerstone of any system of precedents, it is fundamental to 
explain – and this is the aim of this Chapter’s final topic – how Brazil has created and 
developed a methodical system of case law reporting to deal with the millions of 
cases that are decided by its courts each year.  
 
(i) Official and Non-Official Law Reporting 
 
Brazil has dealt with law reporting for many years as a tool to present the 
Brazilian court’s understandings about legal issues. In spite of the great amount of 
decisions pronounced in Brazil318, a sophisticated system – reliable and easily 
accessible – is being progressively developed with the decisive participation of the 
Brazilian courts and government bodies, as well as the private sector. Indeed, and 
different from England319, law reports in Brazil are either officially delivered (by one of 
the several state or federal courts) or unofficially delivered (by a private publisher).320 
The argument for official reports, mainly for all decisions of Brazilian superior 
and appellate courts, is very powerful. These are the most important decisions and 
they really build the Brazilian case law. They frequently establish new principles of 
substantive or procedural law or contain a modern understanding of an existing 
                                                                                                                                                        
decisions are reported. As it is impossible for the (private) publication of all cases that are decided in 
England, law reports become a matter of editorial discretion (see McLeod, 2011, p. 105). The most 
evident problem of editorial discretion in law reporting is that oversights inevitably occur. It can 
produce a problem of acknowledgment of some important judicial decisions and lawyers and courts 
have more difficulty finding and referring to these (unreported) precedents in current and future cases 
(see Zander, 2004, p. 319). The potential problem of acknowledging some relevant judicial decisions 
nowadays has been relieved, especially because, with the development of digital media and online 
legal databases, such as LEXIS, WESTLAW or BAILLI, only a few cases decided by the English 
superior courts are really not available to law professionals. However, the argument for official reports 
of all judgments of the English superior courts is very powerful (the Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal, more precisely), as happens in the United States of America (see Black, 1990, p. 887). 
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principle. They originally interpret statements of statutes, clarify a common clause in 
contracts or even resolve conflicting decisions of lower courts. They strongly affect 
the future of people, companies and the Government and, sometimes, even their 
pasts if the decision has retrospective effects. Obviously, decisions like these must 
be swift and very well reported. 
In the Federal Court System, besides the decisions of the five Courts of 
Appeal321, decisions of the District Courts (courts of first instance or inferior courts) 
are also reported, although only selectively. As a rule, in the federal states only the 
decisions of the appellate courts (the highest court of a state) are always reported. 
Full decisions of the several inferior courts are not usually officially reported, 
although they may appear in some official state press. 
Brazilian courts have specialised personnel to revise their own decisions and 
reproduce all the necessary aspects of them. Full or (sometimes) concise texts of the 
decisions are published in the official press. These printed versions of the federal 
and state courts’ decisions are published by the official press of the federal and the 
respective state governments. The problem of a lack of access to these reports is 
solved by the free online access to the decisions of the country’s courts. Although 
oversights occasionally occur, Brazilian courts have developed a very good 
knowhow in delivering cases to be reported on with the support of electronic and 
online tools that are currently generally reliable, and hence accuracy and authenticity 
for case law is ensured.  
On the other hand, the fact that there are official law reports does not forbid 
the existence of private publications. Some of them are even officially accredited by 
certain courts. Commonly, these private law reports have a commercial character. 
For these private reports, as happens in England, based upon their criteria (or 
according to their costumers’ profiles), the editors in charge select the precedents 
which they believe to be the most appropriate. Furthermore, if everything that is in 
the official law reports is officially part of the decision, the same does not always 
occur with private law reports. In these publications, for instance, some “ementas” (a 
kind of summary of the case) are occasionally added by publishers in charge of them 
and these are not considered as an official part of the decision.322 
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The fact is, currently lawyers in Brazil often prefer to consult the official law 
reports (mainly the court’s webpage), motivated by the fact that their publications are 
updated and their structure is very rational, not to mention that these law reports are 
online, which makes the search much easier. 
 
(ii) Online Accessibility 
 
The amount of cases decided in Brazil is immeasurable. Similar to England, 
due to this enormous quantity of cases it is extremely difficult to research and find 
the suitable precedent from the printed forms of any law report. To supersede this 
difficulty, Brazilian Courts (including the Supreme Court, the superior courts, the 
federal courts and several state courts) have systematically built computer and 
internet tools (on the court’s official webpage)323 to satisfactorily manipulate and 
publish this huge amount of case data. Evidently, lawyers prefer to rely upon these 
online versions to obtain information faster and more safely.324  
The many systems (although they are integrated, each court manages its own 
system) are based on the concept of free online access to the decisions. The idea is 
to classify the decisions of the court through a very sophisticated scheme of 
descriptors and numbers. The main points of the decisions are summarised into 
topics (short expressions or sometimes even a single key word). These decisions 
are saved in the online database linked with these descriptors (and also numbers) 
according to the scheme of classification. By searching for topics on the web pages, 
researchers can find cases related to issues of their interest. Identifying the case, 
they can consult the full version (or an abridged if preferred) of the decision on the 
same web page. Despite the possible failures of the system of classification, any 
experienced lawyer, when typing in any of these topics can, in a short time, put 
together several cases judged by a specific court (or some of them) on a certain 
                                                                                                                                                        
summaries of the judged cases but are produced by the court or judge responsible for the decision.  
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point.325 This consulting method is fast and reliable in spite of the considerable 
amount of decisions pronounced. The various systems are also updated almost 
daily. Obviously, the reason for this daily updating is to make the precedents 
expeditiously available to the legal community. 
 
(iii) The Content and Nomenclature of Cases 
 
Generally, decisions, both on courts’ web pages and in printed reports, are 
commonly delivered with the following data: (i) the data to indentify the case; (ii) a 
report of the events of the case, officially made by the judge who writes the decision, 
presenting the main points of the controversy and a summary of allegations 
presented for the court to consider, so that the decision of the court can be 
understood; (iii) the fundamentals, fully exposing the concrete judicial norms that 
were established; (iv) the proper decision of the judge or court; and (v) some 
additional data containing the name of the rapporteur of the decision, names of other 
judges that were on the bench, a reference to the unanimity of the decision or the 
dissenting opinions, among others. 
Furthermore, there is a norm about nomenclature and citation of Brazilian 
case law that is mainly used in academic works. It is Norm NBR 6023/2002, issued 
by the Brazilian National Standards Organization (Associação Brasileira de Normas 
Técnicas – ABNT), a non-profit organisation which is responsible for technical 
standards in Brazil and is a founding member and the exclusive Brazilian 
representative in the International Organization for Standardization.326   
It can be noted that, different from the Anglo-American approach, Brazilian 
cases are not designed by the names of the parties involved. But there can be 
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exceptions and the very controversial or famous cases inevitably became popularly 
known by the names or the issues involved in them.  
Finally, despite the existence of a norm about the nomenclature of cases, it is 
usual to find cases quoted differently, without some of the recommend data or for 
them to be in a slightly different sequence. In fact, lawyers or courts in Brazil, based 
upon their preferences, have independently established their own rules of citation of 
precedents (before courts or in academic essays). It has been considered sufficient 
to label the cases by specific terms, abbreviations, numbers and dates that can 
easily identify them. The usual terms, not necessarily in the proposed sequence, are: 
the type of appeal in which the case was decided and a chronological number of 
identification given by the court, followed by the abbreviation of the name of the court 
that pronounced the decision, a reference to the panel that pronounced the decision, 
the name of the rapporteur, the expression “unanimous” (if it was), the date of the 
decision, as well as the date of the publication of the decision in the official press. 
To summarise, this chapter has discussed the practical uses of precedents in 
Brazil under the traditional civil law perspective and compared them to the English 
model. Having fulfilled the purpose of addressing both the theoretical and practical 
traditional approaches to precedents in Brazil in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
respectively, the following chapters will address the Brazilian categories of binding 
precedents that are expected to progressively transform the Brazilian legal system 










Chapters 2 and 3 introduced a general picture of the manner in which the 
Brazilian legal system traditionally deals with precedents, identifying the basic 
differences and similarities between traditional common law and Brazilian law uses 
of them. As was seen, generally in Brazil previous judicial decisions (even 
pronounced by higher courts) are not binding precedents that must be followed by 
courts and judges. However, there are some departures of this general rule.327 This 
Chapter aims to address this aspect of Brazilian law, presenting a taxonomy of the 
several Brazilian categories of binding precedents.328  
 
4.1 General Considerations 
 
The traditional approach to precedents in Brazil can be summarised as 
follows: (i) the courts do not have to follow what other courts in the same hierarchical 
level have already decided or even have to follow their own previous decisions; (ii) 
the lower courts do not have to follow the previous decisions of the higher courts.329  
However, it cannot be denied to binding precedents, especially when this 
expression is understood in its lato sensu330, a role in the Brazilian legal system. 
Indeed, in Brazil, challenging the traditional approach to the doctrine of the 
separation of power and aiming to achieve a standardisation of understanding 
relating to legal issues and to ensure speed in judicial decisions (at least these are 
the most apparent objectives), there are certain decisions or groups of decisions, as 
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a result of specific procedures, whose authority is binding on the law courts 
(sometimes for all, sometimes for some) and for the Administration as a whole. 
Specifically with regard to decisions made by the Brazilian courts – that, somehow, 
have a binding effect – it is possible to find categories ranging from the result of the 
incident for case law standardisation that internally binds a panel of a court, going 
through the decisions endowed with a binding effect on centralised control of 
constitutionality, going to quasi-legislative acts (such as the normative sentences of 
the Labour Courts).  
It is not the intention of this thesis to address in details all these fields. It would 
be a futile task, especially for the purpose for which this thesis is proposed, which is 
(i) to present, compare (with the English approach) and systematise the concepts, 
the terms and the modus operandi of the doctrine of stare decisis as implemented in 
Brazil, and (ii) to present, compare (with the English approach) and analyse the new 
Brazilian binding precedent model, nominated “Binding Súmula”, something, indeed, 
unprecedented and that can be of considerable use to this field of law. The 
remainder of this chapter will deal with these Brazilian binding precedents 
separately, discussing the features of each particular category: (i) the Portuguese 
Assentos, (ii) the Prejulgados in Labour Courts, (iii) the Labour Courts “normative 
sentence”, (iv) the Prejulgados in Electoral Courts, (v) the normative power of the 
Electoral Courts, (vi) the general incident of standardisation of case law of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, (vii) the special incident of standardisation of case law of the 
Federal Small Claims Courts, (viii) the binding decisions in case of multiplicity of 
special appeals (that are appeals to the Superior Court of Justice) based upon a 
similar question of law, (ix) the incident to declare the unconstitutionality of a 
normative act in the context of the decentralised judicial review of legislation, (x) the 
binding decisions concerning the general repercussion (“repercussão geral”) in the 
extraordinary appeals (that are appeals to the Supreme Court) and (xi) the binding 
decisions on the centralised judicial review of legislation in Brazil. The aim is to 
expose their main aspects jointly with the details referring to the binding character 
that they have. 
At the end of the Chapter, it will be present a table condensing the taxonomy 






4.2 An Historical “Precedent”: the Portuguese Assentos 
 
For historical purposes, a note is needed about the Portuguese Assentos, as 
they can be considered the first Brazilian experience with judicial decisions of 
binding effect. 
A former Portuguese colony, Brazil, during the period of the Empire331, 
recorded the existence of a kind of “judicial decision” whose characteristics, despite 
its peculiarities, has something in common with the doctrine of stare decisis: the 
Assentos. Of Lusitanian origin, its ancestry has generally been attributed to the 
ancient Assentos of the old Casa de Suplicação, the highest law court of the 
Portuguese Kingdom and, in principle, ruled by the King. These Assentos were 
created by the Manueline Ordinances of 1521 and maintained by the Philippines 
Ordinances, a tradition that was upheld and enforced with detailed regulation in the 
Lei da Boa Razão (Law of Good Reason) of 18 August 1769. During the period of 
the Empire, this ancient Portuguese practice was explicitly incorporated into Brazilian 
law by a General Assembly Resolution sanctioned by Decree 2684 of 23 October 
1875, despite the strange implication that it would enforce a “binding law” from one 
country to another. More specifically, the Decree attributed status of “law” to the 
Assentos of the Casa de Suplicação of Lisbon issued between 1805 and the date of 
independence, as well as empowering the Brazilian Supreme Court to also issue its 
own Assentos.332  
Neves details the main aspects of the Assentos: (i) the body that issues the 
Assento is a court (or body with a judicial function) and therefore is responsible in 
principle for the performance of a judicial function (even though this court is a 
Supreme Court), and operates in a particularly qualified manner (full bench); (ii) as a 
judicial body, it is required to deal with a conflict in the case law by means of a 
presentation of an appeal; (iii) it will consider and resolve the conflict through a truly 
judicial activity, pondering and deciding a concrete case; (iv) however, overcoming 
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the strict character of its judicial activity or at least not self-limiting to fulfil the function 
that the nature of the judicial activity corresponds to (the judicial decision of a 
concrete case), the judicial body establishes a judicial general norm – an assento – 
as a solution that no longer applies only to the concrete case but for future 
application.333 
According to Neves, the Assentos, for their peculiar characteristics, differ from 
other categories of “binding decisions” that are present in other legal systems. To 
him, one cannot identify the model of the Assentos to the model of binding 
precedents, which exists in the common law legal systems. In the common law 
tradition, a precedent is a concrete judicial decision, necessarily linked to the 
concrete case (the fundamental facts) in which it was proffered, that is taken (or 
imposes) as a model for future similar cases. An assento goes beyond the concrete 
casuistic plan. Ultimately overcoming the strict character of a judicial activity, an 
independent abstract norm, detached from the concrete case, is created for future 
general application.334  
The practice of Assentos went also beyond the limits of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers as it was (and is) understood in Brazil and Portugal 
(considering also that both are civil law countries). In fact, the configuration given to 
the Assentos335 conferred (i) to a law court the possibility to establish (ii) universally 
binding judicial statements that create (iii) norms in the strict sense of abstract and 
general precepts, that are (iv) abstract and become independent from the cases that 
have been their cause, with the purpose of establishing (v) a rule for future general 
application. Indeed, the issuing courts were called to proclaim legal criteria that both 
formally and intentionally have characteristics of legislative precepts.336 The 
Assentos did not have to address the conflict views in the cases, opting for only one 
of them, or to explain why to depart from a case law orientation previously followed. 
In this sense, they were not case law (understood here as a set of solutions that 
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come from the past and persist). They really were norms deliberately formulated for 
the future.337 
With the proclamation of the Republic and the natural tendency to cut links 
with Portugal, the Assentos were abolished in Brazil by the Constitution of 1891.338,339 
 
4.3 Binding Precedents in Labour Courts 
 
(i) The Prejulgados 
 
The Portuguese Assentos did not represent an epilogue in the Brazilian 
binding precedents history. Yet during the first half of the 20th Century, the 
Prejulgados of Labour Courts – an assemblage of binding statements dealing 
individually (a single Prejulgado) with questions of labour law – were created by 
article 902 of the Brazilian Consolidation of Labour Laws340 (with the text amended 
by Decree-Law 8737/46). According to Decree-law 8737/46, the Superior Labour 
Court was permitted, in conformity with its Internal Regulations, to establish 
Prejulgados that would have bindingness in relation to the other labour courts. They 
could be also revoked or reformed by the full bench of the Superior Labour Court, 
pronouncing in abstract or in a concrete case. 
The greatest problem was that, if by the terms of the Decree-Law, only the 
reform or revocation of the Prejulgados could be made in abstract (i.e. in the 
absence of a concrete case), it would not be done in that manner. In fact, the internal 
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regulations of the Superior Labour Court also permitted the creation of the 
Prejulgados in the absence of a concrete case. The Superior Labour Court on 
several occasions acted as such.341,342,343 
The constitutionality of the Prejulgados was powerfully contested. It was said 
that the ordinary Legislature could not grant power to a court (even a superior court) 
to issue “judicial norms” and bind the lower courts. Certainly, this was the case of the 
Prejugados: the ordinary Legislature giving power to the Judicial Branch to 
“legislate”, which, as it is known, is a typical function of the Legislature. The Decree-
Law clearly offended the principle of the separation of powers of the Brazilian 
Republic, which, pursuant to article 2º of the Federal Constitution, are independent 
and harmonious.344 
Despite this evident flaw, the Prejulgados survived for many years, passing 
through three constitutions. In 1977, based on the arguments cited above, the 
Federal Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional. In 1982, Law 7033/1982 
was issued, which eventually suppressed the Prejulgados of the Brazilian law.345 
 
(ii) Labour Courts Normative Sentence 
 
Despite the Prejulgados no longer surviving, there still exists in Brazilian 
Labour Courts a kind of decision that has a very heterodox type of bindingness to a 
judicial decision. It is the “normative sentence” that is regulated in articles 868 to 871 
of the Consolidation of Labour Laws (Decree-law 5452/1943). In summary, an 
appellate Labour Court (and, at national level, the Superior Labour Court), in case of 
collective disputes, may establish new labour conditions and extend these conditions 
to all employees of the company in the same profession, even those that do not 
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participate in the bargaining. The extension may still be larger, covering all 
employees of the same professional category within the jurisdiction of the court, 
provided it fulfils the requirements of articles 869 and 870.346 It is said that the 
normative sentence produces ultra partes effects, limited to the employees of a 
professional class in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, somehow anticipating the 
similar effect presented in the United States with class actions, although with other 
desiderata.347 
Consequently, the normative sentence binds the inferior courts, which must 
appreciate further individual actions in accordance with earlier provisions in the 
normative sentence. It is, therefore, a decision that does not follow the lines of a 
classical judicial decision, whose binding effects only reach the parties involved. 
By containing general and abstract commands, almost matching the activity of 
legislation (almost, because the effects are not as general and abstract as those of 
the statutes in stricto sensu are), the constitutionality of the normative sentence was 
vigorously discussed in the past (before the Constitution of 1946, precisely). 
However, currently, there is no more space for this discussion. It is only necessary to 
consult article 114 and article 5º, XXI, of the 1988 Constitution, to see that it has 
recognised the existence of the normative sentence.  
 
4.4 Binding Precedents in Electoral Courts 
 
(i) The Prejulgados 
 
Electoral courts also had a type of Prejulgados. According to Brazilian 
Electoral Code (Law 4737/1965, article 263), during a single electoral period, the 
previous decisions on questions of law constitute Prejulgados (binding precedents) 
to further similar cases, unless, against the previous decision, there are the votes of 
two thirds of the member of the Court. 
The desiderata of the electoral Prejulgados were to ensure the uniformity in 
the interpretation of the electoral law. They had, as objective limits, the question of 
law decided, which constituted a binding precedent to the court at the judgement of 
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similar cases during the very same election. They did not involve questions of fact. 
More restricted than labour Prejulgados, they had a very definite time limit. They only 
bound the further cases of the same election.  A Prejulgado, decided in relation to an 
election, did not bind questions pertaining to another election.348 It also had, 
according to a literal interpretation of the legal text, a bindingness limited to the court 
that issued it. 
Recently, they have lost their practical interest (keeping the historical interest, 
certainly) because the Superior Electoral Court considered article 263 of the 
Electoral Code, which created the electoral Prejulgados, with respect to their 
bindingness, as incompatible “with the subsequent Constitutions”349, including, 
evidently, the current Federal Constitution.350 
 
(ii) The Normative Power of the Electoral Courts 
 
The normative power of the Electoral Courts is now exercised through 
resolutions, which are almost “legislative” acts issued by the Superior Electoral Court 
or by the Regional Electoral Courts on any question of electoral Law, such as 
eligibility, coalitions of parties, surveys, advertising and voting. The issuing of 
resolutions is often provoked. In fact, the Superior Electoral Court (Electoral Code, 
article 23, XII) and the Regional Electoral Courts (Electoral Code, article 30, VIII) are 
empowered to respond to what has been called for consultations. These are 
questions in abstract – never a concrete case – on certain point of electoral law. The 
answers to them are also given in abstract, through resolutions, that is, as normative 
acts of the Electoral Courts. 
The dominant understanding in Brazil is that, in being a normative act of the 
Electoral Courts, the resolution must have a binding effect to the court which 
delivered it and for the lower courts and judges (in the same jurisdiction). Indeed, the 
answer to a consultation would make no sense if thereafter not followed by the Court 
itself, when presenting the same question in concrete case. As Sampaio states, “it 
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would be disconcerting irony, during a concrete case in which is discussed the 
meaning of a normative act, to give a solution different from that established in a 
resolution”.351 If delivered by the Superior Electoral Court, the resolution will bind all 
Regional Electoral Courts and electoral judges; if given by a Regional Electoral 
Court, it will bind itself and the electoral courts in its jurisdiction. It could not be 
otherwise, defends the majority in Brazil, and this normative character is for the 
Electoral Courts as the Binding Súmula of the Federal Supreme Court is to all courts. 
There are those who think differently. Jardim, for example, complaining of the 
absence of the perfect adversarial proceeding and of a concrete case, argues there 
is no bindingness in the answers to the consultations. For him, the Electoral Code, 
requiring the judges and inferior courts to decide according to a predetermined 
abstract judicial interpretation, disregarding the circumstances and peculiarities of 
the concrete case, under Brazilian constitutional model of separation of powers, is 
unconstitutional.352 
Constitutional or not, in practice, the bindingness exists, especially referring to 
the answers given by the Superior Electoral Court to the consultations addressed to 
it. Taking in consideration the Brazilian reality, it is never too much to remember the 
natural peculiarities of an electoral proceeding, which is much more judicial 
administration of paramount questions (the elections of the country) than 
jurisdictional activity itself: maximum speed, convenience of reducing disputes and 
the need for the democracy of a predictability of what the law is, among others.353 
These peculiarities forged the existence of the consultations and the resolutions. 
And, actually, the resolutions are invariably followed (at least until a new response is 
given) by the Superior Electoral Court, the regional courts, judges, parties and 
candidates, based much more on the certainty of the futility of opposing to an 
understanding of a superior or regional court, during time of electoral proceeding 
(expedited by nature), than on the knowledge of the existence of a binding effect 
(whether it constitutionally exists or not).  
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4.5 Incidents of Standardisation of Case Law354 
 
(i) The General Incident of Standardisation of Case Law of the Code of Civil 
Procedure  
 
The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure (articles 476 to 479) regulates an 
incident to the standardisation of the case law within the same court.  Its name 
clearly reveals the concern of the Code in maintaining the uniformity of the case law 
within the same court. It also aims to avoid that the fate of the litigants be under the 
dependence of the distribution of the case to this or that panel.355,356 
Its proceeding is, in summary, as follows: during the trial in a panel, if it is 
observed that the court has previous conflicting decisions on the same question of 
law, this question of law can be, on the request of one party, the Prosecution 
Service357 or even on the initiative of the panel itself, submitted to the analysis of the 
full bench, the special court or the great civil panel;358 the trial at the panel is halted 
until the full bench (or the pertinent standardisation organ) decides the incident; once 
the incident is decided, its result will be applied, then, bindingly, in decision of the 
concrete case by the panel.359,360 
It is worth stating that the pronouncement of the full bench (or the pertinent 
standardisation organ), at the incident, will concern only the question of law or, by 
using the wording of the Code, will concern “the interpretation of law”361, and not the 
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facts of the concrete case. Concerning the facts, the panel will then decide, already 
bound to the interpretation given to the question of law by the standardising body. 
Indeed, the panel will decide the appeal, but it will be bound to the interpretation of 
law established by the full bench.362,363 Besides, article 479 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure states that the decision of the incident approved by the absolute majority 
of the members of the court, will be incorporated in the súmula of the court and, 
internally, will constitute, a binding precedent. 
In accordance with the above, the full bench (or the pertinent standardisation 
organ) interpretation by absolute majority produces a double order of effects: it must 
be observed by the panel in the decision of the concrete case (article 478) and 
constitutes, to the court, a binding precedent for further cases (article 479).364 
Regarding the first effect (of article 478 of the Code of Civil Procedure), 
subjectively speaking, the decision of standardisation binds the panel that will decide 
the appeal, or the cause that served as the presupposition of the request for 
standardisation. Its material validity amounts to the concrete facts on which the 
appeal or the case is based, meaning that it applies to such facts. With these 
characteristics it can be classified as a specific precedent, since it limits its authority 
to the case in question and to the organ empowered to decide it.365 
Referring to the second effect – the understanding of the standardisation 
organ as a binding precedent for future cases within the same court – it is also 
possible to establish its features. Subjectively speaking, article 479 states that the 
decision will constitute a precedent in the standardisation of the case law of the 
court. Consequently, the understanding of the standardisation organ binds the Court 
(and certainly its panels and judges) that produces it.366 Concerning the material 
ambit of the second effect, the understanding proclaimed by the court, as article 479 
determines, is not only applicable to the concrete case, but equally, as a binding 
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precedent, to all similar cases that may arise before the court in the future, unless 
the court exercises its power to repeal it. One can say that the “the interpretation of 
law”, as a binding precedent to further cases, is a quasi-general norm as to the 
conditions of application, since it imposes consequences in a generic way, opening 
the possibility that an undetermined number of identical cases can be subsumed 
within the generality of its terms.367 
Currently, in Brazil, there is no disagreement about the constitutionality and 
appropriateness of the second effect (the bindingness to other cases in the same 
court when the same question of law is discussed). The court is only one body, 
though divided, for functional reasons, into smaller panels. These panels (and the 
judges, individually) must therefore follow the understanding of the court as a whole, 
represented by the decision of its full bench (or the pertinent standardisation organ) 
in the precedent of standardisation of case law. 
 
(ii) The Special Incident of Standardisation of Case Law of the Federal Small Claims 
Courts 
 
Law 10259/2002, which regulates the proceedings in the Federal Small 
Claims Courts, states, in its article 14, caput, that a request for standardisation of 
interpretation of federal law will be required when there are divergent interpretations 
on matters of substantive law in decisions pronounced by appellate panels. 
The objective of this incident is the same as the incident of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Besides, referring to the means of operation, it must follow the same 
modus operandi stated by the Code of Civil Procedure (articles 476 to 479) with the 
necessary adaptations (the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applies 
subsidiarily to the Federal Small Claims Courts when not inconsistent with Law 
10259/2002).368 
In fact, if during the trial of a concrete case before an appellate panel is 
observed that there are conflicting decisions on the same question of substantive 
law, this question, by request of a party, the Prosecution Service or even ex officio, is 
to be submitted in advance to a standardising organ. The trial before the appellate 
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panel is suspended until the standardising body decides the incident. Once the 
incident is decided, the appellate panel that has to decide the concrete case will 
directly apply the result, bindingly.369 
According to Law 10259/2002, this incident of standardisation of case law will 
be decided: (i) if based on a divergence between panels of the same region, by a 
joint meeting of panels in conflict, chaired by a co-ordinating judge (article 14, § 1º); 
(ii) if based on a divergence between panels of different regions or on a decision in 
opposition to the dominant case law or the Súmula of the Superior Court of Justice, 
by a National Standardisation Panel, comprising of judges of all appellate panels, 
chaired by a Federal Co-ordinator (article 14, § 2º). Exceptionally, the interested 
party may request a further decision of the Superior Court of Justice, when the 
orientation stated by this decision of the Standardisation Panel, in matters of 
substantive law, is contrary to the dominant Súmula or the case law of that court 
(article 14, § 5º). 
The pronouncement of the standardising organ on this incident must be, 
according to Law 10259/2002, on a question of substantive law and not on the facts 
of the concrete case. Indeed, it will be the appellate panel that, bound to the 
interpretation (about the question of substantive law) given by the standardising 
organ, shall decide on the facts and the concrete case as a whole. It is very 
important to observe that the object of this incident of standardisation is more limited 
than that of its counterpart of the Code of Civil Procedure, since it deals only with 
questions of substantive law, unlike that which can also consider the questions of 
procedural law.370 
Following the example of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decision of the 
incident of standardisation in the Federal Small Claims Courts must also produce a 
double-order of effects. Firstly, it should be observed by the respective appellate 
panel in the decision of the concrete case. Secondly, to make sense to the incident, 
the legal interpretation established by the National Standardising Panel (§ 2º) and 
the Superior Court of Justice (§ 4º) must bind the decision of new cases to what has 
been discussed of the same question of substantive law. It is a matter of common 
sense and economy, as it would be unreasonable to decide to the contrary or even 
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raise a new incident in each new trial that conveys the same question of substantive 
law, when this question is already nationally decided (by a procedure specifically 
created to do so).371 
In truth, Law 10259/2002 does not mention this bindingness to the decision of 
the National Standardising Panel. It mentions (and only implicitly) to the case of the 
envoy of the discussion to the Superior Court of Justice. According to § 5º of article 
14, in the case of envoy of the discussion to the Superior Court of Justice, the 
Rapporteur may concede ex officio or at the request of the interested party, a 
preventive measure determining the suspension of the cases in which the same 
divergence is established. And following this, § 6º concludes that any eventual 
requests for identical standardisation, subsequently received in any appellate panel, 
will be suspended, waiting for the pronouncement of the Superior Court of Justice. 
The expression “waiting” implies the necessary application of the understanding of 
the question of substantive law that will come from the pronouncement of the 
Superior Court of Justice. However, it is necessary to give meaning to the incident of 
standardisation in the Federal Small Claims Courts. Simply binding the appellate 
panel to the interpretation given (by the National Standardising Panel or the Superior 
Court of Justice) in the specific concrete case is to destroy the most practical and 
important effect of the incident. The key to making sense of this incident is to 
nationally bindingly apply the understanding for cases in which the same question of 
substantive law will be discussed, thus ensuring the uniformity that is so desired.372  
 
4.6 The Case Multiplicity of Special Appeals Based upon a Similar Question of 
Law 
 
A new rule of binding precedents was created by Law 11672/2008, which 
established a new proceeding to the case of multiplicity of special appeals (“recurso 
especial”), addressed to the Superior Court of Justice (but filed before a Federal 
Regional Court or a State Court of Justice), based upon a similar question of law. In 
what clearly is one more effort of the Brazilian legal system to make justice faster, 
the new law intends to expedite the processing of these several similar special 
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appeals. It added article 543-C to the Civil Procedural Code and therefore allows 
these special appeals with identical law theses to be solved in the ordinary instances 
without being analysed by the Superior Court of Justice. 
In summary, the new article 543-C, § 1º, of the Civil Procedural Code 
determines that, once a great amount of special appeals concerning the same matter 
are verified, the president of the court of appeal – a Federal Regional Court or a 
State Court of Justice – will be in charge of admitting one or more appeals that 
represent the controversy, which will be forwarded, by sampling, to the Superior 
Court of Justice. The proceedings of the other similar special appeals will be 
pending, waiting for a decision of the Superior Court of Justice. If this step is not 
taken by the Presidency of the Federal Regional Court or the State Court of Justice, 
the rapporteur of a similar special appeal in the Superior Court of Justice may 
identify this situation and order the suspension, in the court of origin, of the 
proceedings of those special appeals based upon the same question of law (§ 2º of 
article 543-C). 
The new rule also determines that the exemplary appeals will be expeditiously 
sent to trial and, most importantly, after the Superior Court of Justice’s decision on 
the appeal(s) addressed to it by sampling, the courts of origin must apply this 
decision to other pending cases.  According to the Civil Procedural Code, article 543-
C, §7º, I and II, once the ruling of the Superior Court of Justice has been published: 
(i) if the final understanding of the Superior Court of Justice coincides with the 
appealed decision, the special appeals discontinued at the origin will be definitively 
dismissed there (in the Federal Regional Courts or in the State Courts of Justice); (ii) 
if the final understanding of the Superior Court of Justice differs of the appealed 
decision, the courts of origin (Federal Regional Courts or State Courts of Justice) will 
re-examine their decisions taking into consideration the understanding of the 
Superior Court of Justice. 
There is a slight difference between items I and II of the above mentioned §7º 
of article 543-C of the Civil Procedural Code that should be made clear. Item II 
basically says that the courts of origin (Federal Regional Courts or State Courts of 
Justice) will re-examine their decisions (taking into consideration the understanding 
of the Superior Court of Justice). The most common interpretation of this provision is 
that the courts of origin are not strictly bound by the understanding of the Superior 





Court of Justice’s precedent but not a strict bindingness. Regarding item I of §7º of 
article 543-C of the Civil Procedural Code, the rule is cogent, and the similar special 
appeals should inevitably be dismissed at the origin. 
Interestingly, on its website373, the Superior Court of Justice keeps track of the 
special appeals that have been affected the quality of paradigm for other special 
appeals based upon a similar question of law. The Federal Regional Courts, the 
State Courts of Justice or any lawyer can easily see their progress and what has 
been decided on the several matters. 
Finally, it is important to note that this innovation for the special appeals 
encompasses two trends in the Brazilian procedural law. Firstly, following the current 
tendency in Brazil of establishing more and more cases of binding precedents, it is 
remarkable that the Brazilian legal system provides one more case of an external 
binding precedent, since the Federal Regional Courts and the State Courts of Justice 
are bound by (or at least constrained to follow in case of item II of §7º of article 543-
C of the Civil Procedural Code), in pending cases, the understanding established by 
the Superior Court of Justice. Secondly, in line with the creation of the general 
repercussion for extraordinary appeals to the Federal Supreme Court (which will be 
seen later in this chapter), the new proceeding for the special appeals based upon a 
similar question of law is an attempt to relieve the Superior Court of Justice so it can 
focus on, with more quality and speed, what it considers the most important 
issues.374 
 
4.7 Binding Precedents in the Context of the Judicial Review of Legislation in 
Brazil 
 
4.7.1 An Overview of the Judicial Review of Legislation in Brazil  
 
Currently, under the Constitution of 1988, Brazil adopts the two main models 
of judicial review of legislation: the decentralised, as in the American model, and 
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centralised, the model developed in continental Europe.375,376,377 These two models, 
as they coexist in Brazil, are quite distinct in terms of intervention and powers.378,379  
Basically, following the American model, the decentralised control (i) is that 
entrusted to all judges and courts of the country;380 (ii) is concrete because the judge 
decides by exception when applying the law to a particular case;381 (iii) and is a 
posteriori because the control refers to a law that has already been promulgated. 
Evidently, in Brazil decentralised control has its own additional particularities, which 
are, in summary, the following: (i) any judge or collegiate court (these only by the 
absolute majority of its members or members of the respective special body - article 
97 of Brazilian Constitution) may declare the unconstitutionality of laws or normative 
acts; (ii) a declaration of unconstitutionality may be required in any case, by either 
party, by way of exception in the discussion of the concrete case; (iii) as a direct and 
immediate effect, the non-application of the norm considered as unconstitutional is 
only in the concrete case discussed in court (inter partes effects); (iv) as an indirect 
and mediate effect, emerges the power of  the Senate to suspend the execution, in 
whole or in part, of a law or a normative act that is declared unconstitutional by 
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definitive decision of the Federal Supreme Court (see article 52, X, of Brazilian 
Constitution); (v) finally, in accordance to the reformed text of Brazilian Constitution 
(article 103-A, altered by Constitutional Amendment 45/2004), it is allowed to the 
Federal Supreme Court, in the decentralised judicial review of legislation, by decision 
of two thirds of its members, after repeated similar decisions on the same 
constitutional matter, to approve a statement (on this matter) to be incorporated in its 
Binding Súmula that, by its publication in the official press, will have to be followed 
by the other judicial courts and the public Administration as a whole, at federal, state 
and municipal levels.382 
In parallel, Brazil also adopts the European model of judicial review. In this 
modality, the control (i) is centralised in the Brazilian Supreme Court383,384 (at federal 
level),385,386 (ii) is done in abstract because the Supreme Court decides regardless of 
any concrete case and (iii) a posteriori because control refers to a law that has 
already been promulgated.387 This centralised control is operated in Brazil through 
direct actions. The two most important actions, which are presented before the 
Federal Supreme Court, are: (i) the direct action of unconstitutionality of a federal or 
state law or normative act (see Brazilian Constitution, article 102, I, “a”, first part); 
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and (ii) the declaratory action of constitutionality of a federal law or normative acts 
(article 102, I, “a”, second part).388 The decisions pronounced by the Federal 
Supreme Court in direct actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory actions of 
constitutionality have force against all, as well as a binding effect in regards to the 
other judicial courts and the Administration as a whole. 
 
4.7.2 The Incident to Declare the Unconstitutionality of a Normative Act in the 
Context of the Decentralised (“Difuso”) Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
An incident very similar to the incident of standardisation of case law of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, in the operation of its internal binding, is the incident to 
declare, in collegiate courts, the unconstitutionality of a normative act in context of 
the decentralised judicial review of legislation. In accordance with article 97 of the 
1988 Federal Constitution, only by the vote of the absolute majority of its members 
or the members of the respective special body may the Brazilian collegiate courts 
declare the unconstitutionality of a statute or normative act. 
This incident is regulated in articles 480 to 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
In short, once argued and upheld in a panel the unconstitutionality of a normative 
act, the analysis of this question must be submitted to the full bench of the court (or 
the special body). The trial at the panel will be suspended until the full bench (or the 
special body) decides the constitutional question. The pronouncement of the full 
bench (or the special body), in the incident of unconstitutionality, will only be on the 
prejudicial question of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the normative act and 
not on the facts of the concrete case. The decision issued by the full bench (or the 
special body) will be applied, then, bindingly, in the decision of the concrete case by 
the panel.389 It is important to note that, if the majority of voters conclude on the 
unconstitutionality of the statute or normative act, but the constitutional quorum of 
absolute majority (Federal Constitution, article 97) is not achieved, the decision of 
the full bench or the special organ must be by the rejection of the claim of 
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unconstitutionality. The case will return to panel, which will have to enforce the 
statute or normative act, as if it were constitutional.390  
Furthermore, despite not having the erga omnes efficacy of the decisions in 
the centralised judicial review of legislation, the decisions on the constitutional 
question by the full bench or the special body in the incident, surpassing the specific 
case that allowed it, internally bind the panels of the court, the full bench and the 
special body in further cases. In further cases, which discuss the same constitutional 
question, these bodies must apply the understanding issued by the full bench or the 
special body in the incident. There is nothing more natural, since the court is one 
single organ, though divided, for functional purposes, in many smaller bodies. These 
bodies (and the judges, individually) must therefore follow the understanding of the 
court (represented in the incident by its full bench or the special body).391 
Throughout the country, the internal regulations of Brazilian courts have been 
predicting this bindingness that surpasses the specific case. The Internal Regulation 
of the Federal Supreme Court, for example, in its article 101, states that the 
declaration of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law or legislative act 
pronounced by a qualified majority, applies to new cases submitted to the panels or 
the Full Bench, except as stated in art. 103. The principle contained in these internal 
regulations receives legal support from the Code of Civil Procedure. The single 
paragraph of article 481 of the Code states that the panels of the courts shall not 
resubmit the question of unconstitutionality when there has already been a previous 
pronouncement on the question by full bench or special body of the court or by the 
Federal Supreme Court. That is to say that, in accordance with the internal 
regulations and the Code, the previous pronouncement must be applied.392 
 
4.7.3 The Issue of the General Repercussion (“Repercussão Geral”) in 
Extraordinary Appeals 
 
As briefly seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the Federal Supreme Court, in the 
Brazilian decentralised judicial review of legislation, commonly performs its appellate 
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jurisdiction via an instrument called extraordinary appeal (“recurso extraordinário”).393 
By the extraordinary appeal, a concrete case dealing with constitutional matter, 
which started before an inferior court, after a long journey and other appeals, finally 
arrives in the Supreme Court. This appeal to the Supreme Court consists of a 
procedural-constitutional instrument specifically created to avoid any eventual harm 
to the Constitution by final decisions from the Brazilian ordinary courts. Its scope is 
restricted to the (constitutional) questions of law that were supposedly wrongly 
resolved by the appealed decision. It is not suitable for (re)considerations of facts 
and evidence. 
The extraordinary appeal is the most frequent and one of the most important 
procedural instruments under the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court. 
Basically, as Bustamante and Bustamante state, “the issue of the unconstitutionality 
of any statute, international treaty, legislative decree or administrative resolution 
which establishes a general norm can be brought before the Supreme Court via a 
recurso extraordinário, although there are some procedural barriers aimed at filtering 
the number of appeals to the Federal Supreme Court”.394  
After the Constitutional Amendment 45/2004 one of these procedural barriers 
is the requirement of general repercussion (“repercussão geral”). According to article 
102, § 3º, of the Brazilian Constitution (with the text given by the mentioned 
amendment), only cases of general repercussion can be submitted to the Supreme 
Court via extraordinary appeal. Clearly, this requirement of general repercussion was 
created as an attempt to solve the overwhelming number of appeals to the Federal 
Supreme Court. The new constitutional provision states that “in an extraordinary 
appeal, the appealing party must demonstrate the general repercussion of the 
constitutional issues discussed in the case, under the terms of the law, so that the 
Court may examine the possibility of accepting the appeal, and it may only reject it 
through the opinion of two thirds of its members”.395 
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 Historically, this exceptional instrument has great similarities with the old North American model of 
the writ of error. 
394
 See Bustamante, Thomas and Bustamante, Evanilda de Godoi. Constitutional Courts as “Negative 
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Additionally, this constitutional provision has been recently regulated by Law 
11418/2006. It added to the Civil Procedural Code articles 543-A and 543-B. 
According to article 543-A, by unappealable decision, the Federal Supreme Court 
will not admit the extraordinary appeals that do not deal with issues of general 
repercussion. This is a significant change in the extraordinary appeals to the 
Supreme Court, whose admission shall pass by the examination of the Court 
regarding this very strict requirement. 
For the purposes of general repercussion, it is imperative to recognise issues 
in the extraordinary appeal which, from the economic, political, social or legal points 
of view396, trespass the subjective interests of the case (Civil Procedural Code, article 
543-A, § 3º). There will also be general repercussion whenever the appeal 
challenges a decision contrary to the Súmula or the dominant case law of the 
Federal Supreme Court (article 543-A, § 3º).397 Taking into account any of these 
points of view, if the general repercussion is recognised, the extraordinary appeal 
should have its merits judged by the Supreme Court. Failing that, the Supreme Court 
should not give it any follow-up. With this filtering mechanism, the Supreme Court 
will appreciate only issues of general transcendence (not of individual importance). 
Roughly speaking, the constitutional issues discussed in the extraordinary appeal 
should cover or interest (from an economic, social, political or legal perspective) a 
large number of people beyond the parties involved. The adoption of the procedural-
constitutional barrier of the general repercussion clearly highlights the (new) 
objective character of the extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court.398,399,400 
                                                 
396
 In general, the appellant, under the economic perspective, shall demonstrate the impact of the 
constitutional issues addressed in the extraordinary appeal on the national economy and tax policies, 
on essential public services (public transportation, telephone, energy etc.) or on the development of 
national industry activity or other specific economic sector. Under the social perspective, the appellant 
must demonstrate, for example, the link of the issue discussed in the appeal with the collective rights 
protected by the Constitution (education, housing, public health, social security, that is, issues that are 
often conveyed through collective actions). Politically, the general repercussion can be related to 
foreign states or international organizations involved in the case, to the fact that the appeal deals with 
internal conflicts between political or public bodies or because the appeal involves a public policy or 
an important government program. Finally, under legal point of view, the general repercussion can be 
based on the fact that the appealed matter involves the definition or a decisive interpretation of a 
specific legal category or a principle of law. 
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 The Internal Regulation of the Federal Supreme Court establishes two cases of presumed general 
repercussion, which, once it is configured, dismisses the examination procedure of the repercussion. 
General repercussion shall be presumed either when the matter has already been recognised 
previously or when the extraordinary appeal challenges decision contrary to the Súmula or the 
predominant case law of the Court (article 323, § 1º). 
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According to the Civil Procedural Code, article 543-B, § 1º, in order to avoid a 
great number of extraordinary appeals in the Federal Supreme Court, the inferior 
court are authorised to select one or more representative appeals and forward only 
them to the Supreme Court, halting the others. However, to decide whether or not an 
issue is of general repercussion, a decision of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court 
is required (with the exception given by § 4º of article 543-A of the Civil Procedural 
Code). But most important for us, under the system of this procedural-constitutional 
barrier, the decision of the Supreme Court, which does not recognise the general 
repercussion in a given situation, will be binding for the Court itself and all the inferior 
courts, when assessing the admissibility of extraordinary appeals in similar cases. In 
this case, the decision will bind all extraordinary appeals regarding the same issue, 
both those that are in the Supreme Court and those that were halted by the inferior 
courts, which will be promptly dismissed.401 
The decisions concerning the existence or not of general repercussion in 
extraordinary appeals are unappealable.402 And, once the decision concerning the 
general repercussion is proffered, the Chief Justice’s Office shall promote specific 
and broad publicizing of the content of the decision and shall update the database 
regarding the issue.403 Efficiently, for the guidance of inferior courts and all lawyers in 
general, the site of the Supreme Court already provides an extensive list of issues 
for which the general repercussion has already been recognised as well as a list of 
issues in which it has not happened. According to the Federal Supreme Court – 
Report 2011, until that year 509 issues of general repercussion had been accessed 
by the Supreme Court. From them, 251 had been decided definitively, either 
because Supreme Court had not recognised the general repercussion in the given 
situation or because the Court had recognised and also decided the merits of the 
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 Based on this idea, § 6º of article 543-A of the Civil Procedural Code allows the Court (by a 
decision of the Rapporteur), in the analysis of the existence of general repercussion, to admit the 
intervention of third parties (“amicus curiae”). 
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 See Marinoni (2010b, pp. 471-472). 
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 On the other hand, if recognised the presence of general repercussion and decided the merits of 
the appeal by the Federal Supreme Court, the halted appeals shall be re-analysed by the inferior 
courts, which can withdraw their previous decisions or decree the appeals aggrieved (Civil Procedural 
Code, articles 543-B, § 2º and § 3º). 
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extraordinary appeal(s). On the other hand, in 258 cases the general repercussion 
had been recognised but they were waiting for the decision on the merits.404 
It is also interesting to mention that, based on the provisions of Law 
11419/2006 and the Internal Statute of the Federal Supreme Court, the entire 
procedure and judgment of the general repercussion issues in extraordinary appeals 
is currently managed electronically. Indeed, Law 11419/2006 disciplines the use of 
electronic media in the transmission of records, documents and communication of 
procedural acts, configuring a very important innovation in the Brazilian judicial 
process. According to article 8º of this law, “the bodies of the Judicial Power are 
allowed to create and develop electronic systems for processing judicial actions by 
means of partially or totally electronic records, using preferably the internet, local or 
wide area networks”. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court’s Internal Statute, 
the rapporteur of the extraordinary appeal shall electronically submit, to the other 
Justices of the Court, his/her opinion on the existence or not of general repercussion 
in the case. Once the manifestation of the rapporteur is received, the associate 
Justices shall also electronically submit to the rapporteur their manifestations on the 
general repercussion. This system is called the “Virtual Plenary” (or “Virtual Full 
Bench”) and has been working with great success since 2008. 
The idea behind the requirement of general repercussion, evidently, is that 
only the really relevant questions will be finally decided by the Federal Supreme 
Court and not what is simple nonconformity of the losing parties (as important as 
their issues are for them), in order to improve, by decreasing the demand upon it, the 
Court’s quality of adjudication. The requirement of general repercussion tends to 
drastically reduce the number of extraordinary appeals in the Court and to limit the 
object of those admitted to properly constitutional matters. It has created promising 
prospects to the decentralised judicial review of legislation in Brazil, especially 
regarding to the role of the Supreme Court as the Brazilian Constitutional Court. 
Indeed, as will be mentioned in Chapter 5 and fully commented in Chapter 6, 
the adoption of new constitutional-procedural mechanisms, such as the requirement 
of general repercussion in extraordinary appeals and the Binding Súmula, has 
already lead to a visible reduction in the number of cases, dealing with identical or 
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similar law thesis, before Federal Supreme Court.405 Comparing the period of crisis 
in the 1990s and at the beginning of this century, when the number of cases before 
the Supreme Court reached insupportable figures, the situation has clearly improved. 
To give some figures from recent years, in 2006 127,535 cases arrived at the 
Supreme Court. In 2007, there were 119,304, in 2008 – 100,895, in 2009 – 82,221, 
in 2010 – 74,708, and in 2011 – 63,427.406 As a consequence, the number of cases 
in trial before de Federal Supreme Court has also been decreasing. In 2006, they 
were 150,001, in 2007 – 129,623, in 2008 – 112,080, in 2009 – 100,634, in 2010 – 
90,295, and in 2011 – 67.395.407 Consequently, there is an unquestionable 
pragmatic value supporting the requirement of general repercussion in extraordinary 
appeals, which has decisively contributed to the reduction in the backlog of trials 
before the Federal Supreme Court. 
 
4.7.4 Binding Decisions on the Centralised (“Concentrado”) Judicial Review of 
Legislation  
 
(i) The Relevance of the Bindingness 
 
In Brazil, as already seen, the coexistence of the two models of judicial review 
of legislation, centralised and decentralised, gives rise to a system that calls for 
special attention concerning the consistency of the constitutional case law. Brazil, 
inspired by the American example, has adopted the decentralised model of control 
but without incorporating the American tradition of binding precedents. While in the 
United States the decisions on decentralised control are fairly uniform by the 
application of a theory binding precedents408,409, in Brazil, exactly by the absence of 
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 With regard to the bindingness of constitutional decisions in Europe (specifically in France) and the 
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this doctrine, this standardisation historically does not exist. Commonly, the very 
same law or normative act, previously to be subject to centralised control of the 
Federal Supreme Court, is subject to decentralised review, incidentally in concrete 
cases, in several inferior courts the country. This generates, repeatedly, conflicting 
decisions, with the same normative act been considered as constitutional by some 
judges and courts and unconstitutional by others. Under the idea of isonomy, this is 
not desirable. The problem could become much more serious if this contradiction is 
concerning the decisions on centralised control of the Federal Supreme Court, the 
organ expressly responsible for safeguarding the Constitution.410,411 Having the 
mechanisms to harmonise the two models, enforcing the centralised one, is of great 
importance to reduce the problem of absence of standardisation to an acceptable 
degree.412 
Currently, in Brazil, it is unanimously recognised that, if the power to have the 
last word regarding the conformity of the laws with the Constitution is a prerogative 
of the Federal Supreme Court (the Brazilian Constitutional Court),413 there is nothing 
more natural and necessary than the universal bindingness concerning the decisions 
of this Court, following the example of the European Constitutional Courts, in the 
case of the centralised judicial review of legislation.414 Despite the Brazilian 
                                                                                                                                                        
review in France has recently been perceived from a slightly different perspective. According to 
Drago, among others, in virtue of the status of its members, its powers, the procedures adopted today 
and its own case law, the French Constitutional Council has increasingly approached (and perhaps 
has already reached) the Kelsenian or European model of Constitutional Justice. See Drago, 
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Dalloz, 2005), pp. 161-172. 
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by the generality of the law: all should be treated equally in accordance with whatever scheme of 
justice is enacted by the Legislature or enforced by the courts. See Allan, T.R.S. Constitutional 
Justice: a Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 32. 
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Court, Constitutional Council, Constitutional Guarantees Court, Supreme Constitutional Court, High 
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 Kelsen highlighted this fact, defending that a court, especially a constitutional court or a court of 
last resort, should be empowered to create, by its own decision, not only individual norms binding on 
the case sub examine, but general norms. About the Kelsenian Constitutional Court, see Sweet 





connection to the civil law tradition, these decisions must be formally binding (and, 
by constitutional directive, are) and be followed by the lower courts and the 
Administration as a whole. A diverse situation would imply, in essence, the non-
compliance of the very authority of the Constitution. 
According to the text of the Brazilian Constitution (with Amendment 45/2004) 
and articles 23 (caput) and 24 of Law 9868/1999415, in both the direct action of 
unconstitutionality or the declaratory action of constitutionality, once the absolute 
majority (6 of 11 Justices) reaches a decision, the constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality of the normative act in question must be declared. A direct action 
of unconstitutionality must result in a declaration of unconstitutionality if it is 
considered well-founded; and, if considered unfounded, a declaration of 
constitutionality. A declaratory action of constitutionality must also result in a 
declaration of unconstitutionality when it is considered baseless; and in a declaration 
of constitutionality if it is considered well-founded.416,417 Expressly, the Constitution 
provides that both actions, declaring the law constitutional or unconstitutional, shall 
produce efficacy against everybody and binding effect. Law 9868/1999, in the single 
paragraph of its article 28, also states that any declaration of constitutionality or of 
unconstitutionality, including the interpretation according to the Constitution and 
partial declaration of unconstitutionality without reduction of text, has an efficacy 
against everyone and binding effects in relation to judicial courts and to the 
Administration as a whole at federal, state and municipal levels.418 Courts and the 
Administration are to apply, to the cases and issues under their responsibility, the 
understanding adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in respect to the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the normative act. If this is not done, they will 
be disobeying a decision of the Supreme Court, which “opens the doors” to a 
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Reclamação (as stated in article 102, I, “l” of the Federal Constitution) and, naturally, 
to appeals applicable to higher courts. Apart from the new Supreme Court’s Binding 
Súmula (see Chapter 5), this is the only undisputable case of universal bindingness 
of precedents in Brazil.  
Before discussing the details of the treatment given to the theme in Brazil, it is 
important to make it clear that despite the similarities, the decision of binding effects 
to the judicial review of legislation in Brazil and the doctrine of stare decisis in Anglo-
American law are different categories. The difference, among other things, is in the 
fact that in the doctrine of stare decisis, the precedent to be followed – or, more 
precisely, the ratio decidendi to be followed – stems from a concrete case. In 
deciding whether to follow or not to follow the precedent, the judge of the case on 
trial makes a comparison of the facts in an appropriate degree of generality; if he 
finds equivalency, he should follow the precedent applying it to the case on trial. In 
contrast, in Brazil, the model of centralised judicial review of legislation, although 
establishing a binding decision, does not deal with facts. Purely a question of law, 
the review of the Supreme Court is in abstract and only recognises the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the normative act. It is of the responsibility of 
a later court which is supposedly entitled to apply the binding decision of the 
Supreme Court to examine the suitability of the facts of the case on trial with this 
decision, but without comparing them with the facts of this precedent, as they do not 
exist. 
 
(ii) Distinctions between Res judicata, Erga Omnes Efficacy and Binding Effect in 
Brazil 
 
For the purpose of Brazilian law, it is important to distinguish the concepts of 
res judicata and erga omnes efficacy and the binding character of a precedent. 
Firstly, mainly in concrete cases, the function of the res judicata is to allow the 
prevailing party to enjoy the judicial decision that was granted without fear that it can 
be challenged in the future. The res judicata aims to provide security to the parties 
and, therefore, is related only to the operative part of the final decision. The erga 
omnes efficacy (especially in class actions and centralised judicial review of 





everyone. It is not the res judicata, which does not extend beyond the parties 
involved, that operates erga omnes, but the direct effects of the decision.  
Erga omnes efficacy and binding effect are also distinct categories. This 
became clear with Constitutional Amendment 3/1993 and the text given to § 2º of 
article 102 of the Federal Constitution, which creates the declaratory action of 
constitutionality and expressly states erga omnes efficacy and binding effect as 
different things. 
Erga omnes efficacy in a decision in centralised review in Brazil means that 
the decision affects the general and abstract validity of the normative act reviewed 
and, therefore, affects everyone.419,420,421 In Brazil, declaring the constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality of a law or normative act – in the first case confirming the general 
and abstract efficacy to which it is innate, in the second case by removing its efficacy 
– the Federal Supreme Court decision actually affects all potential recipients, 
including the public Administration, the other bodies of the Judicial Power and the 
actual Supreme Court. 
Binding effect (or bindingness) means something different. Following the 
European example (although, in Europe, the contours of the binding effect vary by 
national system), in Brazil the binding effect is considered as a quality of the decision 
that goes beyond its res judicata and erga omnes efficacy. In short, it is a plus in 
relation to erga omnes efficacy, signifying that the decision must be followed by other 
bodies of the Judicial Power and the public Administration as a whole. 
The bindingness of a precedent is related to determining grounds of the 
decision (ratio decidendi). This bindingness is intended to provide legal certainty, 
consistency, predictability and equality to judicial decisions, and not ensure the 
immutability of the solution given to a certain case (the function of the res judicata). 
One can also say that the res judicata is related to the operative part of the decision 
of the individual case, while the binding character is related to the fundamentals 
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(ratio decidendi) of the decision, preventing them from being ignored in other 
decisions of the same or lower courts. In the case of the concentrate judicial review 
of legislation, it is inconceivable that a particular legal provision is constitutional for 
some situations and unconstitutional in others. This indispensability of the question 
of constitutionality to be decided uniformly in all jurisdictions, with the support of the 
Federal Constitution (article 102, §2º) and Law 9868/1999 (article 28, sole 
paragraph), leads to the bindingness of the rationes decidendi (determining 
fundamentals) of Federal Supreme Court’s decisions in direct actions, which bind all 
the other organs of the Judiciary and the Public Administration at the federal, state 
and municipal levels. 
Besides, the binding effect imposes a procedural qualified force to the 
decision, in the event of recalcitrance of the other courts or the Administration, to 
impose the compliance of the decision:422 the “Reclamação Constitucional” 
(“Constitutional Complaint” or “Constitutional Claim”),423 a kind of injunction.424 In 
practical terms, this means that the public Administration and courts, in proceedings 
in which the same question should be incidentally decided, must apply what was 
decided by the Federal Supreme Court in the centralised control. In case of non-
compliance, it can be filed a Reclamação (directly to the Supreme Court), as states 
article 102, I, l, of the Federal Constitution425, as well the appeals to higher courts. 
That is to say, if the decision in centralised control is not followed, a legally entitled 
person may use a specific injunction, the Reclamação, applying to the Federal 
Supreme Court that must directly ensure the authority of its decision. 
  
                                                 
422
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(iii) Objective Limits of the Binding Effect  
 
One point that has raised great debate in Brazil concerns the objective limits 
of the binding effect. What would be achieved by this effect? Does it only comprise 
the provision of the decision or, like the German426 and Portuguese427 models, also 
(or mainly) comprise the determining fundamentals of the decision? 
In Brazil, there is some dispute in doctrine. Some argue that the bindingness, 
currently disciplined in article 102, § 2º, of the Brazilian Constitution, applies only to 
the provision of the decision.428 However, other authors defend, following what 
happens in German Constitutional Court, the extension of the binding effect not only 
to the provision of the decision, but also (or mainly) to its fundamentals.429,430,431  
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 In Germany, to be precise, some defend, like Wischermann, a restrictive interpretation of 
paragraph 31, I, of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court and that the binding effect has to be 
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There is no definitive position of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court on the 
question. However, there are some decisions showing a tendency. An example is 
Reclamação 2126/SP432, where the procedural implications of the binding effect 
arising from a final decision in direct action of unconstitutionality were specifically 
addressed. Justice Gilmar Mendes, in appreciating and granting a preventive 
measure, consigned that in the case, although the impugned acts do not maintain 
absolute identity with the central theme of the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 1662/SP433 (that would be being disobeyed), it 
was worth noting that the extent of the binding effect of that decision cannot be 
limited to its provision, having also to consider the so-called “determining 
fundamentals”. 
The same understanding, which recognises the binding character to the 
determining fundamentals of the Supreme Court’s decisions in centralised judicial 
review of legislation, was recognised by the Full Bench of the Court in Reclamação 
2363/PA434. In this case, the same Justice Gilmar Mendes, as the rapporteur, noted 
that the Supreme Court has frequently applied the fundamentals of a leading case in 
similar cases dealing with the judicial review of municipal laws. He emphasised he 
had found in survey that many Justices of the Court have consistently applied, in 
cases discussing the constitutionality of a municipal law, the fundamentals of a 
precedent set in similar situations to laws from other municipalities. 
Another very good example is the Federal Supreme Court’s decision in 
Reclamação 1987/DF.435 In this case, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court expressly 
acknowledged the possibility of recognising (in the Brazilian legal system) the 
existence of the phenomenon of “transcendence of the fundamentals” of the 
decisions in the centralised judicial review of legislation and proclaimed that the 
binding effect of its decisions refers to the ratio decidendi (the fundamentals given by 
the Supreme Court to declare the unconstitutionality of a normative act) in addition to 
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the operative part of the constitutional decision. The Supreme Court concluded that 
in the case in trial (Reclamação 1987/DF) it should apply the ratio decidendi 
(determining fundamentals) of Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 1662/SP. 
Supporting the extensive point of view, Law 9868/1999, which regulated the 
proceeding of the direct actions of unconstitutionality and constitutionality, states that 
the declaration of constitutionality or unconstitutionality, including the interpretation 
according to the Constitution and the partial declaration of unconstitutionality without 
reduction of text, has erga omnes efficacy against everybody and binding effects in 
relation to the Judicial Power and the federal, state and municipal public 
Administration (article 28, sole paragraph). By attributing bindingness to the 
interpretation according to the Constitution and the partial declaration of 
unconstitutionality without reduction of text, Law 9868/1999 suggests that, in 
Brazilian law, this bindingness must be extended beyond the provision of the 
decision, also covering the fundamentals of the decision. It is understood as such 
because, with this legal provision (considered constitutional by the Federal Supreme 
Court),436 the system has shown to be more concerned about the content of the 
decision in centralised control of constitutionality than its form.437 These interpretative 
decisions, which respond to a need of the system and establish a special 
interpretation different to that of the literal meaning of the legal text, create an almost 
new norm of greater or lesser extent of the literal meaning established by 
Parliament. Frequently, the interpretation or the “new norm” is not found in the 
provision of the decision, but it refers to the fundamentals, with the resulting 
complexity for its determination and difficulty for the knowledge of the judges, 
administrators and lawyers.438  
The fact is that the restrictive view (bindingness only to the provision of the 
decision) is very concerned with the res judicata concept and its objective limits. 
Sometimes, it even confuses res judicata with binding effect, believing that the 
objective limits of this must coincide with those of the latter. Evidently, in Brazil, what 
is covered by res judicata is only that which is described in the provision of a 
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decision on the merits. However, it is binding effect that we are dealing with. In this 
case, it is necessary to consider the special structure of the centralised judicial 
review of legislation in Brazil. In the strict sense, there are no parts and there are no 
facts. Only those who may file the actions require, directly to the Federal Supreme 
Court, the affirmation of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a normative act 
(or how this could be interpreted as constitutional), and everything in abstract. 
Certainly, in regards to a similar or identical normative act, the decision of the 
Federal Supreme Court would be the same, because the fundamentals are identical. 
It is logical to anticipate this inevitable decision. This will result in saving of time and 
resource and, above all, ensure standardisation in the treatment of identical 
situations, the goal in this type of review.439 For instance, if a certain state normative 
act is declared unconstitutional, there is no reason to continue applying – as if it were 
constitutional – an identical law of another state of the Federation. The basis for the 
decision of direct action applies to both and must therefore have a binding 
effect.440,441 
Following the extensive tendency, in a certain sense Brazil is progressing 
toward the doctrine of stare decisis as it is applied in common law tradition. In that 
tradition, there is the binding application of the precedent to “similar” concrete cases. 
In the case of Brazilian centralised judicial review of legislation, as it deals with 
abstract norms, it is the application of the precedent to “similar” normative acts. Even 
so, Brazil is not acting revolutionarily if it is compared to what takes place in the 
tradition of common law. The similarity between two legislative acts will often mean 
true identity, contrary to what occurs in the doctrine of stare decisis, in which, by 
dealing with concrete cases – and the concrete cases always have their peculiarities 
– the similarity will hardly imply identity.442  
 
(iv) Subjective Limits of the Binding Effect 
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Another point that deserves to be addressed is the subjective limits of the 
binding effect. In Brazil, it is understood that the decisions of the Federal Supreme 
Court in direct actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory actions of 
constitutionality bind the other judicial courts as well as the Administration as a 
whole. It is a consequence of the literal meaning of the constitutional text.  
However, in Brazil there is some debate around two connected points: (i) do 
the decisions in direct actions, following European examples, also bind the 
Legislature that could not issue a norm of equal content (the problem here, evidently, 
stands in the face of the decisions that declare a norm unconstitutional)?443,444,445 (ii) 
Do the decisions in a direct action bind the Supreme Court itself that could not 
reconsider the matter further and, if thinks appropriate, decide differently? 
Firstly, based on a literal interpretation of the constitutional text, the 
understanding that the binding effect only covers the judicial courts (with exception of 
the Supreme Court) and the administrative bodies, not binding the Legislature in its 
typical functions, which can approve a norm with the same content that it was 
recognised as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (certainly, this problem does 
not arise in the case of declaration of constitutionality), prevails in Brazil.446,447,448 
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One objection to extend the binding effect of the decision declaring the 
unconstitutionality of the norm to the Legislature is the reverence (almost religious in 
some minds) to the doctrine of separation of powers. A second alleged obstacle is 
the actual absence of any constitutional text expressly addressing the bindingness 
towards the Legislature. However, in future, it is believed Brazil will be able to 
surpass both objections. Firstly, the theory of separation of powers, in the current 
comparative conception and in Brazil’s case, is not so strict. If this were so, it would 
not even permit the judicial review of legislation by the Judicial Branch. But it does 
allow it, and no one can argue this. Concerning the second obstacle, this also occurs 
in Italy (as has been seen in footnote) and there the binding of the Legislature is 
recognised. In fact, in Brazil, as well as in Italy, an explicit affirmation of the extent of 
the binding effect to the Legislature was – and is – unnecessary. This bindingness is 
implied in the very constitutional model designed by the Brazilian Constitution of 
1988, in which the Federal Supreme Court exercises the role of guardian of the 
Constitution (see article 102, caput, of the 1988 Constitution). It is its responsibility to 
give the last word on the constitutionality of infra-constitutional legislation. There is 
nothing more natural than the Legislature being bound to this, not only for the 
specific norm declared unconstitutional by direct action (and on this no one 
disagrees), but also for the future, not being entitled to issue a new norm of identical 
content of that which was considered unconstitutional. The situations that interest – 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality – are identical to both norms, the new and the 
old one. If a norm (or a similar norm) has already been declared unconstitutional, 
what is the reason, if there was no constitutional mutation, for the Legislature to 
repeat the same mistake?449 
It is true that to declare that the Legislature is prohibited from issuing a norm 
of identical content to that declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in a direct 
action is not to say that it factually removes from the Legislature the capacity to go 
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voluntarily against the decision of the Supreme Court and actually to issue a new 
norm of equal content. In fact, it would be completely unrealistic. The very nature of 
the legislative procedure, which in essence is a political procedure, prevents one to 
think like this. What is meant here is: once a norm of identical content to that 
declared unconstitutional in a direct action is issued, by this fact alone (without need 
of a new declaration of unconstitutionality via direct action), it must be unapplied by 
courts and the administrative agencies, and if applied, it will enable the use of the 
Reclamação.450 
The second question – do the decisions in direct actions bind the actual 
Federal Supreme Court, which cannot reconsider the matter further and, if 
appropriate, decide to the contrary to its earlier decision? – is capacious, especially 
because it is a question that should be divided in two. The first question is: do the 
decisions in direct action bind the Supreme Court? The second is: can the Supreme 
Court reconsider the question of constituonality already decided and, if appropriate, 
decide to the contrary to its earlier decision? 
The answer to the first sub-question, according to the prevailing opinion, is 
that the Federal Supreme Court is not formally bound – in future similar cases – by 
the determining fundamentals of its own previous decision in direct actions of 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality. In Brazil, the formula adopted by Brazilian 
Constitution excludes the Supreme Court from the sphere of the application of 
binding effect. The explicit reference to the binding effect in relation “to other organs 
of the Judicial Power” legitimises this understanding.451 Furthermore, there is the fact 
that a Reclamação would certainly be absurd before the Supreme Court to ensure 
the authority of its own decisions that would be disobeyed by itself. As has been 
said, the possibility of Reclamação is the main practical consequence of the binding 
effect in direct actions. 
The negative answer to the first sub-question could suggest to us that the 
answer to the second should be positive. This would be a great mistake. In Brazil, 
the second question is much more related to the res judicata and to the erga omnes 
efficacy than to the binding effect. The decisions on the merits pronounced by the 
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Federal Supreme Court in centralised review of legislation follow the general rule: 
materially produce res judicata, becoming indisputable and immutable.452 So, as a 
general rule, the res judicata and the erga omnes efficacy prevent the 
constitutionality of the same legislative act to be submitted to the Supreme Court 
once again. Although res judicata and erga omnes efficacy merely extend to the 
provision of the decision (unlike what happens with the binding effect), in relation to 
that specific normative act, which appears in the provision, their occurrence means 
that a new assessment is sealed.453 
Certainly, in Brazil, in regards to a decision that declares the constitutionality 
of a normative act, there is the possibility of constitutional mutation, which, 
exceptionally, allows the constitutionality of the same act to be re-submitted to the 
consideration of the Federal Supreme Court and, if appropriate, receive a different 
decision.  
 
(v) The Binding Effect of Preventive Measures  
 
In Brazilian’s centralised review of legislation, the concession of preventive 
measures is possible when required to prevent the harmful effects of inferior court 
decisions (or of administrative behaviour) against what perhaps might be decided by 
the Federal Supreme Court in the final decision of the direct action. With the 
preventive measure, the Supreme Court aims to ensure the efficacy of its future 
decision. 
With the question put in these terms, the Federal Supreme Court has 
understood, since Declaratory Action of Constitutionality 4/DF, that the preventive 
measure granting in a direct action, appreciating the constitutionality of the normative 
act, will immediately bind the other courts, which are dealing with the constitutionality 
of the same act.454 The inferior courts, to the extent of the preventive measure, will 
be prohibited to apply, in appreciating the concrete cases, diverse understanding of 
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that adopted by the Supreme Court. If it was the case of considering the normative 
act as constitutional, the inferior courts cannot stop applying the norm on the 
grounds of its unconstitutionality. According to Law 9868/1999, article 21, in the 
declaratory actions of constitutionality, the Supreme Court can also pronounce a 
preventive measure, suspending the various cases on the same controversial theme 
throughout the country until its final decision in the direct action. 
Assuring the same in direct actions of unconstitutionality, articles 23 (caput) 
and 24 of Law 9868/1999 say that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the 
normative act shall be pronounced if either way they had manifested at least six 
Ministros (Justices), whether to be a direct action of unconstitutionality or declaratory 
action of constitutionality. Besides, with this appropriate quorum, the constitutionality 
or unconstitutionality of the normative act shall be declared with erga omnes efficacy 
and binding effect.455 
 
4.7.5 The Issue of Prospective Decisions in the Context of the Centralised 
(“Concentrado”) Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
The issue of prospective decisions is of special relevance in the context of the 
Brazilian centralised judicial review of legislation. It is related to the time 
effectiveness of the decision that resolves a constitutional question, “declaring” the 
unconstitutionality of a law or normative act: are the “effects” of this decision to be 
retroactive or merely prospective? 
As seen in Chapter 3, the Constitution of 1988 does not expressly regulate 
the possibility of limiting the retroactive effect of the decisions of unconstitutionality. 
This silence regarding the term a quo for the temporal effects of the decision of 
unconstitutionality is interpreted in the sense that this regulation was left to the 
Legislature. Under Brazilian law, however, the retroactivity of the decisions in the 
centralised judicial review of legislation has traditionally been the rule. Theoretically it 
fits better with the Brazilian declarative understanding to the unconstitutional laws. 
As also seen in Chapter 3, although this retroactive application is the rule in Brazil, 
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scholars and judges have realised that in certain situations retroactive decision-
making imposes unfair solutions: as everyone is expected to act in accordance with 
the laws, which are presumably constitutional, there is a need in maintaining the 
confidence in the relations established under the aegis of them.456 The mitigation of 
the general rule was inevitable, in favour of values such as good faith and legal 
certainty. And, despite the silence in the Federal Constitution and the absence of a 
statute regulating the matter until 1999, prospective decisions began to be adopted 
by the Supreme Court. 
Since 1999, Law 9868/1999 has expressly authorised to give prospective 
effects to decisions in the centralised judicial review of legislation. The possibility of 
modulating the temporal effects of constitutional decisions is disciplined by its article 
27 as follows: “In declaring the unconstitutionality of a law or normative act, the 
Supreme Court may, based on reasons of legal certainty or exceptional social 
interest, by a majority of two thirds of its members, restrict the effects of that 
statement or decide that it only has effectiveness from the res judicata or another 
moment it decides appropriate”. 
Currently, based on this provision, the Federal Supreme Court has often 
refused to retrospectively change the law (notwithstanding the fact that it has 
expressed its disapproval over the normative act) and has pronounced that some of 
its understandings are to be followed just for future facts or acts to be performed 
after the respective decisions. In other cases, when announcing the rule, the 
Supreme Court has simultaneously indicated a precise date from which the new 
precedent should be applied. In these cases, for reasons of legal certainty or 
exceptional social interest, the law or the normative act will continue to be applied for 
a certain period of time fixed by the Supreme Court itself. The point is, if it is the case 
of its decision to be applied prospectively, as a rule, the Supreme Court does not 
leave the question of time effectiveness to be decided by the court where the same 
point of law can be discussed in the future (because, of course, with the possibility of 
different points of view about time effectiveness, this could affect the uniformity of the 
application of its understandings). 
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Basically, as briefly anticipated in Chapter 3, the decisions in Brazilian 
centralised judicial review of legislation, concerning their temporal effects, may be 
classified into two general categories: retrospective or prospective decisions. 
However, analysing the Supreme Court case law, it is possible to see some variants 
inside each of these two original matrixes. These variants aim, through minor 
adjustments, to overcome the problems existing in both options. 
The following classification aims to cover the specifics of Brazilian law. In 
summary, in Brazil, it is possible to mention the following variants: (i) pure 
retroactivity; (ii) classical retroactivity; (iii) retroactivity at a specific time; (iv) pure 
prospectivity; (v) classical prospectivity; (iv) and prospectivity at a specific time. In 
the case of the three retrospective variants, the decision that affirms the 
unconstitutionality should be retroactively (ex tunc) applied to situations that 
occurred before and after it and, of course, be applied to the facts of the case in 
which it was pronounced (if it is a case of concrete judicial review of legislation). The 
difference is that in the case of pure retroactivity the decision that declares the 
unconstitutionality of the law will reach all the events that took place before and after 
the decision, including those already subject to res judicata and the statute of 
limitations.457 In the case of a classical retroactivity (certainly the most common in 
Brazil), the decision of unconstitutionality will be applied retroactively, since the time 
when the unconstitutional statute was enacted (ex tunc), reaching events that took 
place before and after it, but excluding those already subject to res judicata and the 
statute of limitations. Finally, the decision that affirms the unconstitutionality, in case 
of retroactivity at a specific time, will have the dies a quo of its application set 
retroactively to a certain date, considering the goals of the decision and reasons of 
exceptional social interest and legal certainty. Regarding the prospective matrix, 
there are also three variants. If it is the case of a pure prospectivity, the decision that 
affirms the unconstitutionality of the law, also considering reasons of legal certainty 
and exceptional social interest, will be applied ex nunc, reaching the situations that 
occurred after its pronouncement and, in the case of concrete judicial review, 
excluding even the facts of the case that gave rise to it (the decision). If it is the case 
of a classical prospectivity, the decision that affirms the unconstitutionality will be 
applied ex nunc, reaching the situations that occurred after its pronouncement and, 
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in the case of concrete judicial review, including the case that gave rise to it (the 
decision). Lastly, if it concerns the case of prospectivity at a specific time, the 
decision that affirms the unconstitutionality will have the dies a quo postponed to a 
future specific date or event, so that both the people and the Legislature will have 
time to evaluate the issue and make changes that are necessary. 
The classification proposed can be illustrated with some binding decisions of 
the Federal Supreme Court in the centralised judicial review of legislation. For 
instance, in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 1086/SC458 the Supreme Court 
declared the unconstitutionality of article 182, § 3º, of the Constitution of the state of 
Santa Catarina, which, in the limits of that state, waived the requirement of a prior 
environmental impact assessment for corporate projects of forestation and 
reforestation. The direct action of unconstitutionality was filed by the General 
Prosecutor of the Republic arguing that the provision of the Constitution of Santa 
Catarina State violated article 225, § 1º, IV, of the Federal Constitution, which 
determines that the Government should “demand, in the manner prescribed by law, 
for the installation of works and activities which may potentially cause significant 
degradation of the environment, a prior environmental impact study, which shall be 
made public”. In its decision, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court recognised that 
activities of forestation and reforestation may actually produce negative 
environmental impacts. Consequently, the waiver of article 182, § 3º, of the 
Constitution of the State of Santa materially violated the constitutional requirement of 
a prior environmental assessment. Besides, the Supreme Court also stated that 
considering the distribution of legislative power established by the Federal 
Constitution, only federal law could introduce waivers to the general rules of 
environmental conservation established in the Federal Constitution. As the issue in 
debate clearly falls under the category of the general rules of environmental 
conservation (and not under the category of complementary norms, which can be 
object of state legislation), article 182, § 3º, of the Constitution of the State of Santa 
Catarina also was formally unconstitutional. Thus, the Supreme Court in Full Bench, 
unanimously, declared the unconstitutionality of the state provision with classical 
retroactive effects. 
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Conversely, in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 1351/DF459 the Federal 
Supreme Court pronounced a decision with clear prospective effects. In this case, 
two Brazilian political parties (the Partido Comunista do Brasil - PCdoB and the 
Partido Democrático Trabalhista – PDT) filed a direct action of unconstitutionality, 
before the Supreme Court, against provisions of Law 9096/1995 (the Brazilian Law 
of Political Parties), mainly its article 57, which created a “performance clause” (also 
called a “barrier clause”) for the functioning of the Brazilian political parties. 
According to the main provision, briefly, a political party could only operate in the 
National Congress, enjoy access to free publicity on TV and radio as well as have 
access to the Parties’ Public Fund if it had obtained, in the last election, at least 5% 
of national votes and at least 2% of the votes per State in at least one third of the 
States (in both cases, excluding all the void and invalid votes). The petitioners 
argued that these requirements of Law 9096/1995 were in conflict with constitutional 
commandments such as the democratic regime, the plurality of parties and the 
principle of proportionality. The Full Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously 
declared unconstitutional the provisions of Law 9096/1995 related to the issue. 
However, by declaring the unconstitutionality of the questioned provisions, the 
Supreme Court faced a resulting normative vacuum. In order to surpass it, the Court, 
in a clear case of prospective decision at a specific time, based on the ideas of legal 
certainty and exceptional social interest, authorised by article 27 of Law 9868/1999), 
temporarily preserved the unconstitutional provision (precisely article 57 of Law 
9096/1995), until the Parliament could enact new legislation consistent with 
constitutional commandments. 
A prospective decision was also pronounced in Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality 2501/MG.460 In this case, the General Prosecutor of the Republic 
alleged the unconstitutionality of § 1º, II, of article 82 (and, by extension, of 
paragraphs 4º, 5º and 6º of the same article 82) of the ADCT461 of the Constitution of 
the State of Minas Gerais, as rewritten by State Constitutional Amendment 70/2005. 
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These provisions attributed to the Board of Education of the State of Minas Gerais a 
broad pedagogical supervision upon all institutions of higher education of that State 
(public and private), which included the authorisation to operate, the accreditation of 
courses and the recognition of diplomas. The Federal Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional the provisions of article 82 of the ADCT of the Constitution of the 
State of Minas Gerais. The Court stated that the questioned provisions had invaded 
the Union’s constitutional attribution to legislate on guidelines and bases of 
education and to establish general rules on the matter (see Federal Constitution, 
articles 22, XXIV, and 24). It also stated that the authorisations to operate, the 
authorisations to launch new courses and the recognitions of diplomas, concerned 
with institutions of higher education, are of the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education, in accordance with Law 9394/96 (the Federal Law of Directives and 
Bases of Education) and the Decree 5773/2006 (which regulates the matter). 
However, the Supreme Court, by majority, also based on arguments of legal 
certainty and exceptional social interest, gave prospective effects to its decision so 
that the diplomas and certificates issued by the institutions of higher education that 
had already started the courses by the date of the decision would be considered 
valid. With this exception and from that point, the Ministry of Education should 
perform its pedagogic supervision as established by the Constitution and the federal 
legislation. The Supreme Court took into account that thousands of students had 
attended or were attending courses offered by institutions of higher education 
created or authorised by the State of Minas Gerais. Balancing the constitutional 
provisions that provides the exclusive authority to the Federal Union to legislate on 
guidelines and bases of education and the fundamental right to education (under 
article 205 of the Federal Constitution), the Supreme Court gave greater prevalence 
to the latter, in order protect the fundamental rights of those who attended or were 
attending the courses of the institutions affected by its decision. The final result was 
a Supreme Court’s decision declaring the unconstitutionality of the mentioned 
provisions (of the ADCT of the Constitution of the State of Minas Gerais) with 
prospective effects. 
Another precedent where the Federal Supreme Court took into account the 





the unconstitutionality of a law was Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 2240/BA.462 In 
this case, the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT filed a Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court against Law 7619/2000 of the State of 
Bahia, which has created the municipality of Luis Eduardo Magalhães by 
dismembering the district of the same name from the municipality of Barreiras. The 
Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT argued that State Law 7619/2000 had violated 
article 18, § 4º, of the Federal Constitution because it had created a municipality in a 
year when municipal elections were to be held and also because the federal 
complementary law – mentioned in article 18, § 4º, of the Federal Constitution, as 
necessary to establish the period during which states could create, incorporate, 
merge and dismember municipalities – had not yet been legislated by the National 
Congress. The Full Bench of the Supreme Court, based on its case law on the 
unconstitutionality of state laws that do not follow the determinations of article 18, § 
4º, of the Federal Constitution, recognised the unconstitutionality of the questioned 
state law. However, balancing the doctrine of the nullity of the unconstitutional law 
and the arguments of legal certainty and exceptional social interest – in this case, 
the potential chaos that a retrospective declaration of unconstitutionality could bring 
to a municipality effectively established, de jure and de facto, for over six years –, the 
Full Bench of the Supreme Court, by majority, applying article 27 of Law 9868/1999, 
decided to act prospectively, maintaining the state law in force for a period of 24 
months. This period was considered reasonable for state Parliament to reassess the 
whole issue taking into account the requirements to be established by the federal 
complementary law, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Direct Action 
of Unconstitutionality by omission 3682/MT.463 
Reading these cases, it can be noted that, despite some criticism464, giving 
prospective effects to decisions in the centralised judicial review of legislation, has 
sometimes appeared to be the most convenient solution or even imperative. In some 
cases, the maintenance of the effects produced by the unconstitutional norm during 
its “constitutional” term safeguards the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
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principles and rights that it encapsulates further than an unconditional assignment of 
retrospective effects to the decision that affirms the norm unconstitutional.  
Finally, a very important practical reason should also be mentioned in favour 
of the possibility of prospective effects in the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
concentred judicial review of legislation: as a matter of legal policy, if maintained, a 
priori, only the possibility of retroactive effects (ex tunc) to the Federal Supreme 
Court’s decision that affirms the unconstitutionality of a norm, the Court – that is, 
after all, the “Brazilian Constitutional Court”, which deals with both legal and political 
questions – would be more conservative. Conversely, open the possibility of limiting 
the impact of the decision, in order to not reach situations prior to the decision itself, 
the Supreme Court feels liberated from any constraint to affirm the 
unconstitutionality, when it understands that this is the correct measure, because the 
decision will not supposedly affect people who acted relying on the (un)constitutional 
norm. 
Technically, however, this choice between a retroactive or prospective 
application of the decision of (un)constitutionality is, under article 27 of Law 9868/99, 
indispensably linked with the definition of the vague concepts of legal certainty and 
exceptional social interest as fully explained in Chapter 3. The retroactivity remains 
the rule concerning the temporal effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality; 
prospectivity, the exception.465 In interpreting article 27 of Law 9868/99, the Federal 
Supreme Court has stated that the definition of the temporal effects of its decisions 
should always take into consideration the fundamental rights of the citizens. Legal 
certainty is also an argument to be invoked in order to protect the rights of citizens 
(and not to defend the interests of the Brazilian state). Thus, prospective effects 
must take place after careful deliberation that concludes to safeguard the idea of 
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legal certainty and one or more constitutional principles characterised as of 
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5 The Brazilian Model of Binding Súmula  
 
 
5.1 General considerations 
 
For decades the development of Brazilian law has been influenced by the civil 
law tradition with codes and statutes being the main sources in the legal system. 
However, as already seen, in spite of having this civil law background, Brazil has not 
been immune to the influence of binding precedents. Recently, Brazil has been 
developing a legal system that is becoming more similar to that of countries that 
abide by common law. Progressively, it is believed, Brazil can become a new 
example of a mixed system or what might be known as a country related to the “new” 
Western legal family, with both statutes and precedents playing equal roles in the 
legal system. 
Law-makers in Brazil are developing a system of precedents – hybrid and 
dynamic and apt to give judges resources to bindingly take into consideration when 
judging a case. One of these resources is the new and very important Federal 
Supreme Court Binding Súmula. According to the new article 103-A of the Brazilian 
Constitution (with the text given by Constitutional Amendment 45, passed in 2004), 
the Supreme Court is allowed to issue a Binding Súmula that represents, by means 
of several statements, its consolidated case law. All other courts and the public 
Administration are hence obliged to follow these understandings of the Supreme 
Court Súmula.  
The new model of Binding Súmula, although not yet thoroughly investigated in 
Brazil, will have a deep impact on the Brazilian judicial system (mainly on the judicial 
review of legislation), as the present chapter will attempt to show together with the 
possible impact that this Brazilian experience might have on the wider doctrine of 
precedent. Specifically, the purpose of this chapter is to present this new Brazilian 
category of binding precedent, analysing its origins, features and significance under 








5.2 The Brazilian Supreme Court Súmula: Origin, Definition and Merits 
 
The Súmula of a court refers to a set of case law that dominates the court, 
including the various branches of law, organised by numbered annotations related to 
defined legal themes. Each numbered annotation, which expresses the 
understanding of the court about a determined question of the law, should be called, 
technically, a statement.472 The Supreme Court Súmula, in its classical form, was 
created during the 1960s as a non-binding or persuasive súmula. Suffocated by an 
accumulation of cases pending judgement, the vast majority about identical 
questions, the Supreme Court, in 1963, decided to officially compile and publish the 
summary of its case law. The Court, after amending its Internal Regulation (session 
of 30 August 1963) and a massive work of the Case Law Commission473, at the 
session of 13 December 1963, officially published the first statements of its Súmula 
to take affect from 1 March 1964. The issue of the Súmula – that is, its many first 
individual statements – was the result of a specific formulation process, which went 
through a choice of themes, a technical judicial discussion, approval, and finally 
publication so that everyone could know about it and its validity.474,475 
The creation of the Súmula, primarily in the Federal Supreme Court, was (i) 
an answer to the large number of cases, and sought, thus, to guarantee greater 
speed in judicial decisions. However, there were other motives for the adoption of 
the Súmula. (ii)  One of them is the fact that the Súmula provides a greater degree of 
certainty to the law. Through the Súmula, the Supreme Court’s consolidated (but not 
immutable)476 case law on various legal themes is identified rapidly. Individually, 
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each one of the Súmula statements covers a determined aspect of the law, or fills an 
empty space left by it, with an interpretation that is considered to be consolidated. It 
contributes, point by point, to the certainty of the law in the resolution of present and 
future litigations. Secondly, (iii) there is the principle of equality: the Súmula, even if it 
does not end, it at least sufficiently mitigates the variation of interpretations on 
determined questions of the law. In other words, it contributes to the application of 
the same rule for similar cases, which results in equal treatment for all in the same 
conditions.477,478 
In addition, two characteristics deserve to be highlighted regarding the origin 
of the Brazilian Súmula: its origin is not legislative, but judicial, certainly the fruit of a 
specific situation which the Supreme Court was going through in the 1960s; and 
secondly the fact that, as a logical consequence of its “judicial” origin, the possibility 
of issuing it was restricted in the 1960s to the Supreme Court itself. In fact, the first 
legislative provision, as well as the extension to the other courts of the possibility of 
issuing súmulas, only appeared with the incident to standardise the case law of the 
1973 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code (article 479), which states that “the judgement, 
made by the vote of the absolute majority of the members of the Court, will be 
subject of Súmula and shall constitute a precedent for standardisation of the internal 
case law”.479 
Progressively, following the creation of the Federal Supreme Court’s Súmula, 
most Brazilian courts have established their own súmulas. As a rule, the statements 
of these súmulas, representing the understanding of the court as a whole on various 
subjects, under the internal regulations of each court, are created to bind the future 
decisions of the emitting court. Indeed, in Brazil, a judicial court (for instance, the 
Superior Court of Justice or the Appellate Court of the State of Rio de Janeiro) is 
only one body, although it is composed of several judges and can be divided, for 
functional purposes, into smaller bodies or panels. Consequently, the idea is that the 
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judges and the panels must follow the understanding of the court as a whole, 
represented by the súmula of its case law. 
The internal regulation of the Superior Court of Justice, article 34, XVIII, for 
instance, states that one of the rapporteur’s duties is to preliminarily deny a special 
appeal that is in opposition to the Court’s Súmula. And article 124 of the same 
Regulation states that the citation of a statement of the Súmula, with its 
corresponding number, will dismiss, before the court, the reference to other 
judgements in the same sense. 
Currently, these rules establishing the internal bindingness of the courts to its 
own súmulas (which are the expression of the certainty of law within a court) have 
full legislative support in the sole paragraph of article 481 of the Civil Procedure 
Code (by the new text given by Law 9576/1998), applicable to any Brazilian court: 
“The judgement, made by the vote of the absolute majority of the members of the 
Court, will be incorporated into the súmula and will constitute a precedent for 
standardisation of case law”. The emitting court as a whole and its members 
individually must follow the binding statements of its own súmula until these are 
properly cancelled or modified under the appropriated rules. 
Furthermore, following the tendency to increase the importance of 
precedents, the provisions of Laws 8038/1990 and 9576/1998 (the latter altered the 
Civil Procedure Code, article 557, caput and §1º-A) have created a kind of indirect 
and external binding effect to the súmulas and the (dominant) case law of the 
Federal Supreme Court and of the Superior Courts. According to the current article 
557, caput and §1º-A, of the Civil Procedure Code, for instance, in a collegiate court, 
the rapporteur (by a monocratic decision, without consulting the panel) will not admit 
an appeal which is conflicting with the súmula or the (dominant) case law of the 
Federal Supreme Court and of one of the Superior Courts. The same provision also 
states that, if the appealed decision is in clear conflict with the súmula or the 
(dominant) case law of the Federal Supreme Court and of a Superior Court, the 
rapporteur may directly (without consulting the panel) grant the appeal.480 These 
legislative provisions are providing what can be called an indirect and external 
binding effect to Brazilian case law, since the courts now are not bound only by its 
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own súmulas, but also by the Federal Supreme Court’s and Superior Courts’ 
súmulas and (dominant) case law.  
 
5.3 Towards a Binding Súmula: the Functional Aspects of the New Model  
 
(i) First Considerations 
   
The legal parameters of the Brazilian Binding Súmula have already been 
established: primarily, by article 2º of Constitutional Amendment 45/2004 that 
created the new article 103-A in the Brazilian Federal Constitution and the new 
Binding Súmula; secondly, by Law 11417/2006, which regulates the various aspects 
of this issue, such as the procedure for approval, revision and cancellation of the 
Súmula.  
With respect to article 2º of Constitutional Amendment 45/2004, the following 
article 103-A was added to the Federal Constitution: 
 
Article 103-A. The Supreme Federal Court shall have the power to, by its own 
initiative or by provocation, by means of a decision taken by two thirds of their 
members, after reiterated decisions about constitutional matters, approve 
Súmula which, after publication in official gazettes, shall have a binding effect 
over the other bodies of the Judiciary Power, over direct and indirect public 
Administration, at federal, state and municipal levels, as well as proceeding to 
their revision or cancelling, in the manner provided for in law. 
§1º. The Súmula shall have as subject the validity, the interpretation and the 
efficacy of specific norms, about which there are actual controversies between 
judiciary bodies or between these and the public Administration which cause 
serious juridical instability and relevant multiplication of lawsuits over identical 
matters.  
§2º. Without prejudice of the provisions of law, the approval, revision or 
cancelling of Súmula may be provoked by those parties which may propose 
the direct actions of unconstitutionality. 
§3º. Any administrative act or judicial decision which goes against an 
applicable Súmula or applies it in an undue manner shall be contested before 
the Supreme Federal Court which, considering the contestation reasonable 
shall nullify the administrative act or revoke the judicial decision and 
determine their substitution with or without the application of the Súmula, as 
the case may require. 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the creation of the Binding Súmula by the 
new article 103-A of the Brazilian Federal Constitution gave a great impulse to what 





review of legislation performed by the Federal Supreme Court. Unlike the centralised 
judicial review of legislation, in which only abstract constitutional issues are 
discussed, the Supreme Court new binding statements result from numerous 
concrete cases in the decentralised judicial review of legislation. The incorporation of 
a statement in Binding Súmula of the Supreme Court is the climax of the Brazilian 
decentralised judicial review of legislation, the last stage of a long journey, which 
usually reaches the Supreme Court via an extraordinary appeal. Clearly, Binding 
Súmula has established a point of convergence between the centralised and 
decentralised models of judicial review in Brazil concerning the bindingness of their 
decisions.481 
Following the constitutional reform of 2004, Law 11417/2006 was promulgated 
to regulate several aspects of the Binding Súmula, such as the procedure for 
approval, revision and cancellation of the statements. 
 
(ii) The Role of the Supreme Court and the Requirements for Issuing a Binding 
Súmula Statement 
 
The jurisdiction to issue the Binding Súmula (and consequently, its 
statements) is restricted to the Supreme Court (article 103-A of the Federal 
Constitution and article 2º of Law 11417/2006). The Constitution also says that the 
Binding Súmula shall have as subject the validity, the interpretation and the efficacy 
of specific norms, about which there are actual controversies between judiciary 
bodies or between these and the public Administration which cause serious juridical 
instability and relevant multiplication of lawsuits over identical matters (see article 
103-A, § 1º).  
It is necessary, therefore, to fulfil the objective requirements established by 
article 103-A of the Constitution (regulated by article 2º, caput and § 1º, of Law 
11476/2006) for issuing a binding statement, which are: a) the occurrence of 
repeated decisions of the Supreme Court on a given constitutional matter (caput); b) 
current controversy among judicial organs or between these organs and the public 
Administration about this matter (§ 1º); c) current controversy about validity, 
interpretation or efficacy of specific norms (§ 1º); d) and the controversy causes 
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severe judicial insecurity and relevant multiplication of cases concerning the same 
question (§ 1º).482 
As for the occurrence of repeated decisions on constitutional matters, there is 
not a pre-determined number of decisions which objectively imply the fulfilment of 
this requirement. It is enough that the repetition demonstrates that the judicial 
question is sufficiently debated and, therefore, ready in the Supreme Court for a 
definitive solution. Thus, a binding statement should be the result of a wide debate 
that happened in previous decisions and not only a simple creation of a judicial rule 
by the Court to regulate an occasional divergence. 
The second requirement is the existence of a current controversy among 
judicial bodies or between them and the public Administration. Nothing is more 
natural: a binding statement is not necessary if the question is not controversial or if 
this controversy, for any reason, is no longer present. 
There must be a type of controversy about the validity, interpretation or 
efficacy of specific norms. In general terms, according to Supreme Court case law, a 
controversy about validity in the constitutional area means the divergence about the 
constitutionality of a concrete infra-constitutional norm. A controversy about 
interpretation is a disagreement about the best meaning of certain provisions 
according to the constitutional rules. A controversy about efficacy is a dissent about 
social coercion of some norms in time and space.483 
Finally, the controversy must cause severe judicial insecurity and relevant 
multiplication of cases about the same question. Multiplication of cases is something 
easy to verify and is very common in the Brazilian legal system. However, verifying 
the severity of the judicial insecurity is not so easy because, linguistically, it is a 
vague concept, i.e., its semantic reference is not so precise. Nevertheless, it can be 
assumed, in principle, that the Federal Supreme Court is only in charge of questions 
that are indeed severe and important, especially since the new § 3º of art. 102 of the 
Federal Constitution, which requires, to extraordinary appeals, the demonstration of 
the general repercussion of the questions debated in the case. Besides, the very 
multiplication of cases, if it creates diverging decisions, inevitably causes severe 
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judicial insecurity, since the parties cannot identify in judicial decisions the necessary 
reference to know what is right or wrong in their behaviour.484 
 
(iii) Quorum for Approval 
 
According to article 103-A of the Federal Constitution and article 2º, § 3º, of 
Law 11417/2006, the statement approval will take place by a decision of two thirds of 
the members of the court. Thus, the binding statement approval happens with a 
decision of at least eight of the eleven Justices of the Supreme Court.485  
It is reasonable that the minimum quorum for approval is constituted by a 
qualified majority of votes, but not the unanimity, in particular to avoid unnecessary 
impasses. Despite this, in exceptional cases, nothing prevents the Supreme Court to 
seek, for some time and through debates, a consensus text for the statement which 
meets the understanding of all its Justices and could be, thus, the result of 
unanimity. 
 
(iv) Objective Limits 
 
The Binding Súmula, in principle, has the same features that the non-binding 
Súmula has. Each statement is a summary, whose content is eminently juridical (that 
consists only in interpreting a question of law), of several previous decisions in the 
same sense, without statements a latere (known in the theory of stare decisis as 
obiter dicta), and furthermore all of its contents are considered essential. A 
statement is an abstract and a generic norm and, thus, an undetermined number of 
concrete cases can be subsumed under the generality of its terms, since the 
question of law that is discussed in them is the same. The difference in relation with 
the classical Súmula is that, if this happens – the case deals with a legal theme that 
was already incorporated into the Binding Súmula –, the application of the respective 
statement, by the judge or by the Administration, becomes binding.  
Article 103-A, § 1º, of the Federal Constitution (as well as article 2º, § 1º, of 
Law 11417/2006) makes it clear that the Binding Súmula will have as a goal to 
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define the Court understanding about the validity, interpretation and efficacy of 
norms, disregarding questions of fact. Indeed, it is a problem of both rationality and 
operation. It is absolutely indispensable that there is a notion of what can be 
abridged.486 As Lamy points out, the richness of daily life situations makes the use of 
a binding statement impossible in cases that refer to questions essentially to do with 
facts. Questions essentially of fact are decided according to the ascertainment of 
facts of the case, and this variable richness has a complexity that is impossible to be 
reduced to direct statements.487 
It is also important to be reminded that not all questions of law can be the 
subject of a binding statement. The Constitutional Amendment 45/2004 (see article 
103-A of the Federal Constitution) allowed the Supreme Court to issue binding 
statements in questions related to constitutional law.488 The issue is usually also 
about another area of law (tax law or administrative law, for instance), but it must 
have constitutional contents.489 It should be added that some branches of law are 
more compatible with the Súmula statements, while others are not. In the first group, 
tax law and administrative law for example, can be cited. Generally, despite the 
complexity of their questions of law, the questions of fact are not of great complexity. 
But there are some areas of law, such as criminal law, in which, besides comprising 
of tortuous questions of law, the questions of fact are almost always very complex 
and deeply casuistic, preventing the issuing of binding statements or at least making 
it difficult to do so. To illustrate, (i) Statement 3 of the Federal Supreme Court’s 
Biding Súmula deals with the Rule of Law and the right of a full defence under 
administrative law and social security law;490 (ii) Similarly, Statement 5 involves 
administrative law and the absence of technical defence provided by a lawyer in a 
disciplinary administrative case;491 (iii) Statement 8 involves tax law and the statute 
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of limitation;492 (iv) Statement 10 deals with judicial review of legislation and 
procedural law;493 (v) Statement 11 involves administrative law, criminal procedural 
law and rightness of police procedures (specifically, the limits for the use of 
handcuffs);494 (vi) and Statement 13 involves administrative law and the nepotism in 
public administration.495,496 
Finally, it is necessary to highlight the fact that, for the binding Súmula to work 
efficiently, the composing technique of its statements must be precise, and 
especially avoid “vague concepts” – for instance, expressions such as “reasonable”, 
which is widely used in common law England – that make conflicting interpretations 
of the judicial norm possible.497 Indisputably, a single binding statement should be, 
as much as possible, short, direct and clear.498  
 
(v) Subjective Limits 
 
Article 103-A of the Federal Constitution (as well as article 2º of Law 
11417/2006) determines that the Súmula of the Federal Supreme Court will bind all 
the other organs of the Judicial Power and the Administration at federal, state, 
federal district and municipal levels. 
The constitutional text certainly suggests that the Federal Supreme Court is 
not bound by its own Súmula. Technically, this can be supported, since it would be 
absurd if there was a Reclamação before the Federal Supreme Court to guarantee 
the authority of its Súmula, which was disregarded by the Supreme Court itself, and 
the Reclamação possibility is the main practical consequence of the binding effect. 
But this does not mean that the Supreme Court must not follow its binding 
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statements. The Supreme Court must do so – both as a collective body as well as its 
individual members – until the statement is properly revised or revoked.499 
As for the public Administration, administrators are expected to not act in 
opposition to what was defined in the Binding Súmula. Certainly, this will decrease 
the amount of litigation where the public Administration is one of the litigants. It 
should be noted that, in Brazil, the vast majority of cases in which the Administration 
litigates today are concerned with tax and welfare law questions (with constitutional 
contents too), and the solutions for these law questions have already been given 
many times by the Supreme Court. 
Conversely, the Legislative Power, exercising its typical function, will not be 
bound by the Súmula. This clearly derives from the reformed constitutional text that, 
with regards to the binding effect of Súmula, it does not refer, at any point, to the 
National Congress, which can legislate in opposition to what the Súmula states.500,501 
 
(vi) The Legitimacy to Provoke the Supreme Court and the Procedure   
 
The Federal Supreme Court can approve, revise or cancel statements of its 
Súmula by its own initiative or by external provocation (article 103-A, caput and § 2º, 
of the Federal Constitution and article 3º of Law 11417/06). By its own initiative, the 
proposition can be made by one (or more) of its Justices.502 As for the external 
provocation, article 103-A, § 2º, of the Constitution states that, without prejudice of 
the provisions of law, the approval, revision or cancelling of Súmula may be 
provoked by those who may file an action of unconstitutionality. The infra-
constitutional law-makers increased the list of authorities and agencies that may 
provoke the issue, revision or cancellation of statements. According to the 
constitutional text and Law 11417/06 (article 3º), the following may initiate the 
procedure: the President of the Republic; the Directing Board of the Federal Senate; 
the Directing Board of the Chamber of Deputies; the General Prosecutor of the 
Republic; the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association; the Public Defender-
General of the Union; a political party represented in the National Congress; a 
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confederation of labour unions or a professional association of a nation-wide nature; 
a Directing Board of a State Legislative Assembly or of the Federal District 
Legislative Chamber; a Governor of State or of the Federal District; the Superior 
Courts, State Courts of Justice, Federal District and Territories Court of Justice; 
Regional Federal Courts, Regional Labour Courts, Regional Electoral Courts and 
Military Courts. 
As it occurs with the direct action of unconstitutionality, for this provocation to 
be considered as “legitimate”, the Federal Supreme Court, in some cases, must 
analyse if the matter of the proposed binding statement has a thematic pertinence to 
institutional purposes of the supposed legitimate plaintiff. In other words, according 
to the case law of the Supreme Court, some potential plaintiffs must demonstrate not 
only the objective requirements established by article 103-A of the Constitution 
(regulated by Law 11476/2006, article 2º, caput and § 1º) for issuing a binding 
statement, but also a relation of pertinence between the proposed binding statement 
and their institutional activities.503 Basically, according to the case law of the 
Supreme Court (on the direct action of unconstitutionality), they are: the 
confederations of labour unions or the professional associations of a nation-wide 
nature; the Directing Boards of the State Legislative Assemblies or of the Federal 
District Legislative Chamber; the Governors of State or of the Federal District; the 
State Courts of Justice and the Federal District and Territories Court of Justice; and 
some Military Courts. 
According to Law 11417/2006, article 3º, § 1º, a municipality may also file a 
proposal to initiate a procedure to approve, revise or cancel a binding statement, 
since it is done within a concrete case in which this municipality is a party and 
demonstrates the requirements of article 2º, § 1º, of Law 11417/2006.504  
Following a line of democratization of the debate on the subjects under 
analysis before the Federal Supreme Court, Law 11417/2006, article 3º, § 2º, in fine, 
also allows the participation of third parties – kind of amicus curiae – in the 
procedure for issuing, revising or cancelling binding statements. This kind of 
intervention does not have the same nature of the interventions provided by the 
Brazilian Civil Procedure Code. In the case of the Civil Procedure Code, for the 
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intervention of a third party, who is not a participant of the original lawsuit, a 
subjective interest is always required, once the third party is (or would be) indirectly 
affected by the decision eventually proffered. Conversely, considering the objectivity 
of the procedure for issuing, revising and cancelling binding statements by the 
Federal Supreme Court, this kind of personal interest is not taken in consideration in 
the case of the Binding Súmula’s amicus curiae’s intervention. The intervention of a 
third party (amicus curiae) in the procedure for issuing, revising or cancelling of 
binding statements must be linked and restricted only to the presentation and 
support of a legal opinion about the validity, the interpretation and the efficacy of 
specific norms. The acceptance of the intervention is submitted to the rapporteur’s 
decision. 
Once the procedure has an objective nature, which only aims to fix a 
generalisation of the court practice, there is no legitimate defendant. Besides, no 
legal provision exists that determines the requesting of information from the body 
responsible for the enactment of the norm linked with the potential statement. 
In general terms, according to Law 11417/2006 and the Supreme Court 
Internal Regulation505, by its own initiative or by external provocation, the Federal 
Supreme Court must follow this procedure concerning its Binding Súmula:506 (i) 
Firstly, the Supreme Court must enable the intervention of the General Prosecutor of 
the Republic in propositions which are not of his initiative, before the issue, revision 
or revocation of the binding statement can take place; (ii) Secondly, during the 
procedure for issuing, revising or revoking a binding statement, the rapporteur may 
accept, through a non-appealable decision, the intervention of the amicus curiae; (iii) 
The proposition of issue, revision or revocation of a binding statement does not 
authorise the suspension of judicial cases in which the same question is debated; 
(iv) The issue, revision or revocation of a statement with a binding effect will depend 
on decisions made by two thirds of the members of the Federal Supreme Court in a 
plenary session (Law 11417/2006, article 2º, § 3º); (v) After the decision, the binding 
statement will have immediate effect, but the Supreme Court, also with a decision 
made by two thirds of its members, based on reasons of exceptional public interest, 
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can restrain the binding effects or decide that they will only have effects from another 
moment (Law 11417/2006, article 4º); (vi) In a term of 10 days after the session in 
which a statement with binding effect was issued, revised or cancelled, the Supreme 
Court will publish, in a special session of the official press, the terms of the 
respective statement (Law 11417/2006, § 4º);507,508 (vii) Finally, in the case of a 
statute that is linked with a binding statement is cancelled or changed, the Supreme 
Court, by its own initiative or external provocation, must revoke or revise the 
respective statement.  
The Federal Supreme Court’s Internal Regulation (article 32) and Resolution 
388/2008509 (article 1º) also require the intervention of the Court’s Commission of 
Case Law in this atypical procedural class, which will analyse the matter and 
propose a decision, to the Full Bench, concerning the issue (or not) of the binding 
statement. However, the Supreme Court has sometimes expedited the issue of 
binding statements, since some binding statements were issued directly by the Full 
Bench of the Supreme Court, without the discussion going previously through the 
analysis of Court’s Commission of Case Law. It is true that there is some resistance 
to this swifter procedure, but the understanding that the Full Bench of the Court 
absorbs the jurisdiction of all its commissions, enabling it (the Full Bench) to carry 
out this more informal and faster procedure, has clearly prevailed. 
 
(vii) Time Efficacy, Revision and Cancellation 
 
Article 103-A of the Federal Constitution and article 4º of Law 11417/2006 are 
explicit when they state that, since publication in the official press, the statement will 
bind all other bodies of the Judiciary and the public Administration in general. It is 
important to note that this efficacy, as a rule, retracts in time, i.e., is ex tunc, 
preserving, of course, the res judicata.  
However, article 4º of Law 11417/2006 allows the Federal Supreme Court to 
modulate the temporal efficacy of the binding statement, according to the court’s 
                                                 
507
 See Tavares (2007, p. 152). 
508
 They are also available by a simple internet search at the Supreme Court website: 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=jurisprudenciaSumulaVinculante. Acessed 23 
July 2012. 
509





discretion, observing the potential repercussions of the particular statement. As it is 
permitted in the centralised judicial review of legislation (Law 9868/1999), the 
Supreme Court, by decision of two thirds of its members (eight Justices), may decide 
that it shall go into effect from another moment, due to reasons of legal certainty and 
of relevant public interest.510  
On the other hand, Law 11417/2006 also permits to restrict the effect of the 
binding statement, presumably to limit the subjective effects of the statement only to 
certain bodies or entities of the (federal, state or municipal) public Administration, 
according to the case. At least, this is the most common interpretation of the letter of 
the law. This provision, although there is no definitive position of the Federal 
Supreme Court, is of disputable constitutionality because it can offend, among other 
things, the constitutional principle of equality of all before the law (Brazilian 
Constitution’s article 5º, caput).511 
Furthermore, article 5º of Law 11417/2006 states the possibility of revision or 
cancellation of a binding statement, which, for any reason, becomes incompatible 
with the legislative norms (including the Constitution). The Supreme Court can revise 
or cancel the statement by its own initiative or by external proposition.512 
In fact, it is absurd to think that the making of laws would always conform to 
the binding statements of the Súmula of the Federal Supreme Court. This would 
mean that the Constitutional Reform of 2004 had created a Judiciary supremacy 
over the Legislative Power. The legislative activity will continue to be fully active 
within the existing constitutional limits.513 As will be shown later in this Chapter, in the 
Brazilian legal system, which is related to the civil law tradition, the validity of a 
statement (either binding or non-binding) depends on the support that it has from the 
legislated norm. In short, a binding statement’s stability depends on the stability of 
the subjacent principle to the legislated norm in which it is integrated. Generally, a 
binding statement will not survive if the legislated norm that it refers to is changed (or 
if a diverse norm is created in case of a previous absence), so that the statement 
and the new text are incompatible. However, even if the norm is changed or a new 
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norm is created, the statement can survive if the change does not affect the 
subjacent principle according to which the statement was created.514 
This possibility of reviewing or cancelling a binding statement (incompatible 
with the legislative norms) is extremely relevant so it can be conformed to the actual 
needs of the law and society, which are always in continuous transformation. 
Otherwise, it is possible, for instance, to face the abnormal situation of having, at the 
same time, a binding statement which was not revised or cancelled, and so it is 
binding for constitutional commands, and a statute with incompatible provisions with 
the statement. 
Although there is no mention in article 5º of Law 11417/2006, the minimum 
quorum to revise or cancel the binding statement, following the same rule of article 
103-A and article 2º, § 3º, of Law 11417/2006, shall be two thirds of the members of 
the court.515 And similar to that which occurs with the issuing of a binding statement, 
it will also demand a thorough discussion on the matter. 
 
(viii) The Binding Effect and the “Reclamação Constitucional”  
 
The possibility of filing a “Reclamação Constitucional” (a “Constitutional 
Complaint” or “Constitutional Claim”) before the Federal Supreme Court, arguing the 
violation of a binding statement by a lower court or the public Administration, is the 
most palpable practical effect of the new Binding Súmula.516 
Historically, the Reclamação is product of the Federal Supreme Court’s case 
law. It is commonly said that its creation was based on the idea of the implied 
powers granted by the Constitution to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
utilised the doctrine of implied powers for the solution of the operational problem of 
enforcement of its decisions: as the Courts had the power to adjudicate, it also had 
the power to create mechanisms to assure the authority of its decisions. In 1957, 
however, it was incorporated into the Supreme Court’s Internal Regulation. 
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Furthermore, the Brazilian Constitution of 1967, which authorised the Supreme Court 
to establish the procedural rules of lawsuits under its jurisdiction, recognised force of 
federal law to the Internal Regulation of the Court. The Reclamação, from that point 
on, at least indirectly, was also based on a constitutional provision. 
Finally, the Federal Constitution of 1988, article 102, I, “l”, expressly granted 
full constitutional status to the Reclamação. According to Constitution of 1988 (article 
102, I, “l”), the purposes of the Constitutional Complaint are both to preserve the 
jurisdiction and to ensure the authority of the decisions of the Federal Supreme 
Court before other courts and the public Administration.517,518 
Specifically, according to the new § 3º of article 103-A of the Federal 
Constitution (regulated by article 7º of Law 11417/2006), any administrative act or 
judicial decision, which goes against an applicable binding statement or applies it in 
an undue manner, may be contested before the Supreme Court. This means that the 
Administration and all other judicial bodies, when dealing with a legal question 
already incorporated to the Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula, must correctly apply 
the legal understanding that is in the respective binding statement. The bound organ 
must always verify the adequacy of the facts of the case into its hands to the binding 
statement. Analysing the concrete case, it will verify if it should or should not apply 
the binding statement of the Federal Supreme Court to it.519 This inevitably implies a 
certain degree of interpretation. The problem of interpreting the statement deserves 
specific attention: the same interpretation commonly given by the Federal Supreme 
Court must be sought, because if the bound body reaches an interpretation that is 
wrong or distorted, the binding statement will remain disobeyed.  
If a judicial decision or administrative act disobey, deny or misapply binding 
statement, the damaged party can file a specific constitutional-procedural 
mechanism, the Reclamação, to present a request to the Federal Supreme Court 
(besides the applicable appeals or remedies before other judicial courts), so that the 
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Court can immediately guarantee the authority of its consolidated case-law (Law 
11417/2006, article 7º).520 The Supreme Court shall nullify the administrative act or 
the judicial decision and determine their substitution with or without the application of 
the statement, as the case may require.521 Sometimes, it is also required of the 
disobedient authority to act appropriately and, depending on the specific case, the 
Supreme Court may use all necessary means to reach this purpose.522,523 
 
(xix) The non-binding statements of the Federal Supreme Court 
 
Constitutional Amendment 45/2004 was also concerned with the Supreme 
Court non-binding statements. As was seen, since 1963, the Federal Supreme Court 
has issued this statements aiming at guiding itself and other courts about its 
dominant understanding on certain matters. Up to now, 736 precedents were 
issued.524 
According to its article 8º, a non-binding statement of the Federal Supreme 
Court will only have binding effect after its ratification by two thirds of the members of 
Court and the publication of this decision in the official press. 
This provision immediately reveals two important things. Firstly, the existing 
difference between the classical Súmula and the new universally Binding Súmula. 
Secondly, it shows that old and persuasive statements of the Federal Supreme Court 
have, with the constitutional reform, not become automatically binding.525,526 
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Furthermore, there is no doubt that the same requirements demanded for the 
new binding statements must be demanded of the old statements, in case they are 
analysed and ratified by two thirds of the members of the Court, in order to have the 
binding effect after publication in the official press.527 
 
5.4 Characteristic Features of the Brazilian Binding Súmula: Distinction with 
the English Model of Precedents 
 
There is no doubt that the Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula 
represents a rupture with the dogmatic tradition that has existed in Brazil and other 
countries that abide by Roman-Germanic tradition around legislated standards.528 
However, it is necessary to be clear that a súmula (or a statement of it) 
signifies something different to the English binding precedent in the theory of stare 
decisis.529 Observing the Brazilian model of súmula and comparing it to the English 
binding precedent, it can be seen, immediately, that its origin is different and that the 
content of a súmula’s statement is much less extensive than the English precedent. 
The differences are not related to the persuasive or binding character of the súmula. 
Even if a súmula is universally binding (as it is the case of the new Federal Supreme 
Court’s Binding Súmula according to the reformed constitutional text), there are still 
several differences which must be highlighted. 
Firstly, in the English binding precedent model, the general binding force is 
the fruit of an isolated decision, while a statement of a súmula is a result of or, more 
precisely, a compendium of a series of judgments that only gives a clear secure 
understanding of what was already dominant in the Court.530 
Secondly, the Brazilian súmula is similar to an index or compendium that 
presents brief statements about the Supreme Court case law. This means that, 
currently, from a simple internet search, this solid case law can be identified rapidly 
on a number of legal themes. 
Thirdly, the binding precedent is an answer, in the form of a judicial decision, 
to a concrete case, that has a ratio decidendi and obiter dicta (without mentioning 
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the question of the facts of the case), aspects that need to be duly distinguished to 
verify what is truly important or not. On the other hand, each statement of a súmula, 
in its formality, is a true extract of essentially legal content531, consolidating the 
interpretation of the question of law as established by previous decisions532 in the 
same sense. A binding statement, as seen previously, should be short, direct and 
clear. It does not have (or are not to have) affirmations a latere (known, in the theory 
of stare decisis, as obiter dicta) and all of its content is considered essential.  
Furthermore, there is a characteristic which has special contours in a legal 
system, such as the Brazilian system, related to the civil law tradition: the validity of 
the statements of a súmula is always conditioned by the support it has on the 
legislated norm.533 It is true that we have several types of statements: a) merely 
declaratory, which basically repeats the text of law; b) intra legem, which, once there 
is a legal provision for the theme, interprets it properly within the limits already 
established in the legal system; c) extra legem, which fills in the blanks left by the 
Legislation or extends the limits established by it, without harming the vector 
principles of the system.534 However, all of them were linked with legislated norms or 
norms that should have been legislated (in this case, precisely because the norms 
were not legislated there is the statement), merely “repeating” their texts, truly 
interpreting them, occupying the spaces left by them or expanding the limits 
previously established by them (legal norms). 
In fact, the statement of a súmula, according to Alvim, in essence, has the 
stability of the principle subjacent from statute for which it was made; so, if it has the 
stability of the principle embedded in the statute, and, even if the statute is changed 
(which has previously occurred) since the same principle is strictly maintained, this 
does not imply changes in the statement, which continues to exist and must be 
applied.535 In other words, a binding statement should not survive if the text of the 
legislated norm it relates is altered (or a legislated norm is created in case of 
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previous absence), so that the statement and the new text of the legislative norm 
become incompatible. For instance, it was what happened to Statement 228 
(approved in 16 December 1963) of the classical Súmula of the Federal Supreme 
Court, which stated that “it is not provisory the execution of a decision even pending 
an extraordinary appeal or other appeal to make it (the extraordinary appeal) 
admitted”. With respect to the civil procedure, this statement was overcome by the 
issue of the 1973 Civil Procedural Code, especially because of the new ruling of 
articles 542, §2º, and 587 of this statute, which state to be temporary the execution 
of a decision those decisions. However, even if the text of a legislated norm is 
altered or a new norm is created where one does not exist, the statement may 
survive if the modification does not affect the subjacent principle in relation with that 
statement was created. As an example, Statement 279 (also approved in 16 
December 1963) of the classical Súmula the Federal Supreme Court, which states 
that “the extraordinary appeal aiming the mere re-examination of evidence should 
not be admitted”, despite the later constitutional and legal modifications of the 
extraordinary appeal discipline, remains in full force, because these modifications did 
not altered the principle that the extraordinary appeal does not serve to re-examine 
evidences.  
It is further important to note that the system of the súmula, in the classical 
model (known as non-binding) has always been the object of profuse praise. It is a 
compass in an extensive and exhaustive case law jungle, as Serpa Lopes, a famous 
Brazilian Scholar, once stated.536,537 Certainly this is one more motive (perhaps even 
the most important) for, in practice, the non-binding Súmula (more specifically its 
persuasive statements) has a tendency to be worth more than the legislated norm 
itself, in spite of it having, dogmatically speaking, a merely persuasive character. 
 
5.5 The Binding Súmula Model: Debates and Perspectives 
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Due to the introduction of the Binding Súmula into Brazilian law, the theme of 
precedents has become a main topic in the legal literature in Brazil. Frequently, the 
discussion among Brazilian scholars has been based upon the convenience of the 
adoption of the Binding Súmula and some form of prejudice has often influenced this 
debate.538 
It is true, as Moreira affirms in an article about the future of justice, that the 
overestimation of foreign models is a myth which has to be faced carefully.539 With 
the simple adoption of the common law system of binding precedents, without the 
proper adaptations, Brazil would be endorsing a model that is opposite to the 
traditions and realities of the country. The adoption of a general rule of stare decisis 
would collide with the reality of a country of continental dimensions and regional 
differences and a Judicial Power that consists of judges often with very different 
values about the same legal or factual situation.  
Undoubtedly, the Binding Súmula is not a case of simple adoption of a foreign 
model. As already said, the Súmula represents a rupture with the dogmatic tradition 
that has existed in Brazil and other countries that abide by civil tradition, around 
legislated standards.540 Nevertheless, the Súmula model has a history of 
achievements in Brazil, in the classic non-binding model, since the 1960s. Based on 
this history, the creation of the Supreme Court Binding Súmula presents a strong 
compatibility with the Brazilian legal traditions. 
In any case, the first direct criticism against a model such as the new Binding 
Súmula is connected to the theory of the separation of powers. It is argued that the 
Judiciary power, issuing a Súmula with a binding effect, with erga omens efficacy, 
seems to be exercising those functions which are appropriate to a Legislative 
power.541 
As seen in Chapter 2, it is possible to counter this argument by arguing that 
the theory of separation of powers is not so strict to the point of totally precluding the 
exercise, by one of the State’s powers, of a function usually attributed to another 
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power.542 In contemporary constitutionalism, the examples of exercise by one of the 
State’s powers of another power’s typical function are well known (for instance, in 
Brazil, the judicial review of legislation).543 This new constitutionalism abandons the 
idea of a rigid separation des pouvoirs and confirms the idea of a sharing of 
powers.544 Besides, in Brazil, after the Constitution of 1988, judges frequently deal 
with cases that involve groups of people or even the whole society. This overcomes 
the idea that attributes the making of general rules to the Parliament and confines 
the judge to the scope of concrete and individual cases.545 Finally, based on this 
neo-constitutionalist interpretation of the Constitution of 1988, the Brazilian Judiciary, 
as also mentioned in Chapter 2, should give effect to the constitutional norms that 
protect values such as equality and speed in judicial decisions, adopting 
mechanisms that improve the Judiciary’s performance. One of the mechanisms, in 
spite of the doctrine of the separation des pouvoirs, is the Supreme Court’s Binding 
Súmula.546 
The second objection linked to the adoption of a model such as the Binding 
Súmula, and probably the most common, is that this would change the judge’s 
decision into a simple mechanism of applying the existent precedent. Judges would 
lose their free conviction to interpret the law and would be completely prevented from 
departing from the binding statement, even though they considered it wrong.547 
  Although any model of binding precedent means, in summary, that judges and 
lower courts must follow higher courts’ precedents (and often their own precedents), 
in practice the judicial decisions, in systems informed by the doctrine of binding 
precedent, are neither neutral nor mechanical. The rule is to follow the precedent 
(and that is the utility of the doctrine) but often, for several pertinent reasons, judges 
or courts do not follow this apparently binding precedent.548 These same reasons, to 
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a proper degree and with proper adaptations, can be applied to the Brazilian Binding 
Súmula. 
It is important to remember that the Binding Súmula is not intended to impose 
ties on judges and courts.549 As seen previously, what is proposed is a formula for 
preventing the litigants’ fortune from depending on the frequent changes in the 
composition of the courts and the changes in the understanding that comes from as 
a result of this, depending on the mere distribution of the case to a certain judicial 
body or, even worse, depending on the stubbornness of the judge appointed to the 
case. 
Besides, even after the Supreme Court confirms some interpretation in its 
Súmula, nothing prevents the judges or courts, although it is not very practical, from 
adopting a contrary position to the Supreme Court. Against this independence, there 
are no disciplinary sanctions.550,551 As previously noted, the consequence of this 
independence is only to allow a “Reclamação” before the Supreme Court, requiring 
this Court to restore the authority of the Binding Súmula. 
This “religious” defence of the judicial independence suffers also from a lack 
of pragmatism, because it disregards all the advantages of a model such as the 
Binding Súmula. It is unreal and, above all, contrary to the public interest, because, 
apparently, the Binding Súmula can be a solution, in the short term, to minimise 
some problems of a historical dilatory and unstable system of justice.552 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the principle of “rational persuasion of 
the judge” or “freedom to interpret the law”, although very important, must be 
reconciled with the constitutional principle of equality of all people before the law 
(declared in the caput of article 5º of the Brazilian Constitution).553 Every time 
diverging judicial decisions are applied to similar cases, the constitutional principle of 
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equality of all before the law is undermined. In other words, the constitutional 
principle of equality will be an empty formula unless both principles are reconciled. 
This conciliation presupposes the non-destruction of one of them. 
To conclude this chapter, it will be useful to consider the following points:  
Firstly, one has to bear in mind that in Brazil a reduction in litigation can be 
achieved with the development of the Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula, 
because there are thousands and thousands of cases that come to courts dealing 
with identical or similar law thesis. The Supreme Court itself, from the 1990s, began 
to complain about the workload which was impeding the optimum running of its office 
and, at the beginning of this century, a crisis arose in the Court when the number of 
cases reached insupportable figures. However, since 2007 (the year of the issuing of 
the first binding statement), lower courts have had to follow the binding statements of 
the Supreme Court, and the situation has improved. To give a comprehensive 
panorama from recent years, 127,535 cases arrived at the Supreme Court in 2006. 
Although others measures, as the “repercussão geral” (which was seen in Chapter 
4), have also contributed for the improvement of the figures, not coincidentally, in 
2007, the year of the first binding statement, there were 119,304 (in 2008 – 100,895, 
in 2009 – 82,221, in 2010 – 74,708), and in 2011 – 63,427.554 Consequently, the 
number of cases in trial before de Federal Supreme Court has also been decreasing. 
In 2006, they were 150,001 (in 2007 – 129,623, in 2008 – 112,080, in 2009 – 
100,634 and in 2010 – 90,295); in 2011, 67.395.555 Currently, with thirty one binding 
statements556 published by the Supreme Court, there is also an unquestionable 
pragmatic value supporting the Binding Súmula, which has contributed to a greater 
fluency in the resolution of cases and a reduction in the backlog of trials. 
However, the efficacy of a mechanism such as the Supreme Court Binding 
Súmula will also depend on how it will be culturally accepted by the Administration 
and the other judicial courts. The voluntary compliance of its statements is 
fundamental. Otherwise, there will be numerous claims that will make the application 
of the binding effect, as a consequence, almost impractical.557 
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In Brazil, one good example of voluntary compliance that can be cited comes 
from the Superior Labour Court that adapted its proper non-binding Súmula, 
precisely its Statement 228558, producing a new text to follow the new Supreme 
Court’s Binding Statement 4. Indeed, the old Superior Labour Court’s Statement 228 
said that the value of the additional pay for hazard conditions should consider the 
minimum wage referred to by article 76 of the Consolidation of the Labour Laws, 
except in the cases referred in its Statement 17. However, in 2008, the Federal 
Supreme Court issued the Binding Statement 4559 saying that, except in the cases 
provided in the Federal Constitution, the minimum wage cannot be used as an 
indexer to calculate any salary advantages of civil servants and private employees. 
In a decision of 26 June 2008, the Superior Labour Court decided to change the 
word of its statement 228, affirming that, from 9 May 2008 (the date of the 
publication of the Federal Supreme Court's Binding Statement 4), the additional pay 
for hazard conditions should be calculated considering the real basic salary of the 
employees.560 
Secondly, although a model such as the Binding Súmula will bring benefits, it 
is not correct to think that it will be a miracle cure for all the problems of any judicial 
system. Indeed, in the near future, in Brazil, it will be necessary to think in parallel 
measures which work together with the Binding Súmula in order for the legal system 
to be more effective, and these include: (i) explicitly establishing the compulsory 
application of a fine in case of abuse of the right of defence, with delaying purpose, 
in order to defy binding statements; (ii) establishing the compulsory application of 
fines to appeals which defy, with the purpose of delaying, binding statements; (iii) 
adopting some type of recommendation for granting an injunction order when the 
case is based upon a binding statement and there is abuse of the right of defence or 
a delaying purpose is manifested.561,562 
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One should also be careful with enthusiastic opinions that state only the 
Binding Súmula can solve the problems of an undesirable dilatory and unstable 
system of justice such as the Brazilian one. Prudently, it is better to say that the 
model of Súmula has been effective in Brazil, and that it is also possible, based on it 
but in a wider perspective, to debate some ideas for a better use of binding 
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6.1 General Considerations 
 
Any rule of binding precedents implies advantages and disadvantages, and 
the doctrine of stare decisis, even in common law countries, has always had its 
supporters and detractors. However, apart from the fact that some of the potential 
problems of the doctrine are more apparent than real, a legal system that adopts any 
rule of binding precedents must find a way to make the advantages, which are in 
greater number, satisfactorily overcome the disadvantages. 
This final chapter focuses on some of the advantages of the doctrine of stare 
decisis: stability, certainty of law, equality and time-saving, as positive criteria of 
functionality, in order to analyse some of the improvements in the deliverance of 
justice in Brazil since the adoption of a more comprehensive approach to binding 
precedents. The analysis will be illustrated with data from Brazilian official databases 
and reports. This methodology is believed to be balanced to avoid the overuse of 
either pure conceptual elements or strict empirical knowledge. 
Taking the English model as a paradigm, this chapter also compares and 
debates some of the strengths of the new Brazilian approach to precedents. 
Revisiting and developing some of the ideas previously addressed, this chapter will 
highlight the question of the greater simplicity of the new Brazilian model of Binding 
Súmula when compared with the common law doctrine of stare decisis. It will also 
focus on the good access to precedents in the Brazilian legal system. Finally, it will 
examine the balance between statutes and precedents as established by the model 
of Binding Súmula, emphasising that the Brazilian mix of civil and common law 
elements has proved a very synergic model. 
Based on this comparative analysis of the improvements in the deliverance of 
justice in Brazil, this chapter aims to pose some questions that could not be fully 
addressed without first giving, as this thesis did, a complete account of how 
precedents are understood and how they operate in Brazil: What role should 
precedents have in a country that abides by a Western (that is, civil or common law) 





attain good standards of functionality? In the near future, should an official binding 
súmula be introduced in the United Kingdom Supreme Court to overcome the 
challenge of distinguishing ratio decidendi and obiter dicta in its case law? Would a 
model of súmula harmonise with the tradition and particularities of the English law? 
What is the nature of the relationship between precedents and legislation in a legal 
system, such as that of Brazil, which has traditionally emphasised the statute law? 
Has Brazil reached a good balance between legislation and precedents? How in a 
civil law system can the judicial law-making be legitimated? 
    
6.2 Disadvantages of the Application of the Rule of Stare Decisis  
 
Martin asserts that, concerning the doctrine of stare decisis, every “advantage 
has a corresponding disadvantage”.563 Although this statement sounds exaggerated, 
the doctrine has some potential disadvantages that cannot be concealed. The legal 
literature in Brazil points out some of these disadvantages: the rigidity and the 
slowness of growth of the binding case law, the complexity of the common law 
doctrine of stare decisis and the supposed offences to the principles of the rational 
persuasion of the judge and the separation of powers.564,565 However, as already 
partially seen in Chapters 2 and 5, some of these disadvantages or problems are 
more apparent than real. 
For instance, in Brazil it is said that the adoption of the Binding Súmula can 
give an undesirable rigidity to the Brazilian legal system. It is pointed out that the 
tendency is, after the Constitutional Reform in 2004 (with the “barriers” of the Binding 
Súmula and the requirement of general repercussion in extraordinary appeals), that 
progressively fewer cases reach the Federal Supreme Court. It is argued that the 
new rules would unhealthily immobilise the “natural” evolution of Brazilian case law. 
Undoubtedly, under social conditions in change or in areas of law in which the 
legislation has been updated, attributing a sacred value to precedents would 
sometimes be an exaggerated formalism and not reasonable.566 
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However, this problem is certainly more apparent than real. As seen 
previously, any (common law) legal system that adopts a rule of stare decisis also 
has some space for flexibility (which is wider in the USA than it is in England). 
Among other things, there is the power to distinguish, which, once it is correctly 
used, gives the courts the freedom to depart from previous decisions; besides this, 
even though it is an exception, there is the possibility of overruling, which serves, by 
revoking the undesirable precedent, to develop the law. 
In Brazil, the existence of the Binding Súmula will not forbid judges or courts 
from adopting a contrary position to the Federal Supreme Court. Once there is a 
binding statement which should be followed, what the judge must not do is to depart 
from it arbitrarily. Indeed, it is possible to depart from the binding precedent with the 
application of reasonable and sufficient grounds. Against this independence, there 
are no disciplinary sanctions.567 The only practical consequence of this is to allow a 
Reclamação before the Federal Supreme Court to restore the authority of the 
Binding Súmula. Consequently, the existence of the rule of binding precedent will not 
eternally prevent the courts from adopting a different point of view and initializing a 
new line of case law. 
A further observation to be made is that a legal system based upon statutes 
and codes can also be very static. Actually, it tends to be even more static because 
the changes in case law are much more usual - at least, normally, they should be - 
than the changes in legislation. In Brazil, as Rosas and Aragão recognise568, the 
case law has frequently anticipated the legislation in the solution of legal questions. 
A statute is supposedly created to last forever. However, the society is not static, but 
dynamic. It changes constantly following the progress. Although Brazilian judges are 
not expected to substitute the Parliament, they are called to interpret the legislation 
and adapt them to a new reality. Besides, it is impossible to imagine the legislation 
covering all the legal issues, and Brazilian judges are also frequently called to 
supplement the legislation. In this sense, the role of the case law in the development 
of the Brazilian law is undeniable. 
It is also argued that the common law doctrine of stare decisis is complex. 
                                                 
567
 See excerpt of the opinion of Justice Nery da Silveira in Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade 
– ADC-MC 4/DF – STF – Full Bench – Rapporteur Justice Sydney Sanches – j. 11-2-1998 – DJ 21-5-
1999 – EMENT 1951-1 – RTJ 169 pp. 432-433, quoted at p. XX. 
568





This is in part true. Firstly, the complexity of any rule of stare decisis comes from the 
circumstance of the existence, in any country, of millions and millions of decided 
cases. It is not easy to find all relevant case law even with an online database. 
Secondly, the doctrine itself, as it was built, is complex. Many times, in a given 
precedent, there is no precise distinction between mere obiter and the ratio 
decidendi of the case. However, in the specific case of Brazil, with the simple 
adoption of the Binding Súmula, such problems, in principle, do not exist.569 On the 
contrary, through the Binding Súmula, the firm case law of the Federal Supreme 
Court, concerning several legal themes, can be identified fast. It is only necessary to 
browse the Supreme Court webpage. Besides, the statements of Binding Súmula, 
each of them compiling and consolidating (the fundamentals of) several previous 
decisions in the same sense concerning an issue of law, do not have affirmations a 
latere (the reported obiter dicta), and all of their contents are considered essential. 
Against the rule of stare decisis (especially against the possibility of judicial 
law-making), some Brazilian scholars also mention the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, encapsulated in the Federal Constitution, which recommends that the 
legislative, judicial and executive functions of the State should be exercised by 
separate bodies. The possibility of the courts to make law would represent a clear 
breach of this doctrine.570 
As seen in Chapters 2 and 5, the doctrine is not so strict to the point of totally 
forbidding the exercise, by one of the State’s powers, of a function usually attributed 
to another power. Currently Brazil has seen the development of a new understanding 
of the principle of separation of powers. This new constitutionalism abandons the 
idea of a rigid separation des pouvoirs and confirms the idea of a sharing of 
powers.571 In the contemporaneous Brazilian constitutionalism, procedures based on 
a system of checks and balances are widely known, such as the judicial review of 
legislation. Besides, above all after the advent of the Constitution of 1988, judges in 
Brazil do not only manipulate individual cases, but also those which, for the massive 
                                                 
569
 Of course the system may be complex due to other factors. The Brazilian appeal system, which 
needs to be improved and simplified, is an important factor for the complexity of our judicial system as 
a whole. 
570
 This question of the limits of judicial power is not exclusive to Brazil. In all legal systems with a civil 
law background, such as France for instance, there has been a similar defiance to the expansion of 
judicial law making. See Steiner (2010, mainly pp. 85 and 87). 
571





impact they can have, involve a considerable part of the community. This also 
overcomes the idea that attributes the abstract and generic treatment of law to the 
Parliament and confines the judge to concrete and individual cases.572 Finally, based 
on this neo-constitutionalist interpretation of the Federal Constitution of 1988, the 
Brazilian Judiciary, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2, should give effect to the 
substantive constitutional norms, which protect values such as equality and speed in 
judicial decisions. The Brazilian law, taking into consideration all these values, is 
obliged to adopt mechanisms that improve the performance of the Judiciary as a 
whole. One of the measures to be taken, in spite of the doctrine of the separation 
des pouvoirs, is the adoption of an effective system of creative and binding 
precedents.573 
One final objection raised against the adoption of any doctrine of binding 
precedent in Brazil – and more specifically to the new Súmula Vinculante of the 
Federal Supreme Court’s decisions – is that this would change the judge’s decision 
into a simple mechanism of applying the precedent to the case on trial.574 The judge 
would lose the free conviction to decide and would be completely prevented from 
departing from a precedent, although he considered it wrong. 
As seen previously, this is not true. In practice, the judicial decisions, in legal 
systems informed by a doctrine of binding precedent, are neither neutral nor 
mechanical. The rule is to follow the precedent, but, often, for several pertinent 
reasons, a court may depart from an (apparently) binding precedent.575 The 
establishment of a more comprehensive approach to binding precedents in Brazil (in 
the case, for instance, of the Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula) does not forbid 
courts and judges to adjudicate the law in a new way when the binding 
understanding shows signs that is outdated. In truth, nothing prevents judges or 
lower courts, although it is not very practical, from adopting a contrary position to the 
Supreme Court. As already seen (mainly in Chapters 4 and 5), the consequence of 
this is simply to allow a “Reclamação” to the Supreme Court in order provoke it to 
restore the authority of its own binding decision.576 Secondly, it can be said that the 
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principle of the judge’s rational persuasion or freedom to interpret law, although it is 
very important, must be reconciled with the constitutional principle of equality of all 
before the law, which is also encapsulated in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. 
Every time divergent judicial decisions are applied to similar cases, the constitutional 
principle of equality of all before the law is seriously attacked.577 Finally, this resistant 
view in favour of a mythological free persuasion of the judge has an inconceivable 
lack of pragmatism, because it potentially wastes all the advantages of the doctrine 
of stare decisis.  
 
6.3 The New Uses of Precedents and the Improvement of the Brazilian Legal 
System  
 
Apart from the fact that some of the disadvantages (or potential problems) of 
the doctrine of stare decisis, as previously mentioned, are more apparent than real, 
in any case, a legal system that adopts a rule of this kind must find a way to make 
the advantages or virtues, which are greater in number, satisfactorily overcome the 
disadvantages. 
These virtues attributed to the doctrine of stare decisis vary according to the 
consulted source578,579. However, the justification commonly given to the doctrine 




It is said that a rule of stare decisis generates stability to the legal system. 
Binding precedents aim to be valid truths for every equal or similar case. It implies 
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the progressive consolidation of well-grounded opinions, which are repeatedly 
considered as right. 
Unfortunately, the instability of the law seems to be part of Brazilian legal 
history. It is enough to remember that, different from the United States of America, 
which has maintained its first constitution, Brazil, through its short existence as an 
independent country (about 200 years), has had several constitutions. 
The Brazilian case law has also suffered from a lack of stability. The historical 
absence of a doctrine of stare decisis suggests that judges are free to depart from 
what they simply consider incorrect.581 For instance, as seen in Chapter 3, judges 
can recognise that, concerning the matter of the case on trial, there is a precedent. 
Nevertheless, they can disregard the precedent by recognising changes in the 
circumstances which caused that previous decision and simply pronounce a decision 
in another sense. This inconsistent application of the law has certainly harmed the 
judicial system’s reliability. It would be better to have a wrong but stable than an 
uncertain case law, it can be said. 
However, those involved in the administration of justice in Brazil started to 
realise that the departures from or the overruling of precedents should not be an 
easy task as it has traditionally been. They realised that the departure from and the 
overruling of a precedent, based on its inconvenience, inaccuracy or even injustice, 
always implies a damage to the stability (as well as to the predictability and equality) 
of the legal system.582 Accordingly, several categories of binding precedents, as 
seen mainly in Chapters 4 and 5, were created to assure more adherence to 
previous decisions.583 
One old example of these binding precedents, presented in Chapter 4, is the 
incident concerning the standardisation of the case law within the same court, 
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regulated by the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure (articles 476 to 479).  Its name 
reveals the concern of the Code in maintaining the unity of the law within the same 
court.584 As seen in Chapter 4, in this incident, the full bench (or the pertinent 
standardisation organ) interpretation concerning a given legal issue must be 
observed by the panel in the decision of the concrete case (article 478) and 
constitutes, to the court, a binding precedent for further cases (article 479).585 More 
recently, Law 10259/2002 (article 14, caput), which regulates the civil proceedings in 
the Federal Small Claims Courts, established an incident for standardisation of 
interpretation of federal law when there are divergent interpretations on matters of 
substantive law in decisions pronounced by appellate panels. The objective of this 
incident is the same as the incident of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision of 
the incident of standardisation in the Federal Small Claims Courts should be 
observed by the appellate panel in the decision of the respective concrete case. The 
precedent will also bind the decisions of new cases dealing with the same question 
of substantive law. 
Most important, stability is one of the clear advantages of the new Supreme 
Federal Court’s Binding Súmula model. Besides the fact that it encapsulates a legal 
thesis that is supposed to be a valid truth for every similar or equal case, the Court 
will only exceptionally revise or cancel a statement of its Binding Súmula. Each 
statement of the Federal Supreme Court Binding Súmula, as a result of reiterated 
decisions in the same sense, is supposed to reflect the wisdom of the Supreme 
Court as an institution transcending the moment. When the Supreme Court, based 
upon principles established in several previous cases, decides to incorporate a new 
statement in its Binding Súmula, it is certainly preserving a rare and precious 
knowledge that, in many decisions, was carefully constructed and improved. Indeed, 
according to article 5º of Law 11417/2006, the Court, by its own initiative or by 
external proposition
586
, should revise or cancel a statement if it becomes 
incompatible with the legislative norms (including the Constitution). However, the 
minimum quorum to revise or cancel the binding statement, as seen in Chapter 5, 
shall be two thirds of the members of the Court, also demanding, similar to what 
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occurs with the issuing of a statement, a thorough discussion on the matter. 
Otherwise, the statement will be constantly remembered and special measures has 
been established to prevent it from being forgotten (mainly the “Reclamação 
Constitucional”).   
 
(ii) Certainty of Law 
 
 The interest in stability does not exhaust the goals that the stare decisis 
doctrine serves.587 The certainty of law is related to stability. It is said that the 
consistent succession of precedents contributes to make the solution of future 
litigations predictable.588 In Brazil, Alvim makes a good connection between stability 
and certainty. According to him, it is not “acceptable that the same legal question has 
more than one understanding [above all in the same historical moment]. The 
attribute of certainty is an irrefutable need of any legal system. The double 
interpretation would create, certainly, dubiety about the conduct”.589 
 The knowledge of the existence of firm precedents makes certain which will 
be the solution applied to the case if the same legal question is brought to the courts. 
Individuals can organise their conduct and businesses appropriately. Lawyers can 
advise their clients beforehand, because there already is a prediction of how the 
legal issues would be solved judicially. Before a stable case law, everyone knows 
what can rely on; whereas, before an uncertain case law, no one is sure of what is 
right or wrong.  
 Since in the Brazilian legal system most precedents are not formally binding, 
they can simply not be followed. The allowance of courts and judges to freely depart 
from or overrule what they consider incorrect is considered a weak point in the legal 
system in terms of certainty of law. 
One of the motives for the creation of the Federal Supreme Court’s Binding 
Súmula, for instance, was that it provides a greater degree of certainty about the law. 
It must be remembered that among the requirements to issue a binding statement is 
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the existence of a current controversy among judicial organs or between them and 
public Administration, which can cause severe judicial insecurity. The Binding 
Súmula is a response to this judicial insecurity. It is the summary of a series of 
judgements that gives a clear and secure understanding of what is dominant in the 
Supreme Court. Individually, each statement of the Súmula recovers a determined 
aspect of the legislation (or fills an empty space left by it), with an interpretation that 
is considered to be consolidated, and contributes, point by point, to the certainty of 
the law. In practice, the Súmula is nothing more than an index, composed of several 
brief statements, that presents the Supreme Court’s solid case law on several legal 
issues. Through the Súmula, by a simple Internet search, this case law can be 
identified. This helpful and user-friendly tool makes a great contribution to 
predictability for the resolution of present and future litigations. 
The same can be said about the issue of the multiplicity of special appeals 
based upon a similar question of law (regulated by Law 11.672/08, which altered the 
Code of Civil Procedure) and the requirement of general repercussion in 
extraordinary appeals, already addressed in Chapter 4. The Superior Court of 
Justice, on its website, keeps track of the special appeals that have been considered 
as paradigms for other special appeals based upon a similar question of law. The 
Federal Regional Courts, the State Courts of Justice or any lawyer can easily see 
their progress and what has been decided in them. Concerning the requirement of 
general repercussion in extraordinary appeals, as seen in Chapter 4, once the 
decision concerning this requirement is proffered, the Chief Justice’s Office shall 
promote specific and broad publicity of the content of the decision and shall update 
the database regarding the issue.590 The website of the Federal Supreme Court 
already provides an extensive list of issues for which the general repercussion has 
already been recognised as well as a list of issues in which it has not happened.591 
As Marinoni states, this clearly “contributes to the certainty of law”.592 
 Finally, the issue of prospective decisions is also of special relevance for the 
stability and certainty of law in Brazil. Under Brazilian law, in the case of the judicial 
review of legislation, the retroactivity of the decisions that declare a law 
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unconstitutional has traditionally been the rule. As seen previously, theoretically this 
fits better with the Brazilian understanding of unconstitutional laws.593 However, as 
everyone is expected to act in accordance with the laws, which are presumably 
constitutional, there is a need to maintain confidence in the relations established 
under the aegis of them. Indeed, despite some criticism594, giving prospective effects 
to decisions of unconstitutionality has sometimes appeared to be the most 
convenient solution. Based on reasons of legal certainty or exceptional social 
interest (article 27 of Law 9868/99), the Supreme Court has often refused to 
retrospectively change the law (notwithstanding the fact that it has expressed its 
disapproval over the normative act) and has pronounced that some of its 
understandings are to be followed just for future facts or acts to be performed after 
the respective decisions. In other cases, when announcing the rule, the Supreme 
Court has simultaneously indicated a precise date from which its decision should be 
applied, and the (unconstitutional) normative act will continue to be applied for a 
certain period of time fixed by the Supreme Court itself.  
 The way the Supreme Courts acts in these cases clearly contributes to the 
certainty of law. The possibility of limiting the impact of the decision, in order to not 
reach situations prior to the decision itself, for instance, clearly enforces the certainty 
of law within the Brazilian legal system, because the decisions of unconstitutionality 
will not supposedly affect people who relied on the (un)constitutional norm. Besides, 
if it is the case of one of its decision to be applied prospectively, the Supreme Court, 
as a rule, does not leave the question of time effectiveness to be decided by the 
court where the same point of law can be discussed in the future. This also 
contributes to the certainty of law (and to the equality) because the possibility of 
different points of view about the time effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s decision 




 It is also defended that the application of the same rule in successive similar 
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cases results in the equal treatment of all who present themselves to justice.595 The 
principle of equality of all before the law is one of the strongest arguments in favour 
of the use of precedents to similar cases. Proclaimed in direct legal terms by article 
VII of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has been acclaimed as a political 
and legal dogma in the constitutions of the great majority of Western countries. It is 
also present in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, in article 5º, caput, as the first of the 
individual fundamental rights. However, the principle of equality before the law 
cannot remain only in the normative plan. It should also have a place in the solution 
of concrete cases by courts. Giving different decisions to equal or similar cases 
would not only seem to be against the law, but also arbitrary to the common man, 
who cannot conceive of two opposite decisions solving the same situation.596 As 
Dworkin defends, the force of a precedent can be explained through an appeal, not 
to implement promulgated laws, but to treat similar cases in the same way.597 
 As seen previously, the allowance of judges to freely depart from a precedent 
they consider incorrect is considered a weak point in the Brazilian legal system. The 
practice even demonstrates that judges and appellate courts see themselves as 
authorised to disregard the precedents of the Superior Court of Justice (the court 
responsible for the harmonisation of the federal law) and Federal Supreme Court, 
sometimes without even giving reasons for this.598 The fact that in many cases 
precedents are simply not followed has historically generated a significant amount of 
contradictory decisions (of courts of the same or different hierarchy and even within 
the same court) and some previous attempts to solve this problem have not proven 
sufficiently effective. 
 The coexistence of both centralised and decentralised models of judicial 
review of legislation in Brazil aggravates the problem concerning the consistency of 
the very important constitutional case law. As previously mentioned, Brazil has 
adopted the decentralised model of control but without incorporating the American 
(common law) rule of binding precedents. The absence of this rule repeatedly 
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generates conflicting decisions, with the same normative act being considered as 
constitutional by some judges and courts and unconstitutional by others. The 
problem can be much more serious if this contradiction is related, as sometimes 
occurs, to the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court (in both decentralised and 
centralised reviews), the organ expressly responsible for safeguarding the 
Constitution. Having mechanisms to harmonise the decentralised and centralised 
models, enforcing the role of the Supreme Court in both cases, is of great 
importance to reduce the problem of the absence of uniformity in issues related to 
constitutional law to an acceptable degree. 
 One of the desiderata of the Binding Súmula, which gives binding effects to 
the Supreme Court’s consolidated case law in context of the decentralised judicial 
review of legislation, for instance, is to make uniform the Brazilian constitutional case 
law. It must be remembered that among the requirements to issue a binding 
statement is the existence of a current controversy among judicial organs or between 
them and the public Administration about the validity, interpretation or efficacy of 
specific norms. With its several statements, the Binding Súmula healthily mitigates 
the variation of understandings on several questions of the law and provides 
consolidated case law upon which the judges will base their decisions. It avoids 
arbitrariness in judicial decisions in spite of the ideology or personality of the judges 
and contributes to the application of the same rule for similar cases. This 
reinforcement of the role of the Federal Supreme Court as the highest national court 
clearly strengthens the principle of equality of all before the law.  
To conclude this topic, some words on the question of the development of law 
are necessary. Certainly, in Brazil or in England, stability, certainty and equality must 
always be balanced with the question of the development of law. It would certainly 
be wrong to think that, based on the doctrine of stare decisis or any other argument 
of justice, similar cases will be necessarily decided in the same way forever. The 
arguments of stability, certainty and equality cannot be taken as absolute. Previous 
decisions should not be constantly regretted and the case law changed, but some 





challenge the ratio decidendi (fundamentals) of a precedent and show that a different 




 Finally, it is said that the use of an established criterion for the solution of new 
cases saves time and energy.600 A leitmotif in the history of the judicial process is its 
duration. The time required for the delivery of the final decision was always seen as 
something that brings appreciable harm to the parties, especially to the one who, in 
the face of the dispute, is not with the goods or property in dispute “in hands”.601 In 
Brazil, although the situation has improved recently, historically the long delays in 
getting the final decisions have led to staunch criticism from lawyers and citizens. 
Everyone has demanded that courts hand out justice more quickly, recognising that 
these delays not only undermine the Judiciary but also destroy the people’s 
confidence in the legal system as a whole. 
One of the greatest problems related to the issue of the judicial process’s 
duration in Brazil is the amount of cases that Brazilian courts should manage with a 
limited budget and limited human resources. This amount is enormous. Considering 
the three most important branches of the Brazilian Judiciary (the State Courts, the 
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Federal Courts and the Labour Courts), around 83.4 million lawsuits were processed 
in 2010 (more than 70% were filed before this year, that is, were already pending in 
early 2010).602 Fortunately, this number represents a decrease if compared with the 
86.6 million in 2009.603604 
The caseload – that is, the amount of lawsuits each magistrate has to rule on, 
on average, every year – is a cause for great concern. According to Justice in 
Numbers 2010 (a report prepared by the Brazilian National Council of Justice), on 
average in 2010, each judge of 1st instance of the Brazilian Judicial Power had 5,423 
lawsuits that could be ruled on.605 In the 2nd instance (appellate courts), each judge 
had, in the same year, on average 2,819 lawsuits to rule on. In the case of the 2nd 
instance, the indicator varies considerably from 1,877 lawsuits in the Labour Courts 
up to 11,896 lawsuits in the Federal Courts (the highest caseload indicator in the 2nd 
instance of the Brazilian Judicial Power).606 
Another problem is the backlog rate – that is, the indicator used to measure, 
in a given year, the percentage of lawsuits being processed which have not been 
closed – that is also extremely high. According to Justice in Numbers 2010, the 1st 
instance courts of the Brazilian Judiciary had, in 2010, a backlog rate of 58% for pre-
trial lawsuits, that is, out of 100 lawsuits being processed in the system in that year, 
approximately 58 were not finally referred (or were not referred to the execution 
stage). The highest percentages were found in State and Federal Courts (60% and 
58%, respectively)607. The backlog rate for execution stage lawsuits is even higher. 
The 1st instance courts of the Brazilian Judiciary had, in 2010, a backlog rate of 84% 
for execution stage lawsuits (that is, out of 100 lawsuits being processed, 
approximately 84 were not closed). The highest percentage values were again found 
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in the State and Federal Courts (86% and 85%, respectively).608,609,610 In the 2nd 
instance, on average, the backlog rate for lawsuits was 50% in 2010. The numbers 
differ when considering the branch of Judicial Power: 48% in State Courts of Justice, 
68% in Federal Regional Courts and 28% in Labour Regional Courts.611 In 2010, the 
general backlog rate of the Brazilian Judiciary, considering both courts of 1st and 2nd 
instances, was 70%. The higher backlog rate, of 72%, was found in state courts; the 
lower, of only 49%, in labour courts.612 
Taking into consideration this unfortunate background, there has been an 
increasing demand for Brazilian courts to hand out justice more quickly. It is 
considered a fundamental goal to be pursued with the adoption of measures to 
prevent procrastinated situations and mechanisms to save time in the solution of 
cases. 
The doctrine of stare decisis, for the practicality that exists in the reproduction 
of criteria, formulas or principles previously worked, is a great mechanism for 
reaching this objective.613 A rule of stare decisis admittedly avoids responsibilities 
and difficulties and saves time for the judge.614 As precedents represent not only the 
experience of the judges, but also their different talents and expertise, they enable 
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judges to draw on the knowledge of its peers. Based upon this economical and 
healthy way of thought, the expenditure of intellectual work that is always involved in 
the search for the correct decision often can be avoided by giving the decision 
accordingly to a principle which has already been found.615 If the same issue has 
already been decided many times before, the judge, instead of reconsidering it, can 
apply the precedents (which is usually a much simpler task) and use his/her time and 
capability to study and decide other issues, sometimes more relevant, for which 
there are no firm precedents. 
To fulfil this idea of a swifter justice, some binding precedents are very 
important to the specialised branches of the Brazilian Judiciary. The normative 
power of the Brazilian Electoral Courts was referred to in Chapter 4. Normative 
resolutions delivered by the Superior Electoral Court bind all Regional Electoral 
Courts and electoral judges; if given by a Regional Electoral Court, they bind the 
court itself and the electoral courts of its own jurisdiction. These resolutions are 
invariably followed based on the certainty of the futility of opposing an understanding 
of a superior or regional court, during the time of electoral proceeding (expedited by 
nature). Taking into consideration the Brazilian experience, these resolutions have 
an indisputable history of success. They democratically predict electoral law and 
contribute enormously to reduce the quantity of disputes and accelerate 
adjudications, among other things.616 The same can be said concerning the Labour 
Courts and the “normative sentence” (referred in articles 5º, XXI and 114 of the 
Federal Constitution and regulated in articles 868 to 871 of the Consolidation of 
Labour Laws). Through a normative sentence, an appellate Labour Court or the 
Superior Labour Court (at national level), in case of collective disputes, may 
establish new labour conditions and extend these conditions to all employees of the 
company in the same profession, even those that do not participate in the 
bargaining. The extension may still be larger, covering all employees of the same 
professional category within the jurisdiction of the court, provided it fulfils the 
requirements of articles 869 and 870617 of the Consolidation of Labour Laws. The 
normative sentence binds the inferior courts, which must appreciate further individual 
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actions in accordance with the provisions of the normative sentence. Its success was 
recognised by the Federal Constitution of 1998 that referred to it as an instrument to 
assure labour as well as fundamental rights.  
Currently, after the Constitutional Amendment 45/2004, the Federal 
Constitution, article 5º, LXXVIII, defines as a fundamental right the reasonable length 
of proceedings and the means to guarantee this to everyone, both in the judicial and 
administrative spheres. Considering both the points of view of the consumer of the 
judicial services and of the Judiciary itself, there will be no due access to justice if a 
final judicial decision is given lately.618  
Not coincidently, after the Constitutional Amendment 45/2004 and the 
implementation of some measures, such as the adoption of several categories of 
binding precedents, most of the indicators concerning the functionality of the 
Brazilian Judicial Power have improved significantly. 
First of all, according to Justice in Number 2010, considering the State, 
Federal and Labour Courts, there was a decrease in the number of lawsuits 
processed by year if comparing 2010 and 2009: 83.4 million lawsuits were 
processed in 2010;619 there were 86.6 million in 2009.620  
Secondly, a reduction of 3.9% was verified when comparing the amount of 
new cases filed in 2010 and 2009. In Federal Courts the percentage of reduction 
was more significant: 6.1%. In State Courts and Labour Courts, the percentages of 
reduction were 3.5% and 3.9%, respectively. These specific figures also suggest an 
improvement in terms of stability and certainty in the Brazilian law as a whole. 
Thirdly, comparing 2010 with 2009, there was a decrease of 6.6% in the 
amount of new lawsuits per judge.621 This confirms the positive figures verified by 
comparing 2009 and 2008, when there was a decrease of 12.75% in the amount of 
new lawsuits per judge.622 This double decrease has inverted a historical trend, 
observed in the period 2004-08, which had indicated an average growth of around 
2% per year. This could signify a definitive turning point in the increase of new cases 
in Brazil, possibly leading towards the stabilisation of the figures. 
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Fourthly, the indicator of lawsuits referred per new lawsuit in the 1st instance 
in 2010 was positive, at 104%623, numerically demonstrating that more lawsuits were 
referred to the next stage than were filed in the year, with positive effects in the 
backlog rate. In 2010, State, Federal and Labour 1st instance courts obtained a 
positive balance as regards the indicator of lawsuits referred per new lawsuit: 111%, 
106% and 104%, respectively.624 Concerning the 2nd instance, with respect to the 
indicator of lawsuits referred per new lawsuit, Federal Regional Courts and Labour 
Regional Courts achieved positive percentages: 100% and 104%, respectively. State 
Appellate Courts had more trouble handling its stock of lawsuits, achieving a 
percentage of around 92%.625 With the general indicator of 104%, Justice in 
Numbers 2010 shows that the Brazilian Judicial Power achieved the goal of referring 
more lawsuits than those filed in the same year.626 
Fifthly, concerning the backlog rates, the figures also improved from 2009 to 
2010. According to the Justice in Numbers 2010627, the 1st instance courts of the 
Brazilian Judiciary had, in 2010, a backlog rate of 58% for pre-trial lawsuits; in 2009, 
according to the Justice in Numbers 2009628, it was 59.6%. In 2010, for execution 
stage lawsuits in 1st instance courts, the backlog rate was 84%; in 2009, 86.6%. In 
the 2nd instance, on average, the backlog rate for lawsuits was 50% in 2010; in 2009, 
51.7%. In 2010, the general backlog rate of the Brazilian Judiciary was 70% 
compared with 71% of 2009. This decrease, although small, seems to break a trend 
that has been stable since 2004. 
Justice in Numbers 2010 also contains data on the rate of electronic lawsuit 
filing, which shows the level of computer technology adherence of the Brazilian 
Judicial Power, a very important tool in terms of a future swifter justice. Considering 
the percentage of new electronic lawsuits in the total number of new lawsuits filed in 
one year, it has been possible to observe that Federal Courts have been working in 
a progressive way regarding the implementation of virtual lawsuits, with indices 
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ranging from 43% in the courts of the 3rd Region to 82% in the courts of the 5th 
Region.629,630 
The new approach to binding precedents in Brazil has helped to improve the 
decision-making and is certainly contributing to this improvement of the figures of the 
Brazilian Judicial Power. The procedural mechanism created for the case of multiple 
special appeals based upon a similar question – a new category of binding 
precedent, since the Federal Regional Courts and the State Courts of Justice courts, 
in pending cases, are bound by the understanding established by the Superior Court 
of Justice – is a good example of this. This new proceeding for the special appeals, 
above all, works to relieve the Superior Court of Justice, the Federal Regional Courts 
and the State Courts of Justice from some of their traditional duties. Thus, these 
courts can focus on what they consider more important issues with more quality and 
speed. 
Another good example is the requirement of general repercussion in 
extraordinary appeals. Under the new procedural-constitutional mechanism, the 
decision of the Federal Supreme Court, accessing the admissibility of extraordinary 
appeals in a paradigmatic situation, will bind the Court itself and all the inferior 
courts, when accessing the admissibility of extraordinary appeals in similar cases. If 
the general repercussion is not recognised, all extraordinary appeals regarding the 
same issue, both those that are in the Supreme Court and those that were halted by 
the inferior courts, will be promptly dismissed. As already seen, according to the 
Federal Supreme Court – Report 2011, until (and including) that year, 509 issues of 
general repercussion had been accessed by the Court. Among them, 251 had been 
definitively decided, either because the Supreme Court had not recognised the 
general repercussion in the given situation or because the Court had recognised and 
also decided the merits of the extraordinary appeal(s). On the other hand, in 258 
cases the general repercussion had been recognised but these cases were waiting 
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for the decision on the merits.631 According to the Federal Supreme Court – Report 
2011, only in 2011, the requirement of general repercussion was analysed in 146 
cases. In 108 of them, the requirement was recognised, while in 38 it was not. 
Besides, 38 cases, which previously had had their general repercussions 
recognised, received decisions on the merits. This represents twice the figures of 
2010 (19 cases). These positive figures of 2011 can be attributed to the Regimental 
Amendment 42 (of 2 December 2010). This Amendment introduced the new article 
323-A into the Supreme Court’s Internal Regulation and allowed that the merits of 
the cases with general repercussion could be decided by the “Virtual Full Bench” (or 
“Virtual Plenary”).632 Indeed, out of the 38 decision on the merits in 2011, 17 were 
taken by the Virtual Full Bench.633 
The idea behind the requirement of general repercussion is that only the really 
relevant questions will be finally decided by the Federal Supreme Court and not what 
is simple nonconformity of the losing parties (as important as their issues are for 
them), in order to improve, by decreasing the demand upon it, the Court’s quality of 
adjudication. It has worked to drastically reduce the number of extraordinary appeals 
in the Court and has created promising prospects for the decentralised judicial 
review of legislation in Brazil, especially regarding the role of the Supreme Court as 
the Brazilian Constitutional Court. 
Besides, concerning the requirement of general repercussion, the joint work of 
all Brazilian courts must be highlighted. In order to manage the issue of general 
repercussion properly, under the supervision of the Federal Supreme Court, all 
Brazilian courts have established a fruitful system of cooperation. The courts of 
origin have great responsibility for the success of the mechanism of general 
repercussion in extraordinary appeals. They are responsible for identifying the issues 
that will be forwarded and judged by the Supreme Court. They are also responsible 
for choosing the representative extraordinary appeals to be sent to the Supreme 
Court and halt the other appeals that have dealt with the same legal theme.  
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According to the Federal Supreme Court – Report 2011, with the definitive 
decisions concerning the general repercussion in 2011, the Superior Court of 
Justice, the Superior Labour Court, the Federal Regional Courts of the 2nd, 3rd and 
4th regions and at least eight State Courts of Justice were able to promptly decide 
about 70,000 cases concerning some relevant themes. This number was obtained 
through a survey in only thirteen courts and is probably much bigger. But this data, 
although incomplete, shows the impact of decisions proffered by the Supreme Court 
concerning the general repercussion of extraordinary appeals. To better illustrate 
this, the decision on merits in the General Repercussion Theme 4 (concerning the 
statute of limitations and the term a quo to file lawsuits to be repaid in case of tax 
unduly paid previously) enabled the Superior Court of Justice and the Federal 
Regional Court of the 4th Region to immediately judge more than 10,000 cases. The 
decision on merits of Theme 88 (concerning the formula to establish the value of 
pensions for retirement for health reasons) made possible the Federal Small Claim 
Courts to judge about 40,000 cases related to this matter.634 
The Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula is another important tool to 
accelerate the adjudication of justice. Although there were other motives, the 
creation of Binding Súmula by Constitutional Amendment number 45/200 (regulated 
Law 11417/2006) aimed to reduce the delay in the adjudication of law in Brazil.635 
There is no question about the usefulness of the Binding Súmula for this. One has to 
bear in mind that in Brazil a reduction in the number of controversies can be possible 
with the adoption of the model of Binding Súmula, because there are thousands and 
thousands of cases that come to courts that deal with identical or similar legal 
questions. They represent a great percentage in the number of cases in all Brazilian 
courts. Where an understanding concerning a legal question is firmly incorporated in 
the Súmula, cases that deal with the same question will unlikely go to courts or, at 
least, go through the lengthy (almost “eternal”) process of successive appeals in 
Brazil.636 
As already mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, the adoption of new constitutional-
procedural mechanisms, such as the Binding Súmula and the requirement of general 
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repercussion in extraordinary appeals, has already lead to an enormous reduction in 
the number of cases, dealing with identical or similar questions of law, before the 
Federal Supreme Court. Comparing the period of crisis in the 1990s and at the 
beginning of this century, when the number of cases before the Supreme Court 
reached insupportable figures, the situation now has clearly improved. As already 
seen, in 2006 127,535 cases arrived at the Supreme Court. In 2011, there were 
63,427.637 As a consequence, the number of cases in trial before the Federal 
Supreme Court has also decreased. In 2006, there were 150,001, and in 2011 – 
67.395.638 Comparing 2006 to 2011, it is possible to see a reduction of around 55% 
in the number of cases in trial before the Supreme Court. This healthy reduction in 
the number of procedures, for the first time in decades, has allowed the Federal 
Supreme Court to exercise its constitutional role more effectively.  
 
(v) 2012 and beyond: perspectives in terms of time-saving   
 
As seen previously, the Binding Súmula and the requirement of general 
repercussion in extraordinary appeals in over just a few years of effectiveness have 
already changed the profile of the judgments of the Federal Supreme Court. They 
have strengthened the role of the Supreme Court as the Brazilian Constitutional 
Court.639 
The Federal Supreme Court really believes in the success of these two new 
Brazilian procedural mechanisms. The issues of Binding Súmula and general 
repercussion in extraordinary appeals have received the priority attention of the 
Court that changed its Internal Regulation and created two specific commissions (the 
Court’s Commission of Case Law and the Court’s Commission of General 
Repercussion) to specifically deal with them. The Court has also given all the 
administrative support for the development of both constitutional-procedural 
mechanisms. 
Concerning the Binding Súmula, apart from the current thirty one binding 
statements, there are several proposals for new binding statements. Considering the 
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date of 15 April 2012, a browse through the Federal Supreme Court’s webpage 
shows that the figures have reached a total of 71 binding statement proposals 
(known as “PSV” or “Proposta de Súmula Vinculante”). This represents a very good 
prospect for the future. 
With regards to the general repercussion in extraordinary appeals, according 
to the Supreme Court’s former Chief Justice Cezar Peluso, it has already been 
identified that the Superior Court of Justice, the Superior Labour Court, the Federal 
Regional Courts of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th regions have around 190,000 extraordinary 
appeals concerning themes that are waiting the decision about their general 
repercussion. The decision of these themes is in the agenda for 2012.640 From the 
Federal Small Claim Courts of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th regions, it was also identified 
that about 150,000 cases are linked with only nine themes that are waiting the 
respective decisions concerning the general repercussion. To give an idea of this, 
themes 264, 265, 284 and 285 together represent 84,320 cases; Theme 313, 24,893 
cases; Theme 163, 18,927 cases; Theme 96, 8,211 cases; Theme 351, 12,205 
cases; and Theme 191, 6,186 cases. These themes are also in the agenda for 
2012.641 
Besides, in order to focus on the cases of general repercussion that can have 
the greatest impact (in terms of quantity of related extraordinary appeals), for 2012 
the Federal Supreme Court has initiated research before other Brazilian courts to 
gain a broader picture of the issue. It has already been noticed that some courts do 
not have the appropriate resources to manage their data. Meanwhile, the Supreme 
Court has started a partnership with the Department of Judiciary Research of the 
National Council of Justice, to better understand the reality of each court and the 
difficulties they face in collecting data and dealing with the respective backlogs. The 
goal is, articulated with the National Council of Justice, to help all courts to overcome 
the identified difficulties. It was also requested that the National Council of Justice 
conduct a new project of “Electronic Judicial Process” that should contemplate tools 
to specifically deal with the issue of general repercussion.642  
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6.4 Strong Points of the Brazilian Model of Precedents 
 
6.4.1 General Considerations 
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the increased use of precedents 
has helped to improve decision-making in Brazil. It is now time to emphasise that the 
Brazilian mix of civil and common law elements has proved a very synergic model, 
and that this cross-cultural Brazilian experience can play a role in developing the 
theory of precedents in both civil and common law legal worlds. After all, as 
Castellucci states: 
 
Lawyers, scholars, courts working in ‘classical’ mixed jurisdictions, as well as 
the scholars devoted to the comparative study of those mixed systems have 
been to some extent – knowingly or not – an avant-garde of comparative law, 
and of Western law in general. They have at least played a role in developing 
a civil law/common law dual legal language for the western world. Most of all, 
they have been involved in dynamics now clearly identifiable in many or all 
legal systems belonging to the WLT: soon every western lawyer might have to 
learn to reason as ‘classical’ mixed jurists do.643 
 
It should be said that this thesis does not intend to demonstrate that the 
Brazilian model of precedents is superior to the English model or vice-versa and, 
therefore, one of them should abandon its legal tradition through a radical transplant. 
However, reflecting on the purposes presented in the introductory chapter, this thesis 
can also be used as a tool for those dealing with law reform. As Steiner says, “law 
reform in common law jurisdictions increasingly concerns itself with examination of 
the legal method employed by Continental legal systems (...)”.644 
Revisiting and developing ideas already addressed in previous chapters, this 
topic will focus on three aspects of the Brazilian law: (i) the greater simplicity of the 
new Brazilian model of Binding Súmula if compared with the common law doctrine of 
stare decisis; (ii) the good access to precedents in Brazilian law; (iii) and the good 
balance between statutes and precedents as established by the model of Binding 
Súmula, emphasising the question of the legitimacy of the judicial law-making in 
Brazil. 
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6.4.2 The Simplicity of the Model of Binding Súmula 
 
This topic seeks to emphasise the greater simplicity of the new Brazilian 
model of Binding Súmula when compared with the common law doctrine of stare 
decisis. It is frequently said that common law doctrine of stare decisis is complex, 
and sometimes is a real challenge to find the suitable precedent for the case in trial. 
It is also said that one of the reasons for this is the notorious inconsistency of the 
concept of ratio decidendi in English Courts.645 Rather than what many people 
believe to be true, the only part of a precedent which is binding is the ratio decidendi 
or the reason for deciding.646,647 If a proposition that is part of the decision is not part 
of its ratio decidendi, it is dictum (or obiter dictum) and, consequently, not binding. 
Consequently, the first task that a common lawyer must do when analysing a 
precedent is to try to identify what propositions really constitute its ratio decidendi, 
distinguishing it from the mere obiter dicta. However, on many occasions, as 
Duxbury states, “the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, although 
important, is not easily made”.648  
Besides, a precedent is binding for the decision of identical cases because 
the individual norm it represents can be generalised. This generalisation – that is, the 
formulation of the general norm or principle – could be realised by the court that 
actually creates the precedent, but in England it is left to the courts that find 
themselves apparently bound by the precedent. It cannot be denied that different 
courts can generalise the decision that constitutes the precedent in different 
manners.649 
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In comparison, the new Brazilian Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula 
seems less intricate and, above all, the challenging task of differing ratio decidendi 
and obiter dicta does not seem to be a problem. 
As seen in Chapter 5, the Binding Súmula refers to a set of case law that 
dominates the Supreme Court, including the various branches of law, organised by 
numbered annotations related to defined legal themes. Each statement of the 
Federal Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula is a consolidation of several judgements 
that gives a clear and secure understanding of what is already dominant in the Court. 
Most importantly, while the binding precedent is an answer, in the form of a judicial 
decision, to a concrete case, that has a ratio decidendi and obiter dicta (and also the 
facts of the case), aspects that need to be duly distinguished to verify what is truly 
important or not, each statement of the Binding Súmula, as already seen, is a true 
extract of essentially legal content, consolidating the interpretation of the question of 
law as established by previous decisions in the same sense. As also mentioned 
previously, a single binding statement, encapsulating a given legal question, should 
be short, direct and clear. It does not have (or are not to have) affirmations a latere 
or obiter dicta, and all of its content should be considered essential.  
Indeed, at first sight, the categories ratio decidendi and obiter dicta do not 
have to be duly distinguished, in a binding statement, to verify which is to be followed 
or not. Certainly, judges in Brazil must examine the statement with scrupulous care 
to ascertain whether and how they can legitimately apply what is expressed in it. 
They must achieve a coherent and just reasoning that can be appropriate to the case 
in trial. But everything that was stated should be evaluated and can be cited as the 
motivation or principle in the later court’s decision. By not having to distinguish ratio 
decidendi and obiter dicta, Brazilian courts avoid difficult situations.  
Should it be the case of adopting something similar in the English law? In the 
near future, should an official binding Súmula - with several statements, presenting a 
previous, clear and secure understanding of what is already consolidated in the court 
- be introduced in the United Kingdom Supreme Court to overcome the challenge of 
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distinguishing ratio decidendi and obiter dicta of its case law? Would this súmula be 
a good point of reference in the extensive and exhaustive case law research in 
England? Would the model of súmula harmonise with the tradition and particularities 
of the English law? 
 It should be reiterated that this thesis does not intend to affirm that the 
Brazilian model of Binding Súmula is superior to the long-established English model 
of precedents. This would be preposterous. However, these challenging questions 
can be posed, for future debate, concerning England or any other legal systems, 
independently of whether they are linked to the common law or civil law traditions. 
This thesis does not aim to answer this kind of challenging question. Nevertheless, 
achieving one of the fundamental goals referred to in the introductory chapter, the 
knowledge that it offers can certainly be used as a source for researchers or those 
interested in law reform, with regards to the issue of precedents, in England or 
elsewhere. 
 
6.4.3 Access to Precedents 
 
As seen in Chapter 3, in spite of the great amount of decisions pronounced in 
Brazil, a sophisticated official system of law reporting (reliable and easily accessible) 
is being progressively developed with the decisive participation of the Brazilian 
courts and government bodies.650 Brazilian courts have designated specialised 
personnel to revise their own decisions and report all the necessary aspects of them. 
Although oversights occasionally occur, courts have achieved a very good knowhow 
in reporting cases with the support of electronic and online tools that are currently 
generally reliable. Lawyers in Brazil often prefer to consult these official law reports, 
motivated by the fact that they are updated and their structure is very rational, not to 
mention that these law reports are online, which makes the search much easier.  
The argument for official reports for all superior courts, both in Brazil and in 
England, is very powerful.651,652 Certainly, it is one of the ideas behind the “new” 
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system of neutral citation in England. Since 2001, the House of Lords (now the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court), the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal and the 
High Court of Justice (partially since 2002) have been issuing decisions with neutral 
citations653, which identify decisions independently of any traditional series of 
reports. 
Although the neutral citation can be seen as a great step in the process of 
publicising the way of deliverance and citation of decisions in England, in general 
terms, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the English law reporting system continues to be 
a private enterprise. Because of an enormous quantity of cases in England and the 
evident problem of editorial discretion, sometimes it is extremely difficult to find the 
suitable precedent for cases in trial, even with the currently available technology.654 
In the past, erroneous decisions were given because relevant cases were not 
brought to the attention of the court. It also occurs that the same case could be 
reported in more than one publisher, with some relevant discrepancies, which 
provokes a lack of authenticity in these reports.655 This diversity of law reports have 
lead the system into a state whereby courts have been oppressed with a weight of 
sometimes impertinent or inconsistent authority, with the result that it has produced a 
decrease in the efficiency and reliability of litigation in England.656 
The Brazilian (official) free online access to precedents must also be 
highlighted.657 The amount of decided cases in Brazil is immeasurable and it is 
extremely difficult to research and find the suitable precedent from the printed forms 
of any law report. To supersede this difficulty, Brazilian Courts – including the 
Supreme Court, the superior courts, the federal courts and several state courts658 – 
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have systematically built more sophisticated online access tools (on their respective 
websites) to accurately publish their case law. As seen in Chapter 3, the idea is to 
collect all cases decided by the Brazilian courts, classifying them through a scheme 
of descriptors and numbers. These decisions are saved in an online database linked 
by topics according to the scheme descriptors and/or numbers. On the web pages, 
by searching for descriptors or numbers, researchers can find several cases related 
to issues of their interest. Identifying the case, they can consult the full version of the 
decision on the court web page. Despite the possible failures of the system of 
classification, any experienced lawyer can, in a short time, put together, with few 
exceptions, all the cases judged by a given court on a certain point of law. 
More specifically, it can be mentioned that, for the issue of multiplicity of 
special appeals based upon a similar question of law (regulated by Law 11672/08, 
which altered the Code of Civil Procedure, as seen in Chapter 4), the Superior Court 
of Justice, on its website659, keeps track of the special appeals that have received 
the quality of paradigm for other similar special appeals. Consequently, the Federal 
Regional Courts, the State Courts of Justice or any lawyer can easily see their 
progress and what has been decided on the several matters. As previously seen in 
Chapter 4, concerning the requirement of general repercussion in extraordinary 
appeals, the Supreme Court Chief Justice’s Office shall promote specific and broad 
publicising of the content of the decisions concerning this requirement and shall 
update the respective database.660 The Federal Supreme Court’s webpage661 
provides an extensive list of issues for which the general repercussion has already 
been recognised as well as a list of issues in which it has not happened.662 
Upgraded in 2009, the system also allows everyone to have access to the themes 
that are being analysed and consult both the rapporteur’s opinion and the final 
decision of the Supreme Court’ Full Bench.663 Finally, with regards to the Supreme 
Court’s Binding Súmula, in practice it is nothing more than an index, composed of 
                                                 
659
 That is www.stj.jus.br. 
660
 See the Internal Regulation of the Federal Supreme Court, article 329. 
661
 That is www.stf.jus.br. 
662
 Until (and including) 2011, 509 issues of general repercussion had been accessed by the Supreme 
Court. See Supremo Tribunal Federal (2011, p. 49). 
663
 Actually, as seen in Chapter 4, based on the provisions of Law 11419/2006 and the Internal 
Regulation of the Federal Supreme Court, the entire procedure and judgment of the general 





several statements, that presents the Supreme Court’s solid case law on several 
legal issues. Through the Súmula, this case law is easily identified by a simple 
Internet search. The creation and periodical upgrade of these electronic/online tools 
is fundamental to the success of both procedural mechanisms. This is also part of a 
broader policy developed by the Brazilian Judiciary following the recommendations 
of Law 11419/2006, which disciplines the use of electronic media in the transmission 
of records, documents and communication of procedural acts, configuring a very 
important innovation in the Brazilian judicial process.664 
In summary, the Brazilian example has demonstrated that it is possible to 
produce reliable free online official law reports. Brazilian courts have trained 
specialised personnel to perform this task. With the support of electronic and online 
tools that are currently generally available, although oversights occasionally occur, 
Brazilian courts have ensured broad, authentic and accurate free online access to 
their case law. 
 
6.4.4 The Balance between Statutes and Precedents 
 
 What is the nature of the relationship between precedents and legislation in 
legal system, such as that of Brazil, which has traditionally emphasised the statute 
law? Has Brazil reached a good balance between legislation and precedents? How 
in such a legal system can judicial law-making be legitimated? These are some of 
the questions that this final topic – and this thesis as a whole – seeks to address. But 
these questions could not be fully addressed without first giving, as this thesis did, a 
complete account of how precedents are understood and how they operate in Brazil. 
As seen throughout this thesis, in the past 20 years Brazil has progressively 
turned to common law countries in order to borrow ideas for the improvement of its 
legal system, especially a wider use of binding precedents. Based upon this new 
knowledge, Brazil has attempted to develop a doctrine of binding precedents in 
which the concepts and modus operandi do not affront the Brazilian historical, 
philosophical and legal backgrounds. 
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Many mechanisms that encapsulate a rule of binding precedents have been 
introduced into Brazilian law, most of them being discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, the 
Federal Supreme Court Binding Súmula (discussed in Chapter 5) is the climax of this 
progress towards an original mixed approach to precedents. This newly created 
Binding Súmula, it is important to note, is just the most recent step in a legal system 
that has recently approached the common law world, despite its historical adoption 
of statutory and codified law such as in Continental Europe.665 
The last two decades have also seen an increase in the use of precedents in 
terms of frequency and creativity. As seen in Chapter 2, courts and judges’ decisions 
nowadays rather infrequently refer only to the Constitution or the relevant statutes. 
Statutory provisions are frequently addressed by means of the discussion of relevant 
precedents. In this case, precedents have given support to the legislation, which 
gains persuasive force when embodied in one or more precedents. Precedents are 
also used as one of the main grounds of judicial decisions. In fields of law less 
comprehensively regulated by legislative provisions, precedents clearly play a very 
significant role. Besides, since the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Courts 
mainly deal with issues of law, precedents really play a very important role in the 
rationale of their judgments. 
This scenario clearly has challenged the myth that affirms the doctrine of 
binding precedent or stare decisis is an exclusive common law practice.666 The 
Brazilian experience has shown that the bindingness of judicial decisions is a 
characteristic freely auto-attributed by any legal system in order to achieve values 
such as stability, legal certainty, equality and speed in judicial decisions. In other 
words, the adoption of a rule of stare decisis by a legal system does not request its 
historical association with the common law tradition. The Brazilian experience has 
also put aside the myth that states that civil law judges, in terms of the creativity of 
their decisions, perform a different role when compared with their common law 
counterparts. Judicial reasoning, anywhere, is a much more sophisticated process 
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than the simple act of declaring what the law is. The rules laid down by Brazilian 
judges sometimes go far beyond the limits of the cases from which they are derived. 
In Brazil, it is becoming quite clear that judges also make the law, and it can be 
proved by the evidence that some areas in Brazilian law, which were not originally 
statute regulated, have been considerably developed by case law.  
 It is also interesting to note that the Federal Supreme Court has pointed out 
the similarity that exists between legislation and precedents in the context of the 
Brazilian legal system. Frequently, the Court, with respect to the rationale of its 
decision, has considered the established case law as a true source of law. In this 
case, the Supreme Court has understood the “law” not only in the strictly formal 
meaning of legislative rules, but also in the substantive meaning of both legislative 
and judicial-making norms. In short, according to the Supreme Court, both legislation 
and precedents are “law” from a material perspective.667 Actually, as a rule, in the 
style contemporarily adopted by judges in Brazil, statutes and precedents are both 
equally stated as the basis for their decisions. 
 Indeed, it seems that Brazil is effectively reaching a very good balance 
between legislation and precedents. Let us take the example of the Federal 
Supreme Court’s Binding Súmula. There is no doubt that the Súmula represents a 
rupture with the tradition that has existed in Brazil (and in other countries that abide 
by Roman-Germanic tradition) based on legislative standards.668 However, as seen 
in Chapter 5, the model of the Súmula (or a statement of it) differs from the binding 
precedent in the common law doctrine of stare decisis.669 
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Most importantly, the Binding Súmula has a fundamental characteristic that is 
very suitable to a legal system, such as the Brazilian one, related to the civil law 
tradition: the validity of the statements of the Súmula is always conditioned by the 
support they have on the legislated norm.670 As seen in Chapter 5, it is true that 
there are several types of statements: merely declaratory (which basically repeats 
the text of law), intra legem (which, once there is a legislative provision for the 
theme, interprets it properly within the limits already established in the legal system) 
and extra legem (which fills in the blanks left by the legislation or extends the limits 
established by it).  However, all of them were linked with legislated norms or norms 
that should have been legislated (in this case, exactly because the norms were not 
legislated there is the statement), “repeating” their texts, interpreting them, occupying 
the spaces left by them or expanding the limits previously established by them. 
A binding statement’s stability will depend on the stability of the subjacent 
principle of the legislated norm to which it is related. Generally, a binding statement 
will not survive if the legislated norm that it refers to is changed (or a diverse norm is 
created, in case of a previous absence), so that the statement and the new text are 
incompatible. The statement can only survive if the change does not affect the 
subjacent principle according to which the statement was created.671,672 Furthermore, 
article 5º of Law 11417/06, which regulates the issue, states the possibility of 
revision or cancellation of a binding statement that becomes incompatible with the 
legislative norms (including the Constitution). This possibility of reviewing or 
cancelling a binding statement is extremely relevant. The statement can be 
conformed to the actual needs of the law and society, which are always in 
continuous transformation. Otherwise, it is possible to face the abnormal situation of 
having, at the same time, a binding statement which was not revised or cancelled (so 
it is binding for a constitutional command) and a statute with incompatible provisions 
with this statement. 
Indeed, the Binding Súmula is not a case of simple adoption of a foreign 
model, preached by enthusiasts of foreign law. Considering the non-binding Súmula 
created in the 1960’s, the Súmula model has a history of achievements in Brazil. The 
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classical non-binding Súmula has always been the object of profuse praise and 
considered “a compass in an extensive and exhaustive case law jungle”.673 Based 
on this history, the creation of the Supreme Court Binding Súmula presents a strong 
compatibly with the Brazilian legal traditions. Preserving the decentralised judicial 
review of legislation, more adequate to the continental dimensions of Brazil, the 
Binding Súmula was the solution found to give a reasonable degree of uniformity to 
the Brazilian constitutional case law. At the same time, it keeps the link between the 
Brazilian legal system and the civil law tradition, marked by the statute law’s 
fundamental role, because, as already seen, any changes in the legislation can imply 
the cancelling or alteration of the pertinent binding statement.674  
 Once recognised this reality, a point for further discussion is the question of 
the legitimacy of the judicial law-making in Brazil. Certainly, this question of the limits 
of judicial power in creating law is not exclusive to Brazil. In France, for instance, 
Steiner says that “the question has become not so much whether jurisprudence 
[case law] is a source law, but rather what is the source of legitimacy for 
jurisprudence”.675,676 In all legal systems of civil law background, such as France and 
Brazil, there has been a similar defiance to the expansion of judicial law making.677 
 Firstly, the legitimacy of binding and creative precedents in Brazil depends on 
the factors/standards of performance improvement in the deliverance of justice that 
were addressed earlier in this chapter: stability, certainty, equality and speed, among 
others. The achievement of better standards of stability, certainty, equality and 
speed, by a proper manipulation of precedents in the practice of the courts, can 
decisively contribute to placing greater weight on the role of precedents in Brazil. 
Unarguably, as seen in this chapter, concerning these standards, the Brazilian 
judicial system has recently undergone positive qualitative changes. 
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Secondly, according to some authors, “what justifies judicial law making is the 
implicit acceptance of precedents by the legislature. Through its silence and inaction 
the legislature implicitly accepts that precedents are law. This is further confirmed by 
the fact that, very often, the legislature adopts a precedent by converting it into 
legislation”.678 In Brazil, important judicial decisions often lead (and are used as the 
ground) for subsequent legislation. More importantly, it is with the clear support of 
the Brazilian Lawmaker (including those that created and those that reformed the 
Federal Constitution), as seen throughout this thesis, that several rules of stare 
decisis are being incorporated into Brazilian law. 
Thirdly, some say that is “a consensus of opinion amongst the legal 
community which validates judicial law making. According to Maury this consensus is 
formed from recognition of the validity of precedents arising out of their acceptance 
by the legal community and the public at large or, even, out of the absence of any 
opposition to them. Thus, according to this view, judges in following precedents – 
and practitioners by using them in court – both ‘adhere’ to the binding character of 
precedent”.679 All involved in the Brazilian legal community – which includes the 
Legislator, the Federal Supreme Court, the superior courts, the appellate courts, 
judges, lawyers, scholars and parties in general – are arriving at the same point.  
The judicial decisions enjoy the same de facto authority as any statutory text. Judges 
frequently follow them and citizens/parties consider them to be as much law as 
legislation itself is. One good example of this, mentioned in Chapter 4, is the case of 
the Resolutions of the Superior Electoral Court that are invariably followed, based 
much more on the certainty of the futility of opposing an understanding of a superior 
court during time of electoral proceedings than on the knowledge of the existence of 
a binding effect (whether it constitutionally exists or not). Furthermore, nowadays, in 
Brazilian law schools, lecturers work with the relevant judicial precedents concerning 
a specific matter (above all, those from the Federal Supreme Court) as they do with 
the pertinent legislation.680  
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There are even proposals concerting the adoption of a general rule of binding 
precedents in Brazilian law. For instance, Marinoni, a prestigious Brazilian scholar, 
proposes to incorporate into the Code of Civil Procedure the following provisions: 
 
The binding effect of the determining fundamentals of the decision: 
Article 1º – The determining fundamentals of the decision shall bind the court 
which rendered it, as well as the lower courts and judges under its jurisdiction, 
in all future cases related to them. 
Articles 2º – They shall have binding effect: 
I – The Federal Supreme Court’s decisions in decentralised or centralised 
judicial review of legislation; 
II – The Superior Court of Justice’s decisions that reached an understanding 
on the interpretation of the federal legislation; 
III – The decisions of the state appellate courts of justice and of the federal 
regional courts that, in the incident to declare the unconstitutionality of a 
normative act in decentralised judicial review of legislation or in the incident of 
standardisation of case law of the Code of Civil Procedure, defined the 
respective constitutional question and controversial legal issue. 
Article 3º – They shall not have binding effect: 
I – the fundamentals that, although present in the decision, are not 
determining to reach the conclusion; 
II – the fundamentals that, although determining to the conclusion of the 
decision, have not been adopted or endorsed by the majority of the members 
of the court. 
Article 4º – The determining fundamentals of the interlocutory decision of a 
collegiate court shall have binding effect since they have been adopted or 
endorsed by the majority of the members of the court. 
Article 5º – Binding precedents may not be followed if the supposed bound 
court or judge demonstrates, through rational argument and convincing 
justification, that the case in trial, for specific factual or legal situation, 
deserves a distinguished decision. 
Article 6º – In special circumstances, duly demonstrated and justified, the 
court may revoke its precedents. 
Sole Paragraph - Precedents that have become inconsistent with decisions of 
the Superior Courts, regardless of revocation, shall not be applied any more. 
Article 7º – The court, in the case of revoking its precedent, shall define the 
temporal effects of its decision. The court may limit the retroactive effects of 
its decision or give to it prospective effects, balancing the degree of reliance 
on the revoked precedent and the relevance of an immediate application of 
the decision to the equal treatment of all affected people. 
Article 8º – If a binding precedent is not followed, a “Reclamação” (a 
Constitutional Claim) can be filed before the court that have proffered it (the 
binding precedent).  
§ 1º – The rapporteur of the “Reclamação” may suspend the proceeding of 





§ 2º – The favourable decision in the “Reclamação” shall annul the claimed 
decision, determining that a new decision shall be proffered in compliance 
with the binding precedent.681 
 
 Fourthly, another important factor, linked with both the acceptance of 
precedents by the Legislature and the consensus of opinion amongst the legal 
community, is the acceptance of the judicial law-making by the public opinion. As Rui 
Barbosa stated a long time ago, “the majesty of the courts is based on public 
esteem”.682 Alexandre Moraes, writing on the judicial review of legislation, reminds 
us that “the decisions that contradict the general consensus simply do not 
endure”.683 
 If the recipients of the judicial decisions are both the legal and the lay 
communities, it is very important, for the legitimacy of the judicial law-making, that 
both are able to verify, by efficient tools of law reporting (which Brazil has been 
developing), if the judges and, consequently, the Judiciary as a whole, decide 
impartially and accurately. It is through the motivation of the judicial decisions that 
one can evaluate the exercise of judicial functions.684 Judicial decisions should 
always be well motivated, enabling an easy access to the elements of the reasoning, 
as well as appropriately publicised.685,686 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988, article 
93, IX, actually states that “all judgements of the bodies of the Judicial Power shall 
be public, and all decisions shall be justified, under penalty of nullity, but the law may 
limit attendance, in given acts, to the interested parties and to their lawyers, or only 
to the latter, whenever preservation of the right to privacy of the party interested in 
confidentiality will not harm the right of the public interest to information”. As Rui 
Barbosa also stated, “the authority of justice is moral. And it is maintained by the 
morality of their decisions”.687 
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 On the other hand, the main critique against the arguments of functionality (in 
terms of stability, certainty, equality and a swifter justice, for instance), acceptance 
from the Legislator, legal community consensus and acceptance by the public 
opinion is that the constitutional framework in Brazil, particularly the principle of the 
rational persuasion of the judge (or freedom to interpret law) and the principle of the 
separation of powers, militate against such a form of binding law-making”.688 
 As seen earlier in this chapter (and throughout this thesis), this is not true. 
The establishment of a more comprehensive approach to binding precedent in Brazil 
(for instance, of the Supreme Court’s Súmula Vinculante) do not prevent judges or 
lower courts, although it is not very practical, from departing from an (apparently) 
binding precedent of a higher court or even of the Supreme Court. There are no 
disciplinary sanctions for this. Commonly, the consequence of this is simply to file a 
Reclamação to the Supreme Court in order to provoke it to restore the authority of 
the binding decision.689 
 The doctrine of the separation of powers is also not so strict to the point of 
totally forbidding the exercise, by one of the State’s powers, of a function usually 
attributed to another power. As seen previously, Brazil has currently seen the 
development of a new conception of the principle of the separation of powers, which 
focus on the idea of a sharing of powers.690 Checks and balances mechanisms are 
widely common in Brazil, such as the judicial review of legislation. 
 In the case of the judicial review of legislation specifically, it is very important 
to emphasise that, when challenged to access the constitutionality of statutes, 
Brazilian courts invariably make clear that they are empowered to review the 
constitutionality of existing legislation. For Brazilian judges, what justifies the 
legitimacy of constitutional justice is the idea of complementarity between democracy 
and rule of law. Democracy is government of the majority, based on popular 
sovereignty. The rule of law enshrines the supremacy of constitutional norms, the 
respect for fundamental rights and the jurisdictional control of state powers, not only 
to protect the majority, but also the rights of the minority. Thus, it is absolutely 
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necessary to reconcile the Parliament (which represents the democratic principle 
and the government of the majority) with the constitutional courts (which guarantee 
the rule of law and the rights of the minority).691,692 
 Besides, as Otto Bachof warned us some time ago, it is nonsense to insist in 
affirming that the Judiciary is antidemocratic. The judge is not less linked with the 
people than the other state bodies. The President, Governors of States, Mayors and 
civil servants have only an indirect mandate of the people. Even Parliament cannot 
be considered as directly commissioned, because its deliberations are in fact much 
more connected to the political parties’ arrangements. Furthermore, more important 
than the class of the mandate is the function performed. Judges administer justice on 
behalf of the people – and this is not an empty formula – in the same way that the 
Parliament enacts laws and a government rules on behalf of the people.693 
 Maybe the most important point is that, in truth, the legitimacy of the judicial 
law-making in Brazil comes directly from the Federal Constitution, which expressly 
established several cases of creative and binding precedents. It is enough to cite the 
decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in the centralised judicial review of 
legislation and the Binding Súmula. It is assumed that the “people”, in both moments 
of promulgation and reform of the Federal Constitution, through the exercise of 
Constituent Power, give a mandate to the Judiciary to exercise some degree of law-
making.694  
Finally, as previously stated, the post-positivism (or the neo-constitutionalism) 
in Brazil695 brings into courts issues that were traditionally placed outside the borders 
of the law: politics, several fundamental social rights and, above all, a potential 
transformation of society through or by the law. More than 20 years after the advent 
of the Federal Constitution of 1988, judges in Brazil do not manipulate exclusively 
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individual cases, but also those which, for the massive impact they can have, involve 
a considerable part of the community. This overcomes the idea that attributes the 
abstract and generic treatment of law to the Parliament and confines the judge to the 
solution of concrete and individual cases.696 Based on this neo-constitutionalist 
interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the Brazilian judicial power must give effect 
to the substantive constitutional norms, which protect values such as equality, 
predictability and speed in judicial decisions. Following this desideratum, the 
Brazilian law must adopt mechanisms that improve the performance of the Judiciary 
as a whole. One of the measures to be taken, as previously said, is the adoption of 
effective rules of creative and binding precedents. 
 
6.5 An Epilogue 
 
The question of superiority between the models of civil law and common law 
has long lost its importance.697 The advantages and disadvantages of the common 
law are somewhat symmetrical to those of the civil law. While the former requires the 
adoption of general and abstract rules in order to give a more systematic approach 
to law, the second commonly lacks the binding precedent and the concretism 
provided by the case law to better define the patterns of the conducts regulated by 
statutes and codes.698 
Furthermore, as anticipated in Chapter 1, currently there is no longer a pure 
model. In spite of having different origins, countries related to the tradition of civil law 
and countries connected to the tradition of common law have had innumerable 
contacts with one another over the centuries. From the perspective of common law 
countries, the importance of statutes has constantly increased. As MacCormick 
points out, in more recent times, even in common law legal systems, it is very difficult 
to find a pure case law. Much of the case law takes the form of interpretation 
(glosses) of the statute law.699 Conversely, even in the continental European law, the 
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fundamental role of precedents and their creative character are largely 
recognised.700 Currently, there is nothing more equivocal than to imagine that judges 
are only bound to statutes in legal systems related to the tradition of civil law or that 
they only rely on precedents in systems that belong to the common law. Many areas 
of law in the legal systems of both traditions are shaped by the Parliament, and in all 
of these legal systems, in a greater or lesser degree, judges also rely on 
precedents.701 
The Brazilian case was presented here as a good example of a legal system 
that, historically built under a civil law perspective, has turned to a more 
comprehensive approach to precedents. In order to have more stability, legal 
certainty, equality and speed in judicial decisions, Brazilian law has adopted a new 
approach to binding precedents, which culminated with the creation of the new 
Binding Súmula of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. Progressively, it is believed, 
Brazil will become a new example of a mixed system or what might be known as a 
country related to this ‘new’ Western legal family. 
Reflecting the purposes presented in the introductory chapter, it was possible, 
by conceptualism and comparative law working together, to achieve a taxonomy of 
the theory of precedents in Brazil that is clearly concerned with: (i) its inner harmony 
and coherence;702 (ii) the harmony and coherence with the legal system that it is 
related to – the Brazilian system; (iii) and the similarities and differences between 
common law and civil law traditions. Certainly, a systematisation of this kind can be 
very valuable because it may be a potent tool in breaking down the barriers of 
mutual ignorance which sometimes split common and civil lawyers.703,704 
Finally, this thesis does not have the intention of demonstrating that the 
Brazilian model of precedents is superior to any other model of precedents and, 
therefore, recommending any kind of radical transplant. This thesis sought to 
demonstrate that the Brazilian mix of civil and common law elements – a very 
synergic one, in which the positive aspects have overthrown the potential problems – 
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can play a role in the development of the theory of precedents in both civil and 
common law legal worlds. As Brazil has been one of the fastest growing countries in 
terms of economic and political development over the last few years, it can be used 
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Appendix I - The Brazilian Judicial System: an Overview 
 
 
Some words about the organization of the Brazilian judicial system should 
certainly be useful (maybe necessary) for a better understanding of this thesis. First 
of all, the entire Brazilian legal system is covered by the Federal Constitution of 
1988, the fundamental law of Brazil. Up until April 2012, there have been 76 
amendments to the Federal Constitution. One of them is the Constitutional 
Amendment 45/2004, known as “the Reform of the Judiciary”, which implemented 
profound changes in the chapter of the Constitution related to the Judicial Power. 
The Federal Constitution, article 92, with the new text given by Constitutional 
Amendment 45, states that the following are the bodies of the Brazilian Judicial 
Power: “I - the Federal Supreme Court; I-A – the National Council of Justice; II – the 
Superior Court of Justice; III – the Federal Regional Courts and the Federal Judges; 
IV – the Labour Courts and Judges; V – the Electoral Courts and Judges; VI – the 
Military Courts and Judges; VII – the Courts and Judges of the states, of the Federal 
District and of the territories”. The Federal Supreme Court, the National Council of 
Justice and the Superior Courts have their seat in the Federal Capital (Brasília) and 
jurisdiction over the entire Brazilian territory. 
The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court in Brazil. According to article 
101 of the Constitution, it is composed of eleven Justices (“Ministros”), chosen from 
among citizens over thirty-five and under sixty-five years of age, of notable juridical 
knowledge and spotless reputation. The Justices of the Federal Supreme Court shall 
be appointed by the President of the Republic, after their nomination has been 
approved by the absolute majority of the Federal Senate. Once in office, a Justice 
will only forfeit the position by resignation, compulsory retirement (at 70 years old) or 
impeachment. Periodically, one of the Justices is elected to be the Chief Justice for a 
mandate of two years (as a rule in all Brazilian courts, it will be the most senior 
Justice that has not yet occupied the post). According to article 109 of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the 
Constitution, which includes the protection of the political system and the civil 
liberties. It is within its competence, for instance, the trial of the direct actions of 





extraordinary appeal, cases decided in a sole or last instance, when the decision 
appealed is contrary to a provision of the Constitution706. Thus, in Brazilian 
constitutional law, the Federal Supreme Court is also a kind of “Constitutional Court”. 
Generally, the Federal Supreme Court deals only with issues of law, both procedural 
and substantive, and not with issues of fact. The court acts by its Full Bench (called 
“Plenary”), its two Panels, its Presidency or a Justice monocratically. The function 
performed by the Federal Supreme Court inside the Brazilian System, as shown 
throughout this thesis, has become more and more important in the last years 
because of the (new) general bindingness attributed to some of its precedents. 
Considering the non-specialised courts of the Brazilian Judicial Power, in a 
degree immediately below the Federal Supreme Court comes the Superior Court of 
Justice, which is essentially responsible for the uniformity of the interpretation of the 
federal law707. It is a national court, dealing with cases linked with both the non-
specialised federal courts and the states courts. According to article 104 of the 
Constitution, the Superior Court of Justice is composed of a minimum of thirty three 
Justices (and currently, it is actually its number). The Justices shall be appointed by 
the President of the Republic chosen from among Brazilians over thirty-five and 
under sixty-five years of age, of notable juridical knowledge and spotless reputation, 
after the nomination has been approved by the absolute majority of the Federal 
Senate708. Among other duties, it has the jurisdiction to judge, on special appeal, the 
cases decided, in a sole or last instance, by the Federal Regional Courts or by the 
Courts of Appeal of the states, of the Federal District and the Territories, when the 
decision appealed is contrary to a federal law (or denies its effectiveness), considers 
valid an act of a local government challenged in the light of a federal law or confers 
upon a federal law an interpretation different from that which has been conferred 
                                                 
706
 As civil and criminal court of last resort, the Federal Supreme Court has other very important 
duties, which are not directly linked with the judicial review of legislation. For instance, it is its duty to 
judge, in common criminal offenses, the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, the members 
of the National Congress, its own Justices and the General-Prosecutor of the Republic, and the 
lawsuits against the National Council of Justice and against the National Council of the Public 
Prosecution. 
707
 See Barroso, Luis Roberto. Constitutional Law. In Deffenti, Fabiano and Barral, Welber (eds). 
Introduction to Brazilian Law (Alphen aan den Rijn/The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 
p. 24.  
708
 One-third of the Justices shall be chosen from among judges of the Federal Regional Courts and 
one-third from among judges of the State Courts of Justice. One-third, in equal parts, shall be chosen 





upon it by another court. Generally, the Superior Court of Justice deals only with 
issues of law, both procedural and substantive. The Superior Court of Justice is also 
frequently a court of last resort. Its judgments may be revised by the Federal 
Supreme Court, but basically on constitutional grounds. 
As a federation, Brazil has an entire system of non-specialised federal courts.  
According to article 106 of the Constitution, it comprises the Federal Regional Courts 
and the Federal Judges (filling the several courts of first instance in all states of the 
federation). Currently, Brazil has five Federal Regional Courts and about 1500 
federal judges. Among others duties, the federal courts have jurisdiction over civil 
cases in which the Union, an autonomous federal government agency or a federal 
public company have an interest as plaintiffs, defendants or interveners, as well as 
criminal offenses committed against the assets, services or an interest of the Union 
or of its autonomous agencies or public companies. The Federal Courts have a 
subsystem of Small Claims Courts. The subsystem is composed by several single 
courts, at least one appellate panel per state and one higher panel for a national 
standardisation of the law (seated in Brasilia/Federal District). The Federal Small 
Claims Courts deal with disputes of a monetary value of up to 60 minimum wages709, 
criminal offenses of lower offensive potential and other cases of small complexity, by 
simpler rules and procedures. It is mainly regulated by Law 10259/2002. 
  The Constitution also establishes a system of Labour Courts, which are 
responsible for individual and collective lawsuits related to employment relation 
disputes. According to article 111 of the Constitution, the system is composed by the 
Superior Labour Court, the Regional Labour Courts and Labour Judges. The 
Superior Labour Court is composed of twenty-seven Justices, chosen from among 
Brazilians over thirty-five and under sixty-five years of age, appointed by the 
President of the Republic after approval by the absolute majority of the Federal 
Senate710. Currently, each state of the federation has one Regional Labour Courts. 
The system of Electoral Courts, according article 118 of the Constitution, is 
composed by the Superior Electoral Court, the Regional Electoral Courts, the 
Electoral Judges and the Electoral Boards. The Superior Electoral Court is 
                                                 
709
 In Brazil, a national minimum wage per calendar month is established annually. 
710
 One-fifth of them are chosen among lawyers and among members of the Labour Public 






composed of seven members. Three of them are Justices of the Federal Supreme 
Court and two are Justices of the Superior Court of Justice. The others two members 
are appointed by the President of the Republic among six lawyers of notable juridical 
knowledge and spotless reputation nominated by the Federal Supreme Court. There 
is a Regional Electoral Court in each capital of state and in the Federal District. 
There is also the system of (Federal) Military Courts. According to article 122 
of the Constitution, it is composed by the Superior Military Court and the Military 
Courts and Judges instituted by law. The Superior Military Court is composed of 
fifteen life Justices, appointed by the President of the Republic, after their nomination 
has been approved by the Federal Senate711. Basically, the Military Courts have the 
competence to carry out the trial of military crimes as defined by law. 
Finally, according to article 125 of the Constitution, all states should have their 
own judicial systems, observing the principles established in the Constitution. Some 
rules of competence of the state courts are defined in the Constitutions of the states 
and the respective law of judicial organization. The 27 state systems (26 states plus 
the Federal District) are composed by one Appellate Court of Justice (“Tribunal de 
Justiça”) and several courts of first instance (filled by single judges)712. All the state 
systems have a subsystem of Small Claims Courts. Several single courts, some 
appellate panels and a panel for the standardisation of the case law compose these 
subsystems. The Small Claims Courts deal with disputes of a monetary value of up 
to 40 minimum wages, criminal offenses of lower offensive potential and other cases 
of small complexity, by simpler rules and procedures. It is mainly regulated by Law 
9099/1995. 
The Brazilian Judicial System can be also classified in two more different 
ways. It can be divided into “federal courts” (including the Federal Courts in a strict 
sense, the Labour Courts, the Electoral Courts and the Military Courts) and “state 
courts”. It can also be divided into “non-specialised courts” (the Federal Courts in a 
strict sense and the State Courts) and “specialised courts” (the Labour Courts, the 
                                                 
711
 Ten of the Justices should be chosen from among General officers of the Navy, the Army and Air 
Force (all of them in active service and in the highest rank of the career) and five from among civilians 
(article 123 of the Constitution).  
712
 According to § 3ª of article 125 of the Federal Constitution, by proposal of the Appellate Courts of 
Justice, a state law may create a State Military Justice, constituted, at first instance, by judges and by 
the Councils of Justice and, at second instance, by the Court of Justice itself, or by the Court of 






Electoral Courts and the Military Courts). It is important to notice that the Superior 
Court of Justice, as a “national” court, is placed above and outside both systems of 
non-specialised courts (Federal Courts and State Courts). And the Federal Supreme 
Court is place above (and outside) all systems and courts. 
Apart from the labour courts (which deal only with civil labour matters), all 
other courts perform both civil and criminal functions. Certainly, in collegiate courts 
there are chambers or panels dealing only with civil cases, and other chambers or 
panels dealing only with criminal matters. In big cities also, where there are several 
single judges of first instance, some of them deal only with civil cases, and others 
deal only with criminal issues. 
It is also very important to highlight that in Brazil all legislation and judicial 
decisions must conform to the Federal Constitution. This includes the State’s 
Constitutions and “Organic Laws” of the Federal District and the Municipalities. The 
Judicial Power, headed by the Federal Supreme Court, is in charge of the control of 
the constitutionality of the legislation and other juridical acts. Judges should act as 
instruments for the defence of Constitution. As shown throughout this thesis, 
currently, under the Constitution of 1988, Brazil adopts the two main models of 
judicial review of legislation: the decentralised, as in the American model, and 
centralised713, the model developed in continental Europe. 
Constitutional Amendment 45 created the new National Council of Justice 
(“Conselho Nacional de Justica” or “CNJ”). Placed in the Federal Capital, according 
to article 103-B of the Constitution, it is composed by fifteen members with more 
than thirty-five and less than sixty-six years of age, with a term of two years (one re-
conduction admitted), and headed by the president of the Federal Supreme Court. 
They are given office by the President of the Republic, after the appointments are 
approved by the absolute majority of the Federal Senate714. The Council is 
                                                 
713
 This concentrated judicial review is operated in Brazil through direct actions. The two most 
important actions, which are presented before the Federal Supreme Court, are: the direct action of 
unconstitutionality of a federal or state law or normative act (Federal Constitution, article 102, I, “a”, 
first part) and the declaratory action of constitutionality of a federal law or normative acts (article 102, 
I, “a”, second part). The decisions pronounced by the Federal Supreme Court in these actions have a 
binding effect as regards to the other courts of the judicial branch and the administration as a whole. 
714
 The composition is very plural, necessarily representing the several careers linked with the 
administration of the justice in Brazil: (i) one Justice from the Federal Supreme Court, appointed by 
the respective Court; (ii) one Justice from the Superior Court of Justice, appointed by the respective 
Court; (iii) one Justice from the Superior Labour Court, appointed by the respective Court; (iv) one 
senior judge (desembargador) from a State Appellate Court (Tribunal de Justica dos Estados), 





responsible, essentially, for a complementary administrative and correctional control 
of the Judiciary Power. It is its prerogative, for instance, the control of some 
administrative and financial acts of the Judiciary and of the fulfilment of functional 
duties by the Judges. Apart from the fact that the General Prosecutor of the Republic 
and the President of the Brazilian BAR Association shall officiate before the Council, 
the Constitution also assures the right for any citizen to denounce directly to it a 
misconduct of any judge, body or auxiliary service of the Judiciary715. 
The Constitution grants the Judicial Power’s independence with respect to the 
other Powers of the Republic. According article 99 of the Constitution, the Judicial 
Power is ensured of administrative and financial autonomy. As a general rule (see 
article 96 of the Constitution), the Brazilian courts elect their directive bodies and to 
draw up their internal regulations (in compliance with the rules of the Brazilian 
procedural legislation), they propose the creation of new courts of first instance and 
they fill offices of career judges under the general terms of the Constitution.  
The method of recruitment of judges adopted in Brazil seeks to conform to the 
role that judges are expected to perform in the Brazilian Constitutional framework. It 
encapsulates both the ideas of independence and efficiency in the profession. Unlike 
England (whose judges are selected from the ranks of barristers), the Brazilian 
judiciary is a completely independent career. Basically, the recruitment for all the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court; (vi) one senior federal judge from a Regional Federal Court, appointed by the Superior Court of 
Justice; (vii) one federal judge, appointed by the Superior Court of Justice; (viii) one senior judge from 
a Regional Labour Court, appointed by the Superior Labour Court; (ix) one labour judge, appointed by 
the Superior Labour Court; (x) one member from the Federal Public Prosecution Service, appointed 
by the General Prosecutor of the Republic; (xi) one member of the States’ Public Prosecution 
Services, chosen by the General Prosecutor of the Republic among the names appointed by the 
competent body of each State institution; (xii) two lawyers, appointed by the Federal Council of the 
Brazilian BAR Association; (xiii) two citizens, of notable juridical learning and irreproachable 
reputation, one appointed by the House of Representatives and other by the Federal Senate. 
715
 Besides other prerogatives determined by the Organic Law of the Judicature (Complementary Law 
35/1979), the National Council of Justice shall to (i): to zeal for the autonomy of the Judiciary Power 
and for the observance of the Organic Law of the Judicature; (ii) to zeal for the legality of 
administrative acts performed by members or bodies of the Judiciary Power, with powers to annul 
them, alter them or fix terms for the adoption of the measures necessaries to the exact obedience of 
law, without prejudice of the competences of the Court of Accounts of the Union; (iii) to hear of and 
examine the complaints against members or bodies of the Judiciary, including those against their 
auxiliary services, without prejudice of the correctional and disciplinary competences of the courts, 
with powers to avocate current disciplinary cases and to determine the reallocation or the retirement 
with remuneration proportional to time in office as well as apply other administrative sanctions, ample 
defence being ensured; (iv) to rectify, by own initiative or when provoked, the disciplinary cases 
involving judges with less than one year of judgment; (vii) to prepare annual report, with proposals of 
the measures deemed as necessaries, about the status of the Judiciary in the country and the 
activities of the Council, which shall be part of the message by the President of the Supreme Federal 





judges of first instance in Brazil is managed by competitive entrance examinations. 
This method of recruitment bases on the academic qualification and aptitude of the 
would-be judges716, rather than the merits of their professional background. This can 
be clearly contrasted with the English method that gives decisive value to the 
professional experience. The competitive entrance examinations are open to 
candidates that have completed a period of three years of experience as advocates 
after successful completion of the first degree in law. Entrance examinations consist 
of written papers, oral test and a final evaluation of the candidate’s titles 
(publications, previous professional experiences, among others). After the 
examinations and the actual selection, there is a training period that follows a 
specific programme of studies. It is both theoretical and practical, but with a clear 
emphasis placed on the challenges that the new judges will find in their careers717. 
According to article 93 of the Constitution, the promotions from level to level of the 
career are based on seniority and merit, observing the general rules established by 
the Constitution itself. As a rule, access to the appellate courts shall also obey 
seniority and merit. The number of judges in Brazil consisted, at the end of 2010, of 
16,804 (considering the Federal, Labour and State Courts), about 9 judges per group 
of 100,000 inhabitants718. There is a compulsory retirement for all judges at the age 
of 70. 
Judges in Brazil enjoy the guarantees of life tenure and irremovability and 
their salaries can never be reduced. But they are forbidden: to hold another office or 
position, except for a teaching position; to receive, on any account or for any reason, 
court costs or participation in a lawsuit; to engage in political or party activities; to 
receive, on any account or for any reason, financial aid or contribution from 
individuals, and from public or private institutions, save for the exceptions set forth in 
law; and to practice law in the court or tribunal on which they served as judges, for a 
                                                 
716
 Consisting in large part of young, as in Brazil a first degree in law is generally finished at an 
average age of 23, high qualified male and female. 
717
 In Brazil, as seen previously, the Constitution determines that at the higher levels judges/justices 
shall be appointed by the Executive Power (with the agreement of the Parliament). In this case, 
political influence still is decisive. This influence can undermine the idea of high standards of quality to 
be expected from an appointed high ranked judge. But it must be pointed out that these “political” 
appointments represent a small percentage (less than 2%, certainly) of the total number of posts of 
judges. 
718
 See Conselho Nacional de Justiça - CNJ. Justice in Numbers 2010 - Indicators of the Judiciary 
Power - Overview of the Brazilian Judiciary Power - Executive Summary (Brasília, Conselho Nacional 





period of three years following their retirement or discharge (article 95 of the 
Constitution). These rights and duties are justified by the need to safeguard the 
independence of the Judiciary. 
The Federal Constitution also considers some legal functions essential to the 
deliverance of justice. The first of them is the Public Prosecution Service. According 
to article 128 of the Constitution, the Public Prosecution Service in Brazil comprises: 
I – the Public Prosecution of the Union, which includes the Federal Public 
Prosecution, the Labour Public Prosecution, the Military Public Prosecution and the 
Public Prosecution of the Federal District and the Territories; II – the Public 
Prosecutions of the states. The head of the Public Prosecution of the Union is the 
General Prosecutor of the Republic719, appointed by the President of the Republic 
from among career members over thirty-five years of age, after his name has been 
approved by the absolute majority of the members of the Federal Senate, for a term 
of office of two years (reappointment being allowed)720. The Public Prosecution is 
ensured of functional and administrative autonomy, and it may propose to the 
Legislative Power the creation and abolishment of its offices and auxiliary services, 
filling them, as happens in the Judicial Power, through competitive entrance 
examinations. Its duty is to defend the juridical order, the democratic regime and the 
inalienable social and individual interests (article 127). According to article 129 of the 
Constitution, the following are some of the specific functions of the Public 
Prosecution Service: to initiate public criminal prosecution, under the terms of the 
law; to ensure effective respect by the Public Authorities and by the services of 
public relevance for the rights guaranteed in the Constitution; to institute civil 
investigation and public civil suit to protect public and social property, the 
environment and other decentralised and collective interests; to exercise external 
control over police activities; and to request investigatory procedures and the 
institution of police investigation721. 
                                                 
719
 In Portuguese, it is called “Procurador-Geral da República”, which is sometimes translated into 
English as “Attorney-General of the Republic”. 
720
 There is also a National Council of the Public Prosecution, headed by the General Prosecutor of 
the Republic, whose plural composition and duties are similar to those of the National Council of 
Justice (see article 130-A of the Constitution). 
721
 To fulfil their duties appropriately, prosecutors also have guarantees and prohibitions similar to 





The Constitution (article 134) also establishes the Public Legal Defence, an 
essential institution to the jurisdictional function of the State, which is responsible for 
the judicial guidance and the defence of the needy. The Federal Union and all states 
have their respective Public Legal Defence services. 
There is also in Brazil a very organized public advocacy. The Advocacy-
General of the Union, for instance, represents the Union judicially and is responsible 
for the activities of judicial consultation and assistance to the Executive Power 
(article 131 of the Constitution). It is headed by the Advocate-General of the Union. 
All states have also the respective agencies to represent them judicially. 
Concerning the legal advocacy in general, the article 133 of the Constitution 
states the lawyer is indispensable to the administration of justice. This legal 
profession is organised (and supervised) nationally under the Brazilian BAR 
Association (“OAB”). The BAR Association is also present in each state of the 


















Appendix II – List of the Statements of the Federal 






Súmula Vinculante 1 
Ofende a garantia constitucional do ato jurídico perfeito a decisão que, sem 
ponderar as circunstâncias do caso concreto, desconsidera a validez e a eficácia de 
acordo constante de termo de adesão instituído pela Lei Complementar nº 
110/2001. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 31 de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
DJ de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
DOU de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, XXXVI. 




RE 427801 AgR-ED 
RE 431363 AgR 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 2 
É inconstitucional a lei ou ato normativo estadual ou distrital que disponha sobre 
sistemas de consórcios e sorteios, inclusive bingos e loterias. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 31 de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
DJ de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
DOU de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 









                                                 
722
 See Supremo Tribunal Federal. Enunciados da Súmula vinculante 1 a 29, 31 e 32. 









Súmula Vinculante 3  
Nos processos perante o Tribunal de Contas da União asseguram-se o contraditório 
e a ampla defesa quando da decisão puder resultar anulação ou revogação de ato 
administrativo que beneficie o interessado, excetuada a apreciação da legalidade do 
ato de concessão inicial de aposentadoria, reforma e pensão. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 31 de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
DJ de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
DOU de 6/6/2007, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, LIV e LV; art. 71, III. 









Súmula Vinculante 4 
Salvo nos casos previstos na Constituição, o salário mínimo não pode ser usado 
como indexador de base de cálculo de vantagem de servidor público ou de 
empregado, nem ser substituído por decisão judicial. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 83 de 9/5/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 9/5/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 7º, IV e XXIII; art. 39, § 1º e § 3º; art. 42, § 1º; art. 












Súmula Vinculante 5  
A falta de defesa técnica por advogado no processo administrativo disciplinar não 






Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 88 de 16/5/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 16/5/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 




AI 207197 AgR 




Súmula Vinculante 6 
Não viola a Constituição o estabelecimento de remuneração inferior ao salário 
mínimo para as praças prestadoras de serviço militar inicial. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 88 de 16/5/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 16/5/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 1º, III; art. 5º, “caput”; art. 7º, IV; art. 142, § 3º, 
VIII, (redação  
dada pela Emenda Constitucional 18/1998); art. 143, “caput”, § 1º e  § 2º. 

















Súmula Vinculante 7 
A norma do §3º do artigo 192 da Constituição, revogada pela Emenda 
Constitucional nº 40/2003, que limitava a taxa de juros reais a 12% ao ano, tinha 
sua aplicação condicionada à edição de lei complementar. 
 





DJe nº 112 de 20/6/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 20/6/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 











AI 187925 AgR 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 8 
São inconstitucionais o parágrafo único do artigo 5º do Decreto-Lei nº 1.569/1977 e 
os artigos 45 e 46 da Lei nº 8.212/1991, que tratam de prescrição e decadência de 
crédito tributário. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 112 de 20/6/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 20/6/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 146, III. 
Decreto-Lei 1.569/1977, art. 5º, parágrafo único. 











Súmula Vinculante 9 
O disposto no artigo 127 da Lei nº 7.210/1984 (Lei de Execução Penal) foi recebido 
pela ordem constitucional vigente, e não se lhe aplica o limite temporal previsto no 
caput do artigo 58. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 112 de 20/6/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 20/6/2008, p. 1. 





DOU de 27/6/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, XXXVI e XLVI. 





AI 570188 AgR-ED 
HC 92791 
HC 90107 
AI 580259 AgR 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 10 
Viola a cláusula de reserva de plenário (CF, artigo 97) a decisão de órgão 
fracionário de tribunal que, embora não declare expressamente a 
inconstitucionalidade de lei ou ato normativo do poder público, afasta sua incidência, 
no todo ou em parte. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 117 de 27/6/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 27/6/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 







AI 472897 AgR 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 11  
Só é lícito o uso de algemas em casos de resistência e de fundado receio de fuga 
ou de perigo à integridade física própria ou alheia, por parte do preso ou de 
terceiros, justificada a excepcionalidade por escrito, sob pena de responsabilidade 
disciplinar, civil e penal do agente ou da autoridade e de nulidade da prisão ou do 
ato processual a que se refere, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade civil do Estado. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 157 de 22/8/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 22/8/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 1º, III; art. 5º, III, X e XLIX. 





Código de Processo Penal de 1941, art. 284. 
Código de Processo Penal Militar de 1969, art. 234, § 1º. 









Súmula Vinculante 12 
A cobrança de taxa de matrícula nas universidades públicas viola o disposto no art. 
206, IV, da Constituição Federal. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 157 de 22/8/2008, p. 1. 
DOU de 22/8/2008, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 













RE 542646  
 RE 562779 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 13 
A nomeação de cônjuge, companheiro ou parente em linha reta, colateral ou por 
afinidade, até o terceiro grau, inclusive, da autoridade nomeante ou de servidor da 
mesma pessoa jurídica investido em cargo de direção, chefia ou assessoramento, 
para o exercício de cargo em comissão ou de confiança ou, ainda, de função 
gratificada na administração pública direta e indireta em qualquer dos Poderes da 
União, dos Estados, do Distrito Federal e dos Municípios, compreendido o ajuste 
mediante designações recíprocas, viola a Constituição Federal. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 162 de 29/8/2008, p. 1. 







Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 37, “caput”. 
 
Precedentes 
ADI 1521 MC 
MS 23780 





Súmula Vinculante 14 
É direito do defensor, no interesse do representado, ter acesso amplo aos 
elementos de prova que, já documentados em procedimento investigatório realizado 
por órgão com competência de polícia judiciária, digam respeito ao exercício do 
direito de defesa. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 26 de 9/2/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 9/2/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 1º, III; art. 5º, XXXIII, LIV e LV. 
Código de Processo Penal de 1941, art. 9º e art. 10. 












Súmula Vinculante 15 
O cálculo de gratificações e outras vantagens do servidor público não incide sobre o 
abono utilizado para se atingir o salário mínimo. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 121 de 1º/7/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 1º/7/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 7º, IV. 
 
Precedentes 
RE 439360 AgR 





RE 548983 AgR 
RE 512845 AgR 
RE 490879 AgR 
RE 474381 AgR 
RE 436368 AgR 
RE 572921 RG-QO 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 16 
Os artigos 7º, IV, e 39, § 3º (redação da EC 19/98), da Constituição, referem-se ao 
total da  
remuneração percebida pelo servidor público. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 121 de 1º/7/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 1º/7/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 7º, IV; art. 39, § 2º (redação anterior à Emenda 
Constitucional  





RE 265129  
AI 492967 AgR 
AI 601522 AgR 
RE 582019 RG-QO 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 17 
Durante o período previsto no parágrafo 1º do artigo 100 da Constituição, não 
incidem juros de mora sobre os precatórios que nele sejam pagos. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 210 de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 100, § 1º (redação dada pela Emenda 
Constitucional 30/2000). 




RE 591085 RG-QO 
RE 298616 
RE 305186 





RE 393737 AgR 
RE 589345 




Súmula Vinculante 18 
A dissolução da sociedade ou do vínculo conjugal, no curso do mandato, não afasta 
a inelegibilidade prevista no § 7º do artigo 14 da Constituição Federal. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 210 de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 14, § 1º (redação dada pela Emenda 






RE 446999  
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 19 
A taxa cobrada exclusivamente em razão dos serviços públicos de coleta, remoção 
e tratamento ou destinação de lixo ou resíduos provenientes de imóveis, não viola o 
artigo 145, II, da Constituição Federal. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 210 de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 145, II. 
 
Precedentes 
RE 576321 RG-QO 
RE 256588 ED-EDv 
AI 476945 AgR 
AI 460195 AgR 
RE 440992 AgR 
AI 481619 AgR 
AI 684607 AgR 
RE 273074 AgR 
RE 532940 AgR 
RE 411251 AgR 
RE 481713 AgR 





AI 457972 AgR 
RE 393331 AgR 
AI 459051 AgR 




Súmula Vinculante 20 
A Gratificação de Desempenho de Atividade Técnico-Administrativa – GDATA, 
instituída pela Lei nº 10.404/2002, deve ser deferida aos inativos nos valores 
correspondentes a 37,5 (trinta e sete vírgula cinco) pontos no período de fevereiro a 
maio de 2002 e, nos termos do artigo 5º, parágrafo único, da Lei nº 10.404/2002, no 
período de junho de 2002 até a conclusão dos efeitos do último ciclo de avaliação a 
que se refere o artigo 1º da Medida Provisória no 198/2004, a partir da qual passa a 
ser de 60 (sessenta) pontos. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 210 de 10/11/2009, p. 1.  
DOU de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 






RE 597154 RG-QO 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 21 
É inconstitucional a exigência de depósito ou arrolamento prévios de dinheiro ou 
bens para admissibilidade de recurso administrativo. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 210 de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 10/11/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 






AI 398933 AgR 
AI 408914 AgR 
ADI 1976 
AI 698626 RG-QO 





AI 431017 AgR 
RE 504288 AgR 
AC 1887 MC 






Súmula Vinculante 22 
A Justiça do Trabalho é competente para processar e julgar as ações de 
indenização por danos morais e patrimoniais decorrentes de acidente de trabalho 
propostas por empregado contra  empregador, inclusive aquelas que ainda não 
possuíam sentença de mérito em primeiro grau quando da promulgação da Emenda 
Constitucional no 45/04. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 232 de 11/12/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 11/12/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 




AI 529763 AgR-ED 
AI 540190 AgR 
AC 822 MC 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 23 
A Justiça do Trabalho é competente para processar e julgar ação possessória 
ajuizada em decorrência do exercício do direito de greve pelos trabalhadores da 
iniciativa privada. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 232 de 11/12/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 11/12/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
















Súmula Vinculante 24 
Não se tipifica crime material contra a ordem tributária, previsto no art. 1o, incisos I a 
IV, da Lei no 8.137/90, antes do lançamento definitivo do tributo.  
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 232 de 11/12/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 11/12/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, LV; art. 129, I. 
Código Penal de 1940, art. 14, I; art. 111, I. 
Código Tributário Nacional de 1966, art. 142, "caput". 
Lei 8.137/1990, art. 1º, I, II, III e IV. 
Lei 9.430/1996, art. 83.  











Súmula Vinculante 25 
É ilícita a prisão civil de depositário infiel, qualquer que seja a modalidade do 
depósito. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 238 de 23/12/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 23/12/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, LXVII e § 2º. 
Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos (Pacto de S. José da Costa Rica), 
art. 7º, § 7º. 
Pacto Internacional sobre Direitos Civis e Políticos, art. 11. 
 
Precedentes 














HC 95170 MC 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 26 
Para efeito de progressão de regime no cumprimento de pena por crime hediondo, 
ou equiparado, o juízo da execução observará a inconstitucionalidade do art. 2º da 
Lei n. 8.072, de 25 de julho de 1990, sem prejuízo de avaliar se o condenado 
preenche, ou não, os requisitos objetivos e subjetivos do benefício, podendo 
determinar, para tal fim, de modo fundamentado, a realização de exame 
criminológico. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 238 de 23/12/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 23/12/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, XLVI, XLVII. 
Código Penal de 1940, art. 33, § 3º; art. 59. 
Lei 7.210/1984, art. 66, III, "b". 




AI 504022 EDv-AgR 
AI 460085 EDv-AgR 
AI 559900 EDv-AgR 
HC 90262 






Súmula Vinculante 27 
Compete à Justiça estadual julgar causas entre consumidor e concessionária de 
serviço público de telefonia, quando a ANATEL não seja litisconsorte passiva 
necessária, assistente, nem opoente. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 238 de 23/12/2009, p. 1. 
DOU de 23/12/2009, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 









AI 607035 AgR 
AI 600608 AgR 
AI 631223 AgR 
AI 662330 AgR 
RE 549740 AgR 
RE 525852 AgR 
RE 540494 AgR 
AI 657780 AgR 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 28 
É inconstitucional a exigência de depósito prévio como requisito de admissibilidade 
de ação judicial na qual se pretenda discutir a exigibilidade de crédito tributário. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 28 de 17/2/2010, p. 1. 
DOU de 17/2/2010, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5º, XXXV, LV. 






Súmula Vinculante 29 
É constitucional a adoção, no cálculo do valor de taxa, de um ou mais elementos da 
base de cálculo própria de determinado imposto, desde que não haja integral 
identidade entre uma base e outra. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 28 de 17/2/2010, p. 1. 
DOU de 17/2/2010, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 145, § 2º. 
 
Precedentes 
RE 576321 RG-QO 
RE 232393 
RE 177835 
AI 441038 AgR 
RE 346695 AgR  
RE 241790 
ADI 1926 MC 








Súmula Vinculante 31 
É inconstitucional a incidência do Imposto sobre Serviços de Qualquer Natureza  – 
ISS sobre operações de locação de bens móveis. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 28 de 17/2/2010, p. 1. 
DOU de 17/2/2010, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Código Tributário Nacional de 1966, art. 71, § 1º; art. 97, I e III. 
Decreto-lei 406/1968, art. 8º e item 79. 




RE 455613 AgR 
RE 553223 AgR 
RE 465456 AgR 
RE 450120 AgR 
RE 446003 AgR 
AI 543317 AgR 
AI 551336 AgR 
AI 546588 AgR 
 
 
Súmula Vinculante 32 
O ICMS não incide sobre alienação de salvados de sinistro pelas seguradoras. 
 
Fonte de Publicação 
DJe nº 37 de 24/2/2011, p. 1. 
DOU de 24/2/2011, p. 1. 
 
Legislação 
Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 22, VII; art. 153, V. 
 
Precedentes 
ADI 1390 MC 
ADI 1332 MC  
ADI 1648 
RE 588149 
